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Hi Eric – could not agree more on the old “anonymous” comments. Not topic related, but seemed to fit nowhere else. I’m originally from Pittsburgh and my parents routinely send me down tapes from the PCNTV broadcasts up there (Gettysburg Battlewalks and Civil War Roundtables). One was a panel discussion on the cavalry (from Gettysburg Civil War College?) and I noticed that I recognized one of the panelists as you. Good stuff (although as Stuart biographer) I feel you spent far too little time on “The Southern Knight” and too much time on Yankee horsemen. I wonder if you are familiar with Tom Carhart’s book “Lost Triumph” and his theories on Stuart’s failed “simultaneous assault during the infantry’s [Pickett’s Charge] theory” and also wondering you’re thoughts on Custer’s lack of recognition for his performance at G’burg. I’m far from being an expert in anything – especially the cavalry – so feel free to email me if you would like to enlighten me. Perhaps your upcoming book will answer some of these issues? Anyway – good job at the roundtable, I enjoyed it very much.

Ouch! I too reviewed Mr. Carhart’s book at the publisher’s request for the Fredericksburg newspaper (I do monthly CW book reviews for the Free Lance-Star Town & Country – and I obviously had a totally different take on it.) I spoke directly with Mr. Carhart, and he agreed that his work has become quite controversial. I gave his book a good review from a readers standpoint and stated that his argument was compelling and “may” have some historians reevaluating their own perspectives. That said – I am far less educated on the subject and may have not been discerning enough in regards to some data. However, he was a nice guy and appreciated my comments. I can’t say if he is right or wrong, but I certainly enjoyed the read and his presentation of the curricula at West Point and the “Napoleonic-style” of warfare that became the foundation for so many CW commander’s doctrine. I do agree 100% with him that Lee made a grave series of errors at Gettysburg, but could not have been as careless and ignorant as we seem to accept today. Understandably, the ANV did boast a sense of invincibility following their victory at Chancellorsville – but to believe that the Confederacy’s disaster at Pickett’s Charge was simply a case of General Lee having a “bad day” and ordering the worst military maneuver in the history of infantry-warfare seems a bit hard to swallow. In fact, his entire scenario at Gettysburg – 1. essentially blind without Stuart’s cavalry at the start of the engagement, 2. in possession of no tactically significant high-ground and 3. spread out on northern soil equaled as bad a situation as there could be on a battlefield. To say there were no other assaults planned (other than the infamous and doomed charge) virtually goes against all realms of reason and also does not fit Lee’s campaign legacy up to 1863. That said – I’m sure that you have spent many more hours than I have studying this specific subject – thus I cannot argue your thoughts on any academic level. (Plus I am fighting a serious ear infection and am typing under the influence of some wonderful pain killers…) I once wrote a lengthy piece about Chancellorsville that included this statement in the opener: “Despite being regarded as a tremendous victory for the South, the loss of Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and the sense of invincibility instilled in the Confederate Army ultimately resulted in more tragedy than triumph.” So I do agree wholeheartedly that Gettysburg was far from the south’s finest hour, but struggle to accept that it was simply Lee’s worst. I guess I need to get your book. 🙂

Well done Eric.