Civil War books and authors

I’ve had four books published by university presses. Three were published by Kent State, and one by LSU. Consequently, I feel qualified to share a few thoughts.

The advantage of a university press is that they don’t have to make a profit. This means that they have the luxury of being able to publish things that most commercial publishers wouldn’t touch with a ten-foot pole. Some of these books are very good. Many of them are books that nobody in their right mind would ever consider reading. Many university presses publish stuff that’s written by professors for professors, and those professors are the only ones who will ever read the books. Clearly, there’s a niche in the marketplace for that.

However, all of this has many very significant downsides.

First, and foremost, is the pricing issue that I mentioned the other day. Because they don’t need to make a profit, they can get away with charging absolutely outrageous prices for things. If a commercial house charged those prices, they’d be out of business in no time flat. As an example, the first book of mine published by Kent State was a collection of letters by a sergeant of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry titled We Have It Damn Hard Out Here. It’s not a long book, only 175 pages. Yet Kent State slapped an outrageous price of $35 on it in 1999. There’s no doubt that that hurt sales. One of the criticisms of it on Amazon says, quite specifically, “I expected more for my $35.” Honestly, I can’t really blame the customer for saying that. That book should have cost a LOT less.

Second, although they can charge ridiculous prices, the university presses often cut corners in ways that detract from the overall quality of a book. I pulled my next book–a study of the March 10, 1865 Battle of Monroe’s Crossroads–from Kent State for a very specific reason. I wanted 26 maps and had accumulated about 50 photos. KSU said 10 maps and no more than 25 photos, and I said no. I terminated the contract because I was not willing to compromise on a book where I had a very clear vision of what I wanted it to be. In my mind, the map study and the photos–several of which have never been published before–really make the package complete. I don’t get that attitude. If you’re going to charge outrageous prices, at least give the public something in return.

Next, university presses can take an unreasonably long time to get stuff published. LSU published one of my books in 2002. I submitted the manuscript in 1999. For the record, it took them nearly THREE years to get the book out. Then, they slapped a $36.95 price on a 240 page book, just to add insult to injury. Since they’re not in business to make a profit, there is no sense of urgency. They get around to things when they get around to them. That’s extraordinarily frustrating.

Some of them publish some pretty crappy books. Mercer University Press has done some pretty good books. But they’ve also done some real stinkers. Last year, Mercer published a book on Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign by a guy named Broadwater. The name of prominent Confederate general Lafayette McLaws is spelled “McClaws” throughout the entire book. There is not a single map. Have you ever tried to understand a complicated, large battle like Bentonville without a single map? Yeah, right. Concisely stated, this book stinks. Take a look at the review I wrote of it that was published in Civil War News. Here’s an example of a bad book that was overpriced and which never should have been published. It embodies pretty much everything that I hate: poor production, no maps, lots of errors, lousy scholarship, etc., etc. Just because it’s a university press product doesn’t mean it’s worth owning.

Finally, we come to the issue of marketing. Because there’s no profit motive, the marketing effort can often be awfully lame. LSU and the University of North Carolina are the only two academic presses that do any marketing at all. Kent State’s marketing efforts are stunningly lame. I can count the books I’ve sold through Kent State on about three hands. Unless you’re Gordon Rhea, don’t bother with a university press if you’re interested in selling books.

Being published by a university press used to be very important to me. Publication by a university press instantly bestows credibility upon an author. Since I’m an amateur, establishing credibility was very important to me early in my career, and I’m glad that my second book was published by a university press. At this point, I think I’ve established myself, and other than a single project which I promised to a friend, I doubt I will ever do another university press book again for all of the reasons stated herein.

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Dimitri Rotov has a very interesting post on his blog today. It got me thinking about a subject that bothers me a great deal.

I’ve always viewed part of my role as a responsible historian as mythbusting, not the perpetuation of those myths. The self-perpetuating myth that inevitably annoys me to no end is the one that says that Brig. Gen. John Buford’s successful stand at Gettysburg on July 1 was the result of the superior firepower of the Spencer carbines carried by his men. Never mind that the Spencer carbine didn’t go into mass production until September 1, 1863 and that only about five prototypes of it existed as of July 1, 1863. Never mind that of the 92% of Buford’s companies that filed ordnance returns on June 30, 1863, not a single one of those companies reported having repeating weapons. Never mind that the only Spencer RIFLES in the Army of the Potomac were in all of the 5th Michigan Cavalry and half of the 6th Michigan Cavalry of Custer’s brigade. Yet, this one particular canard lives on endlessly and relentlessly, repeated again and again by historians, and, yes, even by licensed battlefield guides.

DaCapo published a horrible little book on the July 1 fighting on McPherson’s Ridge by an academic historian named Stephen D. Newton a couple of years ago that repeats the myth of the repeaters yet again, even though it’s been disproved again and again. See the reviews of this little gem on its page on Amazon.com. In the interest of full disclosure, I am not the author of any of the reviews of Newton’s book on Amazon, although my friend J. D. Petruzzi is. Not only did Newton get any number of things wrong, he also perpetuates myths. How does this stuff get published?

Another myth that bugs me is the one that says that Gettysburg was a “meeting engagement.” Here’s the Army’s definition of meeting engagement: “a combat action that occurs when a moving force engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place.” This, by definition, then requires that the armies both be on the move and that they engage at an unexpected time and place. If both requirements are not met, then by definition, any action is NOT a meeting engagement. That the Battle of Gettysburg was a meeting engagement has been accepted for years by what Dimitri describes as Centennial history. According to this theory, the armies blundered together at Gettysburg in an unplanned engagement. On the Confederate side, that happened because Jeb Stuart was off joyriding.

Never mind that modern research plainly shows that both sides knew precisely where the other was; Buford provided Army headquarters with very precise reports on the dispositions of Lee’s army on June 30, and never mind that A. P. Hill knew that a large force of Union cavalry was in Gettysburg that day. Never mind that Lee himself had ordered Stuart’s “ride” and that Stuart actually obeyed those poorly written orders to the letter. Any other explanation other than that it was a meeting engagement by definition means that Robert E. Lee was, in fact, spoiling for a fight in Pennsylvania, that Gettysburg was the chosen location for it, and that Stuart cannot be blamed for the Confederate defeat in Pennsylvania.

However, this myth also gets perpetuated by the likes of Stephen Sears. It’s bad history, and it’s irresponsible.

Yet, this stuff is accepted as the gospel truth solely because a credentialed professional historian says it’s so. Just because one has credentials doesn’t necessarily make one right. And I would suggest that those credentials add to the professional historian’s duty to get it right, even if doing so means that a few sacred cows–cherished myths–get taken down along the way. The same, by the way, holds true for me. I strive for the truth, and I follow where the evidence leads me. Even when I don’t like where it leads me, and even when it leads me to precisely the opposite conclusion that I expected.

My interpretation of the Battle of Trevilian Station is an example of just that. I expected Sheridan’s management of the campaign to be magnificent, and I was terribly disappointed when I realized just what a brutal and incompetent job he actually did. Those conclusions, in turn, led me to write my book Little Phil. In my mind, following the evidence is the only path that a responsible historian can and should take.

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Here are a few more things that really irk me.

1. There are a handful of historians out there who have, through their past works, built up a fair amount of credibility. They have, however, badly diluted their reputations and the value of their endorsements by being promiscuous about doing so. Here’s the best example–and I know that I keep coming back to the Carhart book, but it’s one of the most egregious examples of being a really atrocious book I’ve seen in a very, very long time–Carhart was a former student of James M. McPherson. Consequently, McPherson gave the book a glowing and ringing endorsement. That the likes of a Pulitzer Prize winner put his imprimatur on the book lends it instantly credibility. Never mind all of the numerous flaws that I have already pointed out. Because most of the reading public is not as well-read about these events as some, they see McPherson’s imprimatur, say to themselves that if someone of McPherson’s stature and reputation says it’s okay, it must be, and they then waste their hard-earned money buying it. And because they don’t know better, they end up being badly misled and believe falsehoods and fabrications to be the truth. That is, in my humble opinion, grossly irresponsible, cronyism at its worst, and fostering the defrauding of the public.

2. I REALLY hate publishers that don’t do their own homework before accepting books for publication. There was a book published a few years ago by a guy named Paul D. Walker that also purported to address the fighting on East Cavalry Field (what is it about this fight that seems to encourage the writing of terrible books?). This book is about 100 pages long, and only 12 of them address East Cavalry Field. Take a look at the reviews of the book on Amazon (the one that was repeated–not sure why–is mine). Disregard mine if you like–instead, read the others. How this kind of stuff gets published is a complete mystery to me.

On a parenthetical note, Walker’s book, published several years before Carhart’s, espouses the same two theories as Carhart’s: that Stuart’s movement to East Cavalry Field was somehow tied to Pickett’s Charge, and that Custer–not David Gregg–was the true hero of the fighting there. Sound familiar? It’s the same theory espoused by Carhart, to much greater fanfare. Both books are awful, just in different ways.

3. Publishers who gouge their customers by pricing things at ridiculously high prices just because they can annoy me to no end. I have a deep interest in the Eleventh Corps, and have for years. Several years ago, I started gathering material for a book on the role of the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg that I hope to write some day. It’s a project of massive proportions that will take years to research thoroughly. Given the important role played by General Francis C. Barlow at Gettysburg, I thought I would check to see what was out there in terms of a biographical treatment of him. I found a recent biography of Barlow published by a university press for the mind-boggling price of $49.50 for a 300 page book. Or then there’s the 150 page book on Sherman’s March to the Sea by Prof. Anne J. Bailey. I gave the book an excellent review in a recent issue of Civil War News–which it definitely deserves–but $65 for a 150 page book that has no dust jacket and no photographs????? Give me a break.

Again, I’m quite certain that there will be more, and I will continue to post these thngs as I think of them.

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Time for a rant. This one has been brewing all day.

Here are a few random gripes, presented in no particular order. All of these are things that I hate about Civil War books.

1. Books that do not have bibliographies. See Tom Carhart. This permits authors to cut corners, big time. It also allows them to avoid being held accountable for the quality and quantity of their research.

2. Books that do not have maps. If you ever want to go nuts, try to read a history of a complex battle without any decent maps. Not including maps is corner cutting of the worst variety.

3. Books endorsed by people who obviously haven’t read them. One very prominent historian sent me a glowing endorsement for a dust jacket blurb for one of my projects without reading the manuscript. His comment was to the gist of I know your work, so I assume it’s going to be a great book, and I don’t need to read it as a result. It’s quite a compliment, but it meant that he was putting his imprimatur on the book sight unseen. What if I had written absolute, utter garbage? This particular fellow’s imprimatur lends instant credibility. This sort of thing is bad news, and it apparently goes on far more than any of us realize.

4. Books written to advocate a particular theory or position but which are not intellectually honest enough to tell the reader this up front. Stephen Sears is a prime example of what I mean here. Each of his books has a theme. Take his Chancellorsville book: Hooker was not as bad as has been portrayed, he did a good job of managing the battle, and it was someone else’s fault. The whole book is oriented around this. I don’t have a problem with people having opinions, and I also don’t have a bit of problem with authors stating them, even if it’s to advocate a position. Just be honest and tell me that’s what you’re doing.

5. Notes lumped together at the end of a paragraph that amalgamate six or seven sources, making it nearly impossible to figure out what came from where. Give me notes to each source, please.

6. Authors who quote themselves as the authority for things that they say. It reminds me of a legend that we heard in law school. The former dean of my law school supposedly quoted one of his own works as THE authority for a proposition of law that he was arguing before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Too many authors do that sort of thing. It’s lazy, and it cuts corners.

7. Books with lousy production values. White Mane is the primary example of what I mean here. They don’t edit, they don’t proofread, and there is almost no quality control. That permits the plagiarism of other people’s works. See my review of one of their recent books for an example of what I mean here.

8. Books that are based almost entirely on the repackaging and regurgitation of secondary sources. Again, this is intellectual dishonesty, because it means that the author has not done his or her homework and is piggybacking on the fruits of someone else’s labors. See my review of the book in the link indicated above for a good example of what I mean here.

There are, undoubtedly, more things to add to this list, but this is all I can think of at the moment. I will keep a list and add to this rant as I think of more things worth adding.

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I’ve been thinking about Carhart’s book again, and about a comment that came in. That comment suggests that although Carhart claims loudly that he’s espousing some novel theory, the historical record plainly demonstrates that others have already tread the same water on a number of prior occasions. That is intellectual dishonesty at best, and consumer fraud at worst.

What bothers me is that people do derivative works without acknowledging that that’s what they are, and without ackowledging that they’re borrowing ideas from others. There has been so much written about the Battle of Gettysburg that apparently the only way to make a splash is to re-package someone else’s work, jazz it up, and try to sell it as such. As a student, I was taught that doing so without attribution constitutes plagiarism. In my humble opinion, Mr. Carhart has engaged in plagiarism by claiming that his theory is novel and by not giving proper credit to those who have come before him.

I wish I could say that this is the first time I’ve seen this sort of thing, but it’s not.

I wrote a review of a book by a guy named Derek Smith on the April 1865 Battle of Sailor’s Creek wherein I lambasted the author and his publisher for stealing the maps of Chris Calkins. I later asked Chris about this directly, and he confirmed that he was never asked for his permission to use his maps, that he was not paid for the privilege, and that those maps were stolen from him by the author and the publisher.

The publication of that review brought about a letter to the editor by Rick Sauers, indicating that the same publisher had done the same thing to him on another book.

As an author who gets paid precious little for the fruits of his labor, I feel their pain. Plagiarism is intellectually dishonest, and when it’s used as a means of selling books–making money at the expense of the ones who REALLY did the work–then it’s theft and a fraud on the consuming public. I cannot forgive that, and I cannot condone it.

Please do yourselves a favor. Don’t buy Carhart’s book and encourage more plagiarism.

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Modern Civil War books that I love, in no particular order:

Anything by Gordon Rhea
Andy Trudeau’s A Testing of Courage
Alan Nolan’s Lee Considered
Anything by Bruce Catton, but especially the American Heritage picture book
Shelby Foote’s trilogy
Douglas Southall Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants
Stephen Z. Starr’s trilogy on the Union cavalry
Virgil Carrington Jones’ Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders
Mark L. Bradley’s two books, but especially Last Stand in the Carolinas: The Battle of Bentonville
Anything by Jeff Wert, but especially his From Winchester to Cedar Creek
Ernest Fergurson’s Chancellorsville 1863: Souls of the Brave
Chris Fonviele’s The Last Departing Rays of Hope: The Wilmington Campaign
Alice Rains Trulock’s In the Hands of Providence
Benjamin Franklin Cooling’s Monocacy: The Battle that Saved Washington
Peter Cozzens’ This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga

There are probably more, but these are the ones that come to mind at the moment.

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Although I have said some of this publicly on a prior occasion, I really believe that it is appropriate for me to pay tribute to someone whose loss I still feel keenly, and whose friendship, support, and guidance meant a lot to me. I’m not one for public outpourings of emotion, but I think it’s appropriate to pass on my thoughts and to share some information.

Brian Caldwell Pohanka was very much a mentor to me. In many ways, if I am a successful historian today, I owe that to Brian. He was always unfailingly generous, sharing knowledge, resources, and time. There was a time, early in my historical work, when I didn’t write anything that wasn’t read, commented upon, and blessed by, Brian. He unfailingly encouraged me in my work, and he always shared his immense knowledge willingly. In my case, as recently as sixty days before his untimely death in June, I asked him for recommendations on some reading on Ranald MacKenzie, and his lovely wife Cricket answered me within hours with his suggestions.

I had a chance to tell Brian the things that I needed to say to him directly this winter. He told me then that he has made certain that his legacy will continue on by donating his massive library–which makes mine look small–and papers so that they will be accessible to all, and he made a cryptic comment about once he was gone, we’d learn more about steps that he took to ensure that his legacy as a preservationist lived on. As Dimitri Rotov points out, Brian donated half a million dollars to the Central Virginia Battlefield Trust, half a million dollars to the Richmond Battlefields Foundation, and another $100,000 to another preservation group. For those who don’t know this, Brian was one of the three original founders of APCWS, which is today the CWPT. He was also one of its largest annual contributors, but always anonymously, as he never wanted to draw attention to himself. That was very characteristic of Brian–he wanted no attention for the things that he did.

Professor Greg Urwin once paid Brian the ultimate compliment. One day while we were having lunch, Greg told me that if the definitive account of the Battle of the Little Big Horn could be written, there was only one person who could do it–Brian. I told Brian this, and he characteristically pooh-poohed it. But I am pleased to be able to tell you that he got to do just that. In August, a new book on the Little Big Horn–a Frassanito-style then and now–was published by the University of Oklahoma Press, and Brian finally got to tell the story of the Little Big Horn his way in it. I understand that he also finished his magnum opus, his regimental history of the 5th New York Infantry, aka Duryee’s Zouaves. Brian spent more than twenty years working on it, and it was a mammoth undertaking.

Rest in peace, Brian. I, and the rest of the Civil War community, miss you. It’s just not the same knowing that you won’t be there to read and comment on my work–it was always a safety net for me. And thank you, for being my friend and mentor. Most importantly, thank you for everything you did for our Civil War community.

And at last, you will be able to look George Custer in the eye and ask him just what the hell he was doing that warm June day in 1876……

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I think that I get asked this question more than any other. I have to admit that there are times when I grow thoroughly sick of it. The obvious answer, of course, is why not the Civil War?

However, that oversimplifies things too much and is probably a bit too flippant to be an appropriate response. So, I will attempt to answer the question here.

No other period in American history impacted this country more than did the period 1861-1865. 600,000 Americans died in an internecine struggle that was probably inevitable. With the tension between Federalism and states rights that marked the great compromises of the Constitutional Convention, it became obvious that one side or the other had to win out. Either there would be a strong central government, or there would be a loose confederation of states wherein the Federal government provided for the national defense and not much else. Mix in economic disparities and the tensions of the debate over slavery, and you have a real witch’s brew. I think that the war was inevitable. The question was not if, but when.

The outcome made this country what it is today. We are now a single country–people are Americans first, not Virginians or Pennsylvanians. That is what made this a great country and propelled it into becoming a world superpower.

So, with that in mind, why not the Civil War?

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Google has commenced a program intended to make more books available on-line, in a free digital format. As an author, I have intensely mixed feelings about this program. On one hand, anything that promotes the further distribution of books or which in any way spreads the word about my work is potentially a good thing. Likewise, I wholeheartedly support the idea of making public domain works available for free in a digital format. Everyone wins there, and no authors are hurt since their entitlement to royalties expired long ago. However, as a lawyer, there is little doubt in my mind that that portion of this program that deals with works that are still subject to protection constitutes copyright infringement on a massive scale.

In this program, Google has decided to disregard the wishes of both publishers and authors by making their works available on-line for free. Here is a link to an article about this program. In order to strong arm publishers into participating, those who agree will have a “buy this book” link placed on the listing for that book. Those who don’t agree, won’t have that link included. The intent is obvious, and it’s a none-too-subtle effort to compel publishers to participate. In order to get around the problem of uncooperative publishers, Google has entered into agreements with three major university libraries to use their collections as the fodder for their scanning efforts.

Google claims that it will permit authors or publishers to opt out of its program. “We think most publishers and authors will choose to participate in the publisher program in order (to) introduce their work to countless readers around the world. But we know that not everyone agrees, and we want to do our best to respect their views too,” said the director of the program.

In my mind, there is no question that that is copyright infringement. Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. In Grokster, the Court addressed a challenge to the system of downloadable file-sharing of copyrighted music and film files on a peer-to-peer network. These ubiquitous networks have led to a proliferation of copyright infringement by permitting the distribution of copyrighted material for free. In short, the complaint against Grokster and its kind is that the copyrighted material is distributed for free, with no compensation to either the artist of the record company.

The U. S. Supreme Court found that “the unlawful objective is unmistakable,” and held that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential. Accordingly, just as Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe, 464 U.S. at 439, n. 19, mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.”

In my mind, what Google is proposing to do is absolutely no different from what Grokster and Napster did. It is not only inducing copyright infringement, it is actively encouraging and promoting it. It is a gross violation of my intellectual property rights, and the intellectual property rights of every other author who has poured his or her blood, sweat, and tears into their work. Nobody asked my permission, and if they had, I would say no.

I think that the most I have ever made in a year from the sale of my books is about $5,000. Clearly, that’s not enough to live on, and it probably doesn’t even cover what I spend per year on researching and gathering materials for my various projects. In short, it’s an awfully good thing that I don’t rely on my writing to make a living, because if I did, I would be living in a cardboard box somewhere. Given the fact that I make so little, and given the fact that I don’t do this purely out of altruism, it should not be much of a surprise that I wouldn’t support such a policy or program. In fact, I have specifically instructed at least one of my publishers to opt my works out of this program.

I was very pleased to see that the Authors Guild has commenced a class action copyright infringement suit against Google to enjoin this massive and arrogant flouting of my intellectual property rights. Here is an article about it. I wholeheartedly support this suit, and intend to take steps to join the class.

I appreciate everyone who buys my books. I fully understand and appreciate the fact that you have chosen to spend your hard-earned money on my work and that you could have spent that money on something else instead. That is both humbling and flattering to me, and I greatly appreciate it every time that it happens. I also appreciate the fact that my work can be checked out of a library. The library purchased that book. What I cannot and will not abide is the idea that the fruits of my labors can be stolen and given away for free with alacrity.

Thank you for your support.

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A version of this post has previously appeared on Bret Schulte’s blog.

I’ve always been one to buck settled history. In my mind, the only way to make sure that history remains a living, breathing, evolving thing is to challenge its settled assumptions. Properly and responsibly done, revisionism can be a powerful and welcome tool that causes us all to sit back and ask whether we should change the way we look at things. Consequently, I’ve always been known as one who’s not afraid of tilting at windmills.

However, doing so carries a great deal of responsibility. Whenever we challenge settled interpretations of history, we must do so carefully. Words are an extraordinarily powerful tool, and the choice of words can play havoc on people and on settled interpretations. Consequently, the only appropriate way to revise settled history is to do so responsibly and where there is ample evidence to support those revisionist interpretations of history.

I wish I could say that Tom Carhart’s recent book, _Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg–and Why It Failed_ is a worthy piece of revisionist history that adds something to the existing body of knowledge. Sadly, I cannot. Carhart’s work is revisionism of the worst sort–it’s grossly irresponsible, and there is not a shred of evidence to support Carhart’s contentions. What astonishes me most of all is that people have been flocking to buy this piece of tripe and that prominent and well-respected historians such as James McPherson and John Keegan have put their imprimatur on something that has no basis in fact.

Carhart’s theory is that Pickett’s Charge was to be coordinated with Jeb Stuart’s thrust at the Union rear with his cavalry. According to Carhart, the one true hero of the Battle of Gettysburg–the man who saved the Union–was Brig. Gen. George A. Custer. Thus, the clash on East Cavalry Field takes on an importance that it never had. Even for the most ardent cavalry admirer–like me–East Cavalry Field, while tactically important, has never been much more than a sideshow to the big show, to borrow a line from Sam Watkins.

The problem with this theory is that there simply is not a single shred of evidence to support it. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Stuart’s movement was in any fashion coordinated with what we now know as Pickett’s Charge. Not to be deterred by the facts, Carhart makes the preposterous and wholly unsubstantiated claim that the historical evidence was either destroyed, or even more absurd, that it was hidden and kept from Jeb Stuart to protect his delicate ego. Never mind that there is not a single stitch of evidence to support any of this. Where there is no evidence, Carhart just makes it up, inventing conversations that never took place to suit his purposes.

Where there is historical or documentary evidence that rebuts his theory, Carhart either manipulates it to suit his purposes, or he launches personal attacks on them. An excellent example of this is Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg, who commanded the Federal forces on East Cavalry Field. Gregg, according to Carhart, lied in his official report of the action in order to steal the credit that rightfully belonged to George A. Custer. The problem with this is that even the staunchest Custer supporter–Capt. James H. Kidd, who was Custer’s hand-picked successor to command the Michigan Cavalry Brigade when Custer was promoted to division command–saw it otherwise. Here’s what Kidd had to say about this:

“Thus, it is made plain that there was no ‘mistake’ about it. It was Gregg’s prescience. He foresaw the risk of attempting to guard the right flank with only the two decimated brigades of his own division. With him, to see was to act. He took the responsibility of intercepting Kilpatrick’s rear and largest brigade, turning it off the Baltimore pike to the right, instead of allowing it to go to the left as it had been ordered to do, and thus, doubtless, a serious disaster was averted. It makes us tremble to think of what might have been, of what inevitably must have happened had Gregg, with only two two little brigades of McIntosh and Irvin Gregg, and Randol’s battery, tried to cope single-handed with the four brigades and three batteries, comprising the very flower of Confederate cavalry and artillery, which those brave knights–Stuart, Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee–were marshaling in person on Cress’ Ridge. If Custer’s presence on this field was opportune, and, as has often been said, providential, it is to General D. M. Gregg to whom, under Providence, the credit for bringing him here is due. Gregg was a great and modest soldier; let us pause a moment before we enter upon a description of the coming battle, to pay him the tribute of our admiration. In the light of all of the official reports, put together link by link, so as to make one connected chain of evidence, we can see that the engagement which took place twenty-six years ago, was, from first to last, a well planned battle, in which the different commands were maneuvered and placed with the same sagacity displayed by a skillful chess player in moving the pieces upon a chess board; in which every detail was the fruit of the brain of one man, who, from the time when he turned Custer to the northward until he sent the First Michigan thundering against the brigades of Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee made not a single false move; who was distinguished not less for his intuitive foresight than for his quick perceptions at critical moments. That man was General David McM. Gregg.”

Unlike Tom Carhart, James H. Kidd was there, and was an active participant in that battle. Kidd had the benefit of his own observations, as well as of speaking with many other veterans. Kidd also worshipped George Custer. Kidd also said, “This conclusion has been reached by a mind not–certainly not–predisposed in that direction, after a careful recent study, and review of all the information within reach bearing upon that eventful day. If the Michigan Brigade won honors there that will not perish, it was to Gregg that it owed the opportunity; and his guiding hand it was that made its blows effective. We shall see how, later in the day, he again boldly took responsibility at a critical moment and held Custer to his work on the right, even after the latter had been ordered by higher authority than he (Gregg), to rejoin Kilpatrick, and after Custer had begun the movement.”

It bears noting that these passages by Kidd come from his speech at the 1889 dedication of the monument to the Michigan Cavalry Brigade that stands on the spot where the 1st Michigan Cavalry’s charge crashed into the onrushing Confederate cavalry on East Cavalry Field. This address has been published a number of times, including in Kidd’s well-known memoirs and also in a MOLLUS paper, and was readily available to Carhart. He never mentions it in his book.

Another point that needs to be made here is that Gregg actually usurped Custer twice during the fighting on East Cavalry Field. On two separate instances, Gregg issued orders directly to the commanders of first the 7th Michigan and later the 1st Michigan Cavalry regiments to charge. On both instances, Custer joined the charges, but he never ordered them. The fact that Custer had only been a general officer for four days, and that other than the fights and Hanover and Hunterstown, he had never led anything larger than a squad, while Gregg had been a general officer since the fall of 1862 and had a great deal more experience may have had something to do with this. Alternatively, perhaps expedience may have required that Gregg usurp Custer. Irrespective of the motives, the fact remains that Custer never ordered these charges, Gregg did. There is plenty of historical evidence to prove this.

Quite disenguously, Carhart then argues that Gregg–who, by the way, was known as one of the modest and self-effacing officers to serve in the Army of the Potomac–intentionally downplayed Custer’s role in order to play up his own role. This outrageous, slanderous claim flies directly in the face of ample historical evidence: David Gregg was remembered fondly by his men as “tall and spare, of notable activity, capable of the greatest exertion and exposure; gentle in manner but bold and resolute in action. Firm and just in discipline he was a favorite of his troopers and ever held, for he deserved, their affection and entire confidence.” Gregg knew the principles of war and was always ready and eager to apply them. Endowed “with a natural genius of high order, he [was] universally hailed as the finest type of cavalry leader. A man of unimpeachable personal character, in private life affable and genial but not demonstrative, he fulfilled with modesty and honor all the duties of the citizen and head of an interesting and devoted family.” A former officer later commented that Gregg’s “modesty kept him from the notoriety that many gained through the newspapers; but in the army the testimony of all officers who knew him was the same. Brave, prudent, dashing when occasion required dash, and firm as a rock, he was looked upon, both as a regimental commander and afterwards as Major-General, as a man in whose hands any troops were safe.” His men called him “Old Reliable.” Does that sound like a man who would downplay Custer’s role just to advance his own interests?

Carhart also claims that Stuart’s decision to order one of his batteries to fire four shots in the four directions of the compass was a signal to Robert E. Lee that he was in position and that Lee could then order the grand assault that became Pickett’s Charge. There is not a single shred of documentary evidence to support this claim. None at all. Further, historian Bill Styple has recently published an excellent new book titled _Generals in Bronze_, which consists of transcripts of interviews conducted by the eminent sculptor, James Kelly, who sculpted the monument to John Buford on the Gettysburg battlefield. One officer interviewed by Kelly was Alexander C. M. Pennington, who commanded the battery of horse artillery assigned to serve with Custer’s brigade. Here’s what Pennington had to say about this episode:

“When Jeb Stuart rode round our army at Gettysburg without striking us on the morning of July 3rd, he found that he could not locate us. Now [Maj. Henry] McClellan who was on his staff told me this story. He said that Stuart looked in every direction but could find no sign of our troops, so he ordered a gun out and ordered it to be fired in different directions in hopes of getting an echo or a reply from one of our guns, and then through his glass locate the smoke.

He fired in one direction, and then [received] an answering gun. He said that shot from that gun entered the muzzle of their gun, and knocked it off the trunions, breaking two wheels. Now, he said, this seems remarkable, almost incredible, but when he told me that story he said, ‘I assure you on the honor of a gentleman that it is true.’ And the singular fact is that it was my gun that did it. I was standing with Custer when I told my gunners to fire at them. He was an Irishman by the name of ————. I noticed he took a long time before he fired. Of course we could not tell at that distance exactly what happened.”

My experience is that H. B. McClellan, who was Stuart’s adjutant, is a reliable and dependable source. So much for Carhart’s nonsensical theory.

Carhart also devotes a major portion of this book–in redundant and poorly written fashion–discussing the historical battles that were taught as the primary curriculum at West Point. The actual discussion of the fighting on East Cavalry Field occupies only a small portion of the overall book, but Carhart claims that these historical lessons molded, formed, and drove Lee’s strategy for the third day at Gettysburg. Never mind that there is no evidence to support any of this. Instead, Carhart conveniently claims that a 1935 fire destroyed the evidence. How convenient.

The rest of this book is just as poorly researched. The book has no bibliography, which makes it impossible to examine the scope of his research. When we reach the discussion of East Cavalry Field, the only real primary sources consulted by Carhart seem to be the Official Records of the Civil War, and the correspondence by veterans included in _The Bachelder Papers_. While the _Bachelder Papers_ are an invaluable source, there are many more important primary sources that Carhart either ignored outright, or more likely, simply disregarded if they did not support his thesis. That this is lazy at best and intellectually dishonest at worst should be obvious.

This book also contains many major errors. How, for instance, is it possible to sneak 4,000 mounted men behind Union lines without detection? According to Carhart, the paved road network meant that billowing clouds of dust would not betray his presence. Later on, Carhart claims that Custer saw the dust of Stuart’s advance, thereby enabling him to prepare his brilliant defense. Which is it? These sorts of inconsistencies fill this book and leave the reader scratching his or her head and wondering just what the hell Carhart’s really trying to say.

I think that the thing that bothers me the most about this book is that Amazon.com, which seems to be selling the hell out of it, has apparently decided that it is no longer interested in honest and fair critical assessments of the works it sells in its reviews section. There have been multiple negative reviews of this festering pile of garbage, and most–but not all–have been censored by Amazon. I am aware, for instance, that one individual has had three different reviews deleted/censored by Amazon. Of course, any fawning review is kept, but anything that questions or otherwise criticizes this terrible book gets censored, meaning that unknowing or unsuspecting consumers will end up buying this book because they have been intentionally misled. In my mind, this is consumer fraud. Then, when the likes of Keegan and McPherson endorse this garbage, it only adds to the appearance of the legitimacy of what is a lousy piece of work.

This book is an intellectually dishonest, poorly researched, fabricated piece of tripe that manipulates SOME of the available evidence to support foregone conclusions and which should be marketed as fiction. It is certainly not history, and it constitutes revisionism of the worst variety. Save your money. Buy a happy meal at McDonald’s. You will find it to be a much better–and ultimately more satisfying–use of your hard-earned money.

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