Interesting Angle

Eric : sounds like another very interesting project where you likely are making use of primary source material previuosly overlooked or simply ignored by others. What is your sense of what letters, diaries or other first hand accounts were left by participants ? And Lew Wallace has always seemed like a fascinating character with the Shiloh controversy and the Ben Hur book as his purported ‘redemption’.

The best overview of the OHNG troops is Jim Leek’s HUNDRED DAYS TO RICHMOND. I’m sure there’s more to be found, as he seems to have been the only one who’s looked.

As far as the Jug bridge action, well, Rodes engaged only his Division Sharpshooters, who numbered 600 men or so. Brown had at the bridge about 750 men, and barely held off Rodes’ men before his position collapsed at the end of the day.

The real hero, IMO, is Captain Edward Leib, a regular cavalryman who was scrounged from recruiting duty in Baltimore and given a detachment of mounted infantry from the 159th OHNG. He, more than anyone else, held things together and he deserves a closer look.

The real question is why Rodes held off his 4 infantry brigades, who could have smashed thru at any time. Doing so would have threatened Baltimore and cut off Ricketts’ retreat. I think it was on orders from Early, but that merits a look also.

BTW this is one of those battles that you just have to see the ground — very unusual situation.

Hi Eric- another dimension of the Monocacy battle I think could use more exploration than has been provided in the past is the artillery dynamic.

Although Wallace had the terrain advantage, he only had six guns from Frederick Alexander’s Baltimore battery. They also had at least one 24-lb howitzer (some sources say two), but that seemed basically worthless.

Confederate forces had nine batteries of between 36 and 40 guns, giving them a significant advantage in this area. But they didnt seem to use that advantage effectively, from what I can tell…US batteries drove CS sharpshooters out of Best barn and seemed to keep CS heads down as much as their guns kept US heads down (until towards the end of the battle during the assault by Gordon)…as the six US guns were deployed in two three-gun emplacements, one would think effective CS artillery fire could have made them irrelevant.

Again, I personally have not seen thorough coverage on this dimension of the Battle of Monocacy, so my comments are based on personal musings.

Also, there was a clash early in the day at northernmost Hughes Ford where companies of the 149th OH, supported by Leib’s company of the 159th OH mtd inf drove off mounted Confederates…in talking w/NPS folks at battlefield, seems general consensus is that those CS were cavalrymen under Bradley Johnson that were on the Point Lookout mission – but can’t find original source info to back that belief up.

AB

Eric,
I’ve been a volunteer at Monocacy for over ten years, done a great deal of research, which is in the files there, and I highly recommend that you look at those — there’s some good, new primary source stuff. I’m writing a book on Lew Wallace’s CW career for Indiana Press, but have written articles on the battle and Wallace for North and South. Think you might also contact Brett Spaulding, NPS interpreter at Monocacy, who’s done a lot of research on the battle.

The guys at the Jug Bridge performed extraordinarily well that day, given their experience level. They did have two veterans in charge; Col Alison Brown of the 149th Ohio and Capt. Leib of the 5th US who was in charge of 100 mounted men of the 159th Ohio that day. Also, I have never believed that Early really wanted that bridge; he wanted the road to Washington. Rodes could have ended it fast if Early really wanted it.

As for why Early spent that time at Harper’s Ferry — he wanted to take the river road to Washington where he had a quick escape route available, if needed. He got to Harper’s Ferry and found the bridge out, so he crossed the Potomac and tried to drive Sigel off the Heights and down the road, but Sigel wouldn’t budge. So, he had to take the road through the South Mountain gaps. It’s in his “Memoir of the Last Year of the War,” and two new documents I found at the Huntington Library a couple of years ago — which are at Monocacy.

As for the artillery, Wallace had wonderful advantage of position for his six guns because the bluffs on the south side of the river are so much higher than the level ground on the north side. Confederates had three battalions, Nelson’s Braxton’s and McLaughlin’s with 40 guns. CS artillery really didn’t do much until Gordon’s attack, when they moved in. Then, two batteries, Chapman’s at the Worthington House, and and Lowry’s, placed on a hill near the viaduct bridge over the railroad, wreaked real havoc on the right of Ricketts’ line.

A point really associated with the artillery. Nothing much happened in the morning when Ramseur came down the Georgetown Pike with his division and some of the artillery. They hit Wallace’s position; river in front, high bluffs on south side and stopped. Early wasn’t there, and I think Ramseur had instructions to hold off; Early needed those men to take Washington, didn’t want to waste men in attack on good position. Then, McCausland found that ford, and the rest, as they say is history.

I’m very glad that someone is taking a close look at Monocacy. It is needed.

Gail