The Forrest Issue, Redux

Well, I can’t say much about Forrest except that your guy Sherman wanted to bankrupt the Treasury if that’s what it took to get him. I would say that’s the opinion by a military man on the ground at the time rather than armchair generals looking at ‘the big picture’ many years later! I really don’t know how you can just ‘disregard’ Sherman’s opinion unless you don’t think much of Sherman as a general.

Oh, and though you say, ‘don’t go there’, I would like to point out that what Sherman believed about Forrest, Grant, Hancock, Sheridan, Augur and Halleck seemed to believe about ‘you know who’. Again, I should think that the opinions of those who were there and dealing with both men and their commands must carry more weight than those who are mere spectators from a long way away.

Just my opinion, of course! 😀

We had this same discussion at our RT meeting Wed., specifically that NBF was very overrated. Wish you would have been there to back my argument. I replied that he was:

A mounted infantry general who was only able to fight dismounted.
Not effective in the traditional cav duties such as recon
A horrible subordinate only good for independent command since he wouldn’t take orders.

I did get a rebuttal from a gentleman who played the Shelby Foote card. My reply was “Shelby Foote didn’t use footnotes.” 🙂

Mike

Eric:

Years ago in Georgia I taught an undergraduate who actually had Forrest’s face tattooed on his shoulder. When I asked him why, he read me the text of his Dixie Outfitter’s Forrest T-shirt. That seemed to be the depth of his knowledge.

Ken

Matt wrote:

It seems OK to me, but Forrest is well regarded by the well regarded for his military skill.

Matt,

Please forgive my ignorance, but who are the “well regarded?”

Mike

Ray,

Good point!

I am of the belief that NBF is the poster child for the “Lost Cause” doctrine –hard fighter, guerilla warrior, slave trader, KKK member, rose from private to general, endorsed by Shelby Foote, etc.

I think there’s a lot more legend/myth than substance where Forrest is concerned.

Mike

Blame Shelby Foote. 🙂

Regards,
Cash

I take Sherman’s words VERY seriously as his actions validated them – which I why I feel as I do about Sherman! Grant was known to say things when angry and then upon reconsideration come to regret their overly harsh nature, but I don’t believe that Sherman ever changed his mind – OR his tactics. He believed by his own words that death was the only “cure” for either a secessionist or an Indian and he didn’t much care whether the target was old or young, male or female, soldier or civilian. Indeed, I distinctly remember reading one author writing from a UNION perspective who noted with considerable alarm that Sherman’s letters could have been written by Adolf Eichmann. Having read at least SOME of the man’s diatribes, I tend to agree.

Other than Geronimo, Forrest was perhaps the greatest palefaced partisan horseman in the history of North American warfare.
Mosby couldn’t carry his jockstrap.

But neither Forrest nor Mosby could hold a candle to Murat and the old school.
I’d say Wheeler flunked out of that school too.

As far as non-West Point trained cavalrymen go, I think Wade Hampton would be considered the anti-Forrest.
For me, this thing boils down to conventional vs. unconventional.

It’s difficult to firmly categorize the multifaceted talents of Forrest, which, in turn, as I see it, makes it difficult to compare him to his “peers”.

Didn’t the guy kill a panther when he was just a kid?
Stan

Mike,

I wrote “non-West Point….”

That’s why I called him the anti-Forrest among non-West Pointers.
LOL! If that makes sense?

My point was that it’s difficult to caompare forrest to his supposed peers.

Stan

I think Brooks comment linking Forrest with Chamberlain makes sense. If the legend of Chamberlain is the civilized warrior, the man of culture who becomes a man of war, who upholds the the values of civilization and America, then the legend of Forrest is its negative image.

Mike, your ignorance is excused. I’m pretty ignorant myself!

Hey Eric,

Well, I guess Hampton’s bear makes them even.
According to JA Wyeth (I know….) a panther attacked Forrest’s mom and when Forrest found out he said, “Mother, I am going to kill that beast if it stays on the earth.” And so he did. That was well before he threatened to slap Bragg’s jowls. Pgs. 8- 9 of Wyeth’s That Devil Forrest.

They’re still telling stories back in Kentucky about the time young Buford killed that mean squirrel with his slingshot. Buford needs a good press agent.

Nice article, BTW!

Stan

Perhaps Forrest was best suited to the role he actually fulfilled the latter part of the war…as a semi-independent leader of a few thousand cavalryman. In other hands, such as Wheeler’s, those men would have contributed little to the Confederate war effort. Forrest’s victories over Streight and Sturgis undoubtedly had a significant effect in maintaining Confederate civilian morale. Also, he, more than anyone else, enabled the Confederacy to effectively control much of Mississippi and Alabama after the fall of Vicksburg in 1863. This was of great importance if only in a logistical sense. I do not think those are insignificant accomplishments.

I believe Wellington made a comment during or after Waterloo that Napoleon was a mere “pounder” or something to that effect. Tactically, Forrest was unsophisticated and usually won his victories by “pounding” methods. But he did win, most of the time, and was so badly outnumbered and outgunned at Selma that a victory was a near impossibility.

Forrest left much to be desired as a cavalry commander attached to an army, as Eric has convincingly stated. He was often ineffective and disruptive. His contribution to the Confederacy was almost exclusively in an independent role.

And finally, one last point. As a leader of men, one would have to concede that Forrest truly got the “mostest out of the leastest” !

The more that I read about Bedford Forrest, the more I become convinced that he would have been a total bust as a cavalry commander in the eastern theater of the Civil War. I view Forrest as I look at sports, basketball to be exact, from the standpoint that he was not really coachable, a bit of a ball hog, too trusting of his own abilities, devoid of compromise, enamored to those who believed in him but a lightening rod to those who would question him and his axioms. For crying out loud the Civil War was decided in the eastern theatre. If Forrest were committed as a subordinate to Stuart I’m convincved that he would have a commander as cantankerous as Grumble Jones but lacking the knowledge that Jones possessed as one of the finer outpost commanders of the war.Simple question: If I assign you a task can you perform it without you misinterpreting the orders and modifying them to extend your own personal beliefs and goals? Could he have evolved into a capable Brigadier content on following instructions like WHF Lee,Fitz Lee, Thomas Munford, Lunsford Lomax,Williams Wickham etc? I don’t think so. Forrest could excel in a quasi unstructered environment. Put him into a theatre of operations that requires careful communication and coordination and I think his volatile ego hangs himself and renders his talents as marginal. Put him up against a Buford or a Merritt or a Gregg or a Sherdian or a top flight cavalry commander: Would he be successful? Was Forrest the type of cavalry commander who could stop and fight not necessarily on his terms or his choosing.The Confederate eastern theatre cavalry commanders did and would. Is this guy a classic cavalry commander or a renegade guerilla operative who had a keen sense of leadership? Loaded question yes but I think his peculiar behavior after the war lends to his leadership rationale during the war. So Forrest achieved a cult like status in his theatre of operations. I call it right place, right time. Anywhere else and I see him as a capable commander only after some failures due to a regression of questioning authority and adapting to structure. Pistol Pete Maravich averaged over 40 points a game all three years he played at LSU. Those LSU teams never won an SEC title.Personal brilliance does not always translate into success for the team or for that matter ones army.

I agree that Forrest would not have ‘thrived’ (thriven?) in an ordinary cavalry environment. He was, from what I have read, a sort of ‘portable army’ called upon to aid embattled forces here and there, showing up (firstest with the mostest) and generally doing very well, thank you. He was not given to following orders when commonsense told him that the orders were hogwash. Hence, he took his command and left when the ‘proper military authority’ chose to surrender after Forrest had come to defend the fort (or whatever it was) saying that he was damned if he came to fight and wasn’t going to surrender his men. He then rode off into the snowy night to fight again another day (made a great painting!). Forrest wasn’t ‘cavalry’ in the way that Stuart, Jones or even Mosby were cavalry. He was, in fact, mounted infantry if that makes sense. Furthermore, he was a force unto himself very much like Morgan, but unlike Morgan, he wasn’t out for plunder.

It is essential, I think, to notice that in the west, commands like Morgan and Forrest pretty much did what they wanted (as did, of course, groups like Quantrill and Anderson). On the other hand, the ‘partisans’ in the Eastern Theater – men like Hanse McNeill, Liege White and John Mosby were much more disciplined and attuned to the need of the Army of Northern Virginia. Yes, they operated ‘independently’, but they were always mindful of the needs of Lee and his army and often coordinated with field commanders like Stuart and Early. Unless I am very much mistaken, that was NOT the mindset in the Western Theater.

The only comparison I made with regard Forrest and Morgan was their ‘independent’ status; they seemed to go where they wanted and do what they pleased without much concern about how the Confederate military authorities felt regarding their actions. I did not compare the men themselves.

However, unlike Mosby, McNeill and White who worked with relatively small groups – Mosby’s largest contingent ever led into battle was some 300 in the Berryville supply train raid – both Forrest and Morgan lead much larger commands which enabled them to engage in much larger battles with their Union counterparts. Comparing either Forrest or Morgan to the partisans in northern Virginia is comparing apples to turnips and comparing the men themselves in either theater is equally futile.

Because they had the men and horses and the ‘fluidity’ of movement to be used for that purpose. Lee obviously used the partisan commands mentioned in the east in support of his army as well. Only White’s command went into the regular service upon the revocation of the Partisan Ranger Act. Both McNeill and Mosby’s commands were retained as partisans but then, neither command had the type of manpower that would have made them attractive to the cavalry wing of Lee’s army; the eastern partisans would have merely been a little extra cannon fodder as ‘regulars’.

As well, neither Hanse McNeill nor John Mosby were schooled in the cavalry tactics of the day albeit Mosby at least had some tutoring by two giants in the field – Stuart and Jones. Yet, his few troops (no more than 1,000 at the most and usually considerably under that number) would hardly have made a dent in the huge Army of the Potomac – except under the circumstances in which they actually fought. As a regular command under someone like Early, the 43rd Battalion would have been decimated fairly quickly, disappearing from the pages of history.

On the other hand, remember that Morgan got ‘into Dutch’ as they used to say, when he disregarded orders and ‘did his own thing’. He went to Richmond to get support but was given the cold shoulder there by the regular military. In the same way, Forrest refused to surrender when his ostensible ‘superior’ did so and took his men out from under Union noses at night in the snow to, as previously noted, fight again another day.

I doubt that either man was anywhere near as responsive to orders from the regular military as was Mosby and McNeill. If Lee had told Mosby that he wanted ‘X’ done, Mosby would have done ‘X’. The difference here is that Lee would not have presumed to tell Mosby HOW to do ‘X’; he simply would have indicated that he wanted ‘X’ done and left the ‘how’ to Mosby. Obviously, there was a certain amount of command independence even in the regular service, but far less so than when the regular service was dealing with ‘independents’.

There is no doubt that Morgan and Forrest did cooperate with the regulars and follow orders from men like Bragg, but in at least the two incidents above it is obvious that they felt far less obligated to do so than did the officers of the ‘regulars’ or even than the partisans in the Eastern Theater. I have no doubt as well, that had either man been less successful, efforts might have been made to make of their ‘independence’ a matter of court martial. But both were popular heroes in the South and I don’t believe that Richmond considered it ‘politic’ to press the matter. Heck, the regulars fought enough amongst each other, for heaven’s sake! Didn’t two Confederate generals engage in a duel that killed one of them?

Parenthetically, one has to wonder how the EASTERN theater would have survived with Bragg in charge rather than either Johnston or Lee. Now THERE’S fodder for a thread! Certainly the partisans in that region would have had a very different time of it than they did!

Mr. Meserves is a very intelligent, well read and knowledgeable and I do not pretend to have even a scintilla of his expertise. However, it is also a fact that one man’s determination is another man’s insubordination. Forrest went to help in a ‘regular army’ situation and when he got there found out that the man in command (regular army, I assume) was going to surrender. Forrest merely decided that he had come to fight, not surrender – so he turned around and left. I don’t know what the fellow in charge thought about that – as noted, I know little about Forrest – but I doubt he could have stopped Forrest no matter WHAT he thought or said. Forrest was that kind of man, apparently.

Secondly, I never said that any command OTHER than White’s – at least a command that was considered ‘independent’ – went into the regulars upon revocation of the Partisan Ranger Act. McNeill and Mosby were kept as partisans, whatever else was left probably either disbursed or ‘jined up’ somewhere else. Apparently, there were quite a few fellows in the area in business for themselves as well as the better known guerrilla groups. As to White, in one book I read, the author opined that White was glad to be mustered into the regulars. Perhaps he didn’t like the way things were going in northern Virginia – and who could blame him? I will tell you this, however, the Yankee press always referred to him – regular or irregular – as a guerrilla. In fact, one of the times Mosby was declared dead or too injured to return to the war, White was named by the newspaper as his successor! Frankly, I doubt that White and his Comanches being ‘mustered in’ would have saved them from being treated as guerrillas if they had fallen into the hands of the enemy. I can only surmise that Mr. Meserves misread my statement regarding White – or simply assumed it wrong by virtue the writer. C’est le guerre.

I do not, however, quite understand the point he made regarding Lee and Mosby. Both Lee and Stuart made requests (demands?) of Mosby which he endeavored to carry out. That is what I meant by my comparison to Forrest’s interaction with the regulars when he refused to surrender. I also think that there were some other contretemps involving the Confederate high command in that theater, but I cannot swear to it. Regarding the matter of surrender, however, I will only say this. At war’s end, Mosby sent a scout to ask Lee what to do – fight on or surrender. Lee told the scout that he was on parole and could not give “Colonel Mosby” any military advice. But had Lee told Mosby to surrender, I do not doubt that he would have done so as he had obeyed every order Lee had ever given him at least so far as he was able.

Furthermore, what would have been the point of sending someone to ask Lee if Mosby did not intend to do as Lee ordered? If Mosby – LIKE FORREST – intended to ‘do his own thing’, the LAST thing he would have done was contact Lee. Not knowing Lee’s desires in the matter at least gave him ‘plausible deniability’ if he determined to fight on. Somehow one has to doubt that Forrest would have bothered to consult with ANYONE before making that decision – and that’s the major difference between the two men and their command style.

Let us remember something ELSE, however with regard to ‘raiders’. I have read MANY Union accounts of Confederate cavalry actions and most of them refer to such ‘regulars’ as Stuart, Imboden et al. as ‘raiders’. Stuart’s famous ‘ride around McClellan’ was considered a ‘raid’ not much (if in fact, ANY) different from Mosby’s depredations! There is also the famous incident during one raid wherein Stuart telegraphed Union Quartermaster Meigs and complained about the quality of the mules he was stealing! But, but the same token, Kilpatrick’s raid on Beaver Dam Station early on (which bagged him a rebel ‘captain’ if I remember correctly) was no different from Confederate cavalry raids. Again, one man’s ‘raider’ is another man’s ‘soldier’.

For some reason, the fact that the statement of mine which you quote was a response to another person’s statement seems to have been missed:

The statement to which I responded was by Mr. Meserves:

“Forrest refused to surrender when his ostensible ’superior’ did so and took his men out from under Union noses at night in the snow to, as previously noted, fight again another day. Gee, that sounds a lot like Arno Voss and the Union cavalry at Harpers Ferry in 1862, except for the snow, of course. That sounds more like determination than a lack of responsiveness to orders.”

To which, I then responded:

“However, it is also a fact that one man’s determination is another man’s insubordination.”

As you can see, I am in agreement with you. My point was made in response to a belief that Forrest’s actions could be considered “determination” rather than “insubordination”, a belief with which I do not concur.

I write clearly enough that this point should have been taken, but as apparently it was not, let us hope that this clarifies the matter.

As for NBF’s “”, I would assume that his usefulness far outweighed the possible consequences of his “determination/insubordination” at the time and therefore, nothing came of it. Or, perhaps the Confederates were unhappy with the decision to surrender and therefore considered Forrest’s response appropriate under the circumstances. Or, perhaps, they were scared to death of the man who seemed quite ungovernable at times (if I read the history aright). Whatever happened, obviously no move was made to remove or replace Forrest. But then, perhaps, he COULDN’T be removed OR replaced!

Then I’m sure that Mr. Meserves will understand if I misunderstood his point under the circumstances. Sadly, editing often leads to confusion as in this case. If Forrest was not a part of the functioning military troops at the scene when Floyd surrendered – he obviously was free to determine (as Mr. Meserves notes) his own course of action and therefore he cannot be considered ‘insubordinate’. However, I do not believe that this was the only incident in which Forrest ‘crossed sabers’ with the Confederate military command in the area, but again, I may be wrong; it is not my area of study.

From what little I have read, however, it seems that both Forrest and Mosby made their OWN determination regarding surrender at the end of the war. I don’t know why this was the case with Forrest unless he was not a part of any Southern force that had already surrendered. But Mosby WAS part of the Army of Northern Virginia. Indeed, in a book with the names of the officers considered as having surrendered at Appomattox, Mosby’s name is listed. For whatever reason, he did not see fit to surrender or disband after Lee surrendered despite his own claim to being a part of that army and therefore, I would assume, subject to its fate. It was only during the final meeting with General Chapman at which time Mosby was informed of the plan to level “Mosby’s Confederacy” using 40,000 troops under Hancock, that he made the final determination to disband. Mosby himself stated that he disbanded to prevent Hancock’s continued war against the people who had supported him during the war.

In Forrest’s case, I don’t know if he was listed as belonging to a larger Confederate army or not. I DO know, however, that Sherman wrote to Grant that he feared men like Forrest AND Mosby would continue the war in their own way and that the bloodshed might go on for years. In this, however, he was proven wrong almost immediately.

Sherman was speaking of actual warfare. Since he cared little or nothing for the Negro, he was not concerned about ‘racial strife’ post war. However, he WAS concerned about him and his men getting shot by clever, resourceful fellows like Forrest and Mosby, both of whom he considered to be no better than outlaws if a whole lot more clever than most of that breed. Whatever complimentary things he had to say about his old nemesis Forrest was said years later when he could afford to be ‘generous’ as the man was dead and the South conquered.

Sherman foresaw the need for a continuing military presence – and hence a target for evil guerrillas – not to assure the freedman’s suffrage or even his basic rights so much as to protect Northern carpetbaggers coming South to make hay at the expense of the devastated region and to be sure that the South and its people became obedient ‘subjects’ of the United States government. I doubt seriously – given Sherman’s QUOTED sentiments about blacks – that their well being ever crossed his mind save only where it was necessary to use them to maintain political and social control of the conquered colonies.

Having ‘saved the Union’ by waging a war against civilians that made the Mongol horde look enlightened, Sherman then went west to continue his genocide against the American Indian. And the History Channel called him ‘misunderstood’ …. yeah.