Nathan Bedford Forrest

The irony about this post is that a number of ardent Forrest supporters reached the exact opposite conclusion: starting with his biographer Andrew Nelson Lytle, some argue that Forrest could have won the war if the likes of Lee and Davis would not have gotten in his way.

Regardless, I think Forrest’s biggest influence on the war is the total dichotomy of public perception regarding his legacy. It helps us understand Civil War historiography and Civil War memory in an unusually clear way. When I graduated last spring, I wrote my sizable term paper on the national and sectional perceptions of Forrest from 1861-now.

On a side note, I never read or saw anything about that alleged comment to Hood until this post, though I do know he made a very similar one to Bragg.

Cavalry in the “traditional” sense of the word?

I’m sure a “heavy” cavalryman would take exception with the notion that he was supposed to patter around the edge of the battlefield sniping and spying ;).

I will agree with Mr Wittenberg that most ersatz cavalryman failed to multi task effectively, and NBF’s manifest inability to work well with others limited his scope.

But given the doctrinal disarray for cavalry I’m not so certain that I would simply disqualify cavalry commanders for failing to be Murat.

Also Selma is hardly a fair example of matched capabilities considering it was an endgame encounter pitting a Confederate polyglot against the final product of 4 years of northern development. Consider what Forrest and Wheeler accomplished vangaurding Braggs plunge against Buell in 1862, tearing up his rear area…. Every dog has his day. ‘cept Kilpatrick :).

I think it is interesting that Forrest ushered in the “New Age” of calvary, yet you claim he was not a calvaryman. The current day “Air Cav” accomplishes with heliocopters what Forrest did on horseback. Alyhough you have a valid point…William Forrest and the” Forty Theives” were NATHAN’S

Sir, you are totally correct in your analysis of Forrest not being a cavalry commander, in the traditional sense. I do understand the criticism to your position, as after the war, the role of the cavalry was redefined to a large part, to the role of mounted infantry, and most people base their understanding of the branch to post-WBTS instead of the traditional role.

And you are also correct in the view that Forrest would not be useful to any commander…in a traditional cavalry role.

I will not criticize your position of Forrest’s effectiveness to the war effort, as it is your opinion, and it is clear that you are unimpressed with the entire “War in the West”. I will let the opinions of Robert E. Lee and William T. Sherman, among others, of Forrest, stand for myself.

I agree with Eric, Forrest has taken on the mantle almost akin to Robin Hood. Forrest performed very poorly for Bragg in the Chickamauga campaign, the same can be said of Wheeler too. If the Cavalry is the eyes and ears of an army, then the Army of Tennessee was blind and deaf. Also, a there is some doubt as to either of the Forrest confrontations actually occured. There is only one account of the Bragg fight, and that was wrote years after the war and never supported by anyone else, also given Bragg’s strict adherance to the rules, Bragg would have had Forrest in irons. As a side note, Bragg was not as universally dispised as most would belive, he did have his supporters in the army and they were split pretty even with his enemies.

Lee

Valerie, you make it sound as if Forrest and Mosby acted independently in a vacuum. Each were allowed to act independently, because that is when they usually were more effective. Either man could be removed from command at any time. More than once in the OR, Bragg gives favorable comments to President Davis of Forrest’s exploits, and tells Davis “it would deprive this army of one of its greatest elements of strength to remove General Forrest, when Forrest had requested permission to form a brigade in northern Mississippi in Jul 63.

General Lee also allowed a fair amount of independence to Stuart, i.e., Stuart’s fairly useless “rides around the entire Union Army”.

At Ft. Donelson, Forrest was not only allowed to leave with his command, he was also allowed to extract many other men that did not desire to surrender, Generals Floyd and Pillow left with him. Obviously, his point was well taken. Yes, they left by stealth, as leaving before the surrender instrument was signed was against protocol.

Actually, Forrest “bought and paid for” two commands, and a significant part of a third. The first two were taken from him and given to Wheeler by Bragg…a man that Bragg well knew that Forrest despised. Of course, we don’t know if Bragg did it malitiously, or out of operational necessity. The third was when he was given command of the poorly equipped States’ Troops, local militias, and former partisan rangers in Jan 64.

Nowhere that I am aware of, was Forrest ever accused of failing to obey orders, only that he allegedly voiced his displeasure of them…at Ft. Donelson, and after Chattanooga. The alleged confrontation with Hood was not over orders, but over the needless deaths of Forrest’s soldiers at Franklin.

Lee, actually, both Forrest and Wheeler performed well at Chickamauga, both in the cavarly roles they were in prior to the battle, and in the infantry roles they performed during the battle. Additionally, Forrest notified Bragg that the Union army was retreating to Chattanooga and advised him to attack, both allegedly in person, and officially. (OR, XXX, XVII, Part IV, Page 681)

Whether the confrontation between Forrest and Bragg after Chickamauga actually took place, who knows, you either believe Dr. Cowan or not, and he waited until both Bragg and Forrest had passed on before telling the tale.

Regardless, a few months later, President Davis gave Forrest a lateral promotion, with even more independence than he previously had. (he was given command of all cavalry forces in north Mississippi, excepting those directly under the command of Gen Stephen D. Lee, and had operational control of at least two of Lee’s cavalry regiments for most of the remainder of the war)

Was general Nathan Bedford Forrest ever married to a blacj woman? Is it possible that Mary Ann Montgomery was a black woman with a very fair complexion?

I just found this comment while reading the Hess book on Bragg. In my opinion (and I have a large analysis of Forrest’s battles and campaigns forthcoming from Savas Beatie), your original post as well as some subsequent posts have a significant amount of misinformation.
I will not argue mounted infantry versus cavalry, he fought his men primarily dismounted. I would say almost always he did as he was ordered, and that was not always scouting, screening, and reconnaissance. He screened the left flank of Bragg before the Tullahoma campaign, reconning Franklin and Triune, and reported in early June that the Union cavalry had moved east to Murfreesboro and Rosecrans was getting ready to move (OR 23 pt.2, 856) – a report Bragg and Wheeler apparently ignored.
He screened the army’s right (by Bragg’s order) at Chattanooga, but Rosecrans chose to go left through Wheeler’s area. He quite correctly informed Bragg of what he could see after Chickamauga, and, had the Confederate army been in any shape to continue the attack I believe there is little doubt they would have crushed Rosecrans – but they were not.
Nowhere have I found any evidence he threatened Hood (although he certainly disagreed with him about Franklin on Winstead Hill), and the story by Cowan is almost certainly highly exaggerated if not false. You obviously confused the two stories. His relations with his commanders (Johnston, Clark, Pillow, Breckinridge, Kirby Smith, Bragg, Wheeler, Polk, S.D. Lee, Maury, and Taylor) were extremely cordial with the singular exceptions of Bragg and Wheeler.
The comment about the “first team” is incorrect. Sturgis and Grierson had twice as many troops, all experienced, at Brices Crossroads, yet they fell. Wilson had 4,800 men, some with repeaters, north of the Duck during the early part of the Nashville campaign. Forrest had 4,500 men and drove Wilson north past Spring Hill. At the end of the campaign Forrest delayed on successive positions, saving Hood’s army, against Wilson, who by that time had close to 10,000 men while Forrest, reinforced by the remnants of an infantry division, had at most half that.
Yes, at Selma he was defeated. He had around 5,000 men, half untrained militia. He was attacked by 10,000 experienced men with repeating rifles, who were aided by an Englishman Wilson had captured who gave Wilson the plan for Selma’s fortifications. On the other hand, Forrest did not know the defenses at all until the day of the battle because he had been delaying Wilson’s advance (Wilson had also captured two of his couriers, letting Wilson know Forrest’s dispositions and plans, during the delay phase.
Forrest had shortcomings and made mistakes, but his record supports Sherman and Lee in their opinions as to his value, not yours.