The Franco-Prussian War of 1870

I generally really enjoy reading your blog, particularly to learn about people like Albert Morrow or the cavalry during the Pope/McClellan period, or any number of other interesting topics. And I’ve greatly enjoyed several of your books. I don’t much enjoy the detours into modern politics and the need to criticize a man who is certainly already overloaded with criticism enough already – but anyway it’s your blog of course. And I guess it would be missnamed if you didn’t actually use it to rant occasionally. Looking forward to more late 19th century insights…and hope your Blackberry is working for you. Just thought I’d post on this tonight. Keep up the good work.

If you haven’t already read them, there are two books I would highly recommend to someone interested in the Franco-Prussian War and the ACW:

Dennis Showalter’s The Wars of German Unification, which covers the Danish War, the Seven Weeks War and the Franco-Prussian War, each with reasonable detail but with a good eye towards the development of the German Army.

On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871, edited by Stig Forster and Jorg Nagler. This is a conference proceedings from the mid-90s. The articles on the American Civil War won’t break any new ground for you but the European and comparative material is well worth it.

On my some-time-in-the-future reading is the Crimean War. I’m interested in how the most recent Big Powers war impacted the ACW. I’m generally familiar with the Delafield Commission and McClellan’s study of the Russian Army (not sure why he focused on them so much) but am curious about the possible influences on the war. McClellan seemed to be trying a Sebastopol-like siege of Richmond. Also, I’m familiar with how Col. Lamb, in command at Fort Fisher, modeled his seacoast bastion on the Malakoff fort at Sebastopol. But I’ve never seen that there was a great deal of Crimean influence on the thinking of American officers generally, except perhaps in the naval realm. Do you have any deeper familiarity on this subject or can recommend any books on the Crimean War?

Also, Eric, in your Sheridan study did you find that he brought back anything noteworthy to the US military from his observer status in the Franco-Prussian War (other than pickelhaubes)?

By the way, you seem to be feel about the same about Pres. Bush as you do about that barbarian Sheridan.

Eric.

Another great post that contains a lot of really good points–historically. I am not touching your comments on current affairs.

But, the Schlieffen Plan could not have worked “big time” in 1870; it was not conceived until decades after the victory of 1870-71. Moreover, the Schlieffen Plan was based on the premise that the French would make their main effort in a future war in Alsace-Lorraine (where the decisive battles of 1870 were fought) and sought to bypass this by going elsewhere, namely Belgium. And whether you considered the Schlieffen Plan to have “worked” depends on your standard for success. If it was the complete defeat of France in less than two months (as Schlieffen defined “worked”) this was simply impossible, for Schlieffen made ridiculous assumptions regarding the marching and fighting capacity of the German reservist, logistics, and how the enemy would react. Even taking the “inside track” east of Paris, rather than the much longer “outside track” proposed by Schlieffen, compelled the German First Army to march about 400 miles in 27 days in 1914, 11 of those days seeing battles.

On the other hand, the German plan of 1914 did ensure that the Western Front would be on French and Belgian soil and that the richest of France’s provinces would be unavailable to the French war effort. The advantages this provided to the Germans were many. It forced the French to be on the offensive, for one, with all the consequences that brought in terms of blood. Moreover, using the trenches of the West as an economy of force measure, enabled the Germans to save the Austrians and ultimately knock Russia out of the war.

And the French did learn from the Schlieffen Plan. Their war plan for 1940 was based on the assumption that the Germans would replay the Schlieffen Plan and go through Belgium. Had the Germans done so–as the initial Plan Yellow called for in late 1939–the French were prepared for this and may well have stopped them at some point in Belgium. Unfortunately for the French, the Germans did not replay the Schlieffen Plan, in part due to the fact that the French got their hands on documents that enabled them to discern the German plan. The Germans learned of this, which contributed to their changing their minds and deciding to make their main effort in 1940 through the Ardennes (the famous Sichelschnitt), which, thanks in part to great luck on the Meuse River, won the campaign of 1940.

Still, the French must have gotten something right. Alsace-Lorraine now belongs to them and they, not the Germans, have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Best,
Ethan

One comparative study begging to be written is a cross-national study dealing with the political and social dynamic fault lines ripped open by the loss of a war. Eric’s point about France’s loss to Prussia in 1870 and Paris Commune is spot on; the fault lines of the Commune survived its destruction, arguably morphing into a French Communist-Fascist political binary (often evidenced by rampant anti-Semitism) that ran through the Dreyfuss trial, the political rot of the 1930s, which finally culminated in Vichy. Likewise, Germany’s loss of World War I also led to a Communist-Fascist binary that was ultimately resolved in favor of the latter and was likewise not resolved until 1945. Interestingly, the destabilization of the Soviet Union, in part brought on by the failure of Afghan War, also brought enormous change. It is quite possible that the U.S. failure in Vietnam provoked a domestic fault line (of course, not a Communist-Fascist binary) but an unprecedented “harder” left and “harder” right split that bedevils us through the present hour.

Proof of the latter can be found in a quick survey of commentary about the current Iraq War. The Vietnam paradigm reigns supreme. One party argues that the effort is Vietnam redux–“quagmire,” “disaster,” puppet government, natives that won’t fight, and so forth–while the other party argues domino theory, world-wide threat matrix, conflict concentration “over there” to avoid having to wage it “over here,” and so forth.

The American fault line have been going strong now for over 30 years. I wonder how, (if ever) it will be resolved?

Has anyone read Michale Howard’s book on the Franco-Prussian War? I bought it becuase I think very highly of Howard’s writings on military history but I havent gotten around to reading it.