Hmmmm….

When I read the text of this dispatch again tonite, I did a double-take and had to call Eric about it. I noticed that in this article, the note is shown as addressed directly to Gen. Samuel Cooper.

Wait a minute, I thought – so I went back to Jones’ diary to check his recording of the dispatch, and for some reason, although he records the rest of the dispatch in its entirety, Jones failed to include that it was addressed to Cooper. Because of that, Eric and I assumed that the note was only addressed to Lee, and we postulated in our book that perhaps the courier carrying this note couldn’t find Lee, and perhaps decided to ride for Richmond to cover his ass. Or, perhaps, the note Jones saw was only a copy of the one sent to Lee, with no other import to it.

However, the fact that this one is addressed to Cooper throws an entirely different light on it. For those who don’t know, Cooper was the highest ranking CSA general during the war. He was made a full general prior to anyone else. Cooper reported directly to, and only to, Jefferson Davis.

Cooper was, during the war, in effect the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was in Richmond at the time, of course. So, the fact that Stuart addressed this missive directly to Cooper meant that the note was INTENDED for Richmond (it’s not just a copy of one sent to Lee, and the courier was not somehow simply diverted to Richmond). Stuart was covering all of the bases, and attached such importance to the fact that Hooker was heading for Leesburg (thus meaning only one thing – he was going to cross soon) that he in effect sent the message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

All of which begs the question – are there any other examples where Stuart sent such a note to Cooper, especially while on active campaign? This will take some digging. But the end result is that Stuart deserves even more credit for getting this information to his superiors even more than we gave him before. The note to Richmond isn’t a simple copy, and it didn’t end up there by mistake. It was meant to get there, and in Cooper’s hands. Amazing.

We recount in our book about Walter Taylor arguing with Stuart after the campaign about not receiving just such a dispatch that Stuart claimed he sent. Why, then, didn’t Cooper later pipe up about getting the note? As Eric posted, everyone, until now, missed not only the note in Jones’ diary (published in 1866, plenty early for everyone to see it and consider it) but also in the contemporary newspaper. It was indeed either missed or somehow squashed.

In my mind, the fact that it’s addressed directly to Cooper means Jeb deserves far more credit that we even tried to give him in our book. I only wished we’d have had this article while we were writing it!

JD

Or 4th’s – Plenty of Blame has already gone through 3 printings 🙂

Seriously, as I told Eric last night, I’d love to be able to rewrite the pages on which we discuss this dispatch. But any changes in books cost money. We’ll see…

JD

Excellent information from Eric and JD, as usual. If I understand the newspaper report, which was published on Thursday, July 2, it appears that the dispatch was received in Richmond on the evening of June 30 (“Tuesday night”). Not sure what this means regarding whether and when the same information got to Lee. At a minimum, however, it clearly shows that Stuart was reporting intelligence concerning the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac. I find it hard to believe that he would get that to Richmond but would make no effort to get at least the same information to Lee (who obviously had a far greater need for it). As for Freeman, I’ve always had some reservations about the thoroughness of research and the objectivity of analysis done by somebody who, if I recall correctly, admitted to pausing reverently before the Lee statue on his way to work every day.

Well you’ve got Lee up north in PA, Stuart somewhere up north in MD, and Richmond to the south with a couple of major rivers and the Army of the Potomac between Stuart and Richmond. and between Richmond and Lee.

Doesn’t surprise me in the least that a courier or twelve didn’t meet up with Lee in, say, Cashtown with this news. Northern newspapers knew that the AoP was on the move of course……

After RE Lee came out, Freeman bought a Lee letter that seemed to implicate him in killing a Canadian lighthouse keeper in 1835 during a fight. Freeman sat on it for a decade, but he did investigate and he finally mentioned it in a footnote to later editions. The irony of course is that Freeman simply had no sense of humor; the letter is clearly a mock-heroic account of Lee killing a snake. But my point is that if Freeman was willing to tell observant readers that his hero probably was guilty of manslaughter if not murder, I just don’t think he would have ignored or suppressed the letter under discussion. Less was at stake. More likely that he simply never bothered to search the newspapers, which was quite an undertaking in the pre-microfilm era. [See John Gignilliat, Journal of Southern History, May 1977].

Of course, after I posted I pulled Plenty of Blame off the shelf to refresh my recollection as to how the Jones reference was treated. I haven’t had the chance to look at any maps showing where Lee was at any time on June 27 in relation to where Stuart was or to where the various parts of the Army of the Potomac were. Understandably, it took at least 72 hours for the message to reach Richmond, and perhaps more depending on when Stuart dispatched it on June 27. One would think that the capture or killing of a courier bearing that kind of information would make the records somewhere, especially because it might also have shown the captors where Stuart was in relaion to the others. But who knows. The newspaper publication of this and similar intelligence during the War is endlessly fascinating in its own right.

Hi Ralph,

Well, we’ve never claimed that all the evidence is on Stuart’s side – hence the title of the book 🙂

We were (and are) just trying to make the case that Stuart did indeed try to forward intelligence on the AOP’s movement – contrary to the other extreme, which is what you always hear… that Stuart did absolutely nothing to notify Lee or anyone else. Consider this – if the note had indeed reached Lee (on or about June 29) would it have made any difference? Perhaps. It certainly would have reinforced what the spy Harrison was saying. The note may have caused Lee to take different and/or quicker action.

The end result certainly came about by a combination of factors – Stuart’s one and only missive that didn’t get to Lee is certainly one.

JD

I’ve always been baffled at the notion that Lee was “surprised” when Hill made contact with Buford’s cavalry and then elements of the I Corps on July 1. Back to June 27 (briefly). If, as Marshall claimed Stuart later told him, Stuart dispatched the intelligence to Lee via Ashby’s Gap, it’s not clear to me why that would not have gotten through. Given the relative positions on 6/27-28 (Lee apparently in the vicinity of Chambersburg, the Army of the Potomac moving generally N-NE, and Stuart S of the Army of the Potomac), Ashby’s Gap would seem to have been a reliable direction by which to get the ihformation to Lee. Lee was also a voracious reader of northern newspapers. Do we know that none of the newspapers he could have gotten his hands on (or, indeed, any other sources of information) reported anything during the 6/27-30 period regarding the Army of the Potomac heading north through Maryland? At some point, the roads were filled with thousands of troops and artillery moving at a hurried pace. In fact, wasn’t Lee aware of the command change from Hooker to Meade before July 1? Odd that he would know about that but not that Hooker’s/Meade’s army was on the move to deal with Lee’s widely-known invasion of Pennsylvania. As to how Stuart handled tactics during his operation, I think that’s a completely different question from the question whether he left Lee “bilnd”. As Eric and JD make clear, it wasn’t as if Lee didn’t retain a cavalry force after Stuart departed.

I’m still trying to figure out what Lee would have learned from Stuart that was better and more current than what he already knew/shuld have known. The Yankess had cavalry, as well, and that cavalry had become a much more effective force during Spring, 1863 (as the guy who runs this blog has shown in one of his many worthwhile books). Stuart’s only real option to stay “more closely attached to Lee”, it seems to me, would have been to keep west of the Army of the Potomac as it moved north. If the Yanks reacted to that with screens, he would have been furnishing reports about federal cavalry, and still would presumably have been involved in clashes with them. The function you suggest would likely only have been performed better if Stuart had actually been retained by Lee. Stuart could then have been at least probing south of the Chambersburg/Carlisle area. Once he was ordered to split off, the consequence seems fairly inevitable. Your point about Lee’s behavior is accurate, I think. But I don’t agree that the “A Team” was needed to perform basic reconnaissance and messaging – especially with all of the other information Lee had.

This thread inspired me to pull PoB off the shelf for another read–and what struck me really quick was a reference to another message Jeb sent on the 25th about the northward movement of II Corps after he shelled the column at Bucktown. Again, the message got to the War Dep’t and was filed but apparently never got to Lee. So the message on the 27th was not his only attempt to pass timely intelligence to Lee and Richmond.

Really enjoying the re-read Eric & JD, and looking forward to the 3rd volume.