Civil War books and authors

Ted Savas recently published a book titled Playing With the Enemy. The book tells the story of Gene Moore, whose extremely promising baseball career was interrupted by World War II. Moore was sent on a secret mission to guard German prisoners of war, and ended up teaching them to play baseball. It makes for quite a story, and it’s a terrific book. Gene Moore’s son Gary wrote the book to honor his father and tell his story.

The rights to Gene Moore’s story were recently sold to a major Hollywood producer, Gerald R. Molen, who is going to make a major Hollywood movie from it. Presumably, Gary Moore was paid a substantial amount of money for the movie rights to his father’s story. I hope he was. There’s so little money being made in history that I root for anyone who does happen to hit it big.

I can only hope that some day, some way, one of my books will be sold to Hollywood. Maybe then, I can finally tell Susan, “See? I told you we’d make back all of that money I spent doing my book projects eventually.” 🙂

Congratulations, Gary, and best wishes.

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Now that the Dahlgren project is winding down, I face the challenge of finding a publisher for the project.

I will finish my third editing pass at the manuscript no later than the middle of next week, and then I will put the revisions into the computer. Once I’ve done that, it’s ready to be circulated to a few chosen friends for review and comment. In other words, it’s getting close to completion.

Before anyone asks, I will answer the question. It’s not an appropriate book for Ironclad because we made a conscious business decision to devote all of our resources to publishing only volumes in our “The Discovering Civil War America Series” (with the exception of two other titles that were already under contract when we made that decision), and a biography of Ulric Dahlgren most assuredly doesn’t fit into the Series. Therefore, Ironclad is not an option.

So, I’m left with the challenge of finding a publisher for this project. As fascinating a young man as Ully Dahlgren was, he died at the age of 21 years, 11 months. He was a colonel, not a general. The story is intriguing, the controversy fascinating, and the saga of what happened to his body after his death tantalizing, but the fact remains that Ully was a minor player in the big scheme of things. That, by definition, means that we’re looking at a limited demand for the book. A limited demand means that placing it with a commercial publishing house will be a challenge at best. Ted Savas has passed on it for that reason, and so have Bruce Franklin of Westholme Publishing and Don McKeon of Potomac Books, formerly known as Brassey’s, and which has published four of my books to date.

It would appear, therefore, that a university press will be where it ends up, in spite of my well-known reservations about university presses. The LSU Press has expressed some interest in the project, and I will give LSU the first shot at it. I sent LSU a query letter, and the acquisitions editor asked to see the manuscript when it’s ready. However, I would really prefer NOT to go with a university press if I can help it for the reasons that I’ve spelled out in the past here. The last book of mine done by LSU took nearly three years to find its way into print, and I really don’t want to have to wait that long for this one.

If anyone has any suggestions for me of other potential commercial publishing houses that might be an appropriate place for my Dahlgren bio, I’m happy to entertain them.

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My first book was published in 1998. It’s titled Gettysburg’s Forgotten Cavalry Actions, and was published by Thomas Publications of Gettysburg. The book won the Bachelder-Coddington Literary Award given each year by the Robert E. Lee Civil War Roundtable of New Jersey as 1998’s best new work interpreting the Battle of Gettysburg.

The book covers Farnsworth’s Charge, Merritt’s fight on South Cavalry Field, and the Battle of Fairfield. It’s short, only about 150 pages, but it’s the first time that anyone ever really tackled these issues in depth. It features excellent maps by John Heiser and lots of photos, including a bunch of modern-day views. The book sells for the very reasonable price of $12.95, as it’s softcover.

Here’s where it came from: I had done an article on South Cavalry Field that was published in Gettysburg Magazine, and one on Fairfield that appeared in America’s Civil War, and I actually was researching Farnsworth’s Charge for another article. My friend Rick Sauers suggested that I should do a book project instead, so I did.

Since I wrote this book, additional sources have surfaced that I would have liked to have been able to include. However, I stand by my conclusions and my analysis, and I think that the book has aged reasonably well. And therein lies the crux of my dilemma.

The book has sold steadily but not spectacularly. To date, it has sold something like 4300 copies–not bad–and there are less than 200 copies left in the inventory at Thomas Publications. Dean Thomas, the publisher, has already told me that when they’re gone, he doesn’t intend to reprint the book and that he will revert my publishing rights to me.

At the same time, J. D. and I plan to write a three-volume history of cavalry operations during the Gettysburg Campaign where I will be able to update the thing and include the additional material, etc. At the same time, it will be a comprehensive study and not a volume devoted to a particular topic.

So, I find myself on the horns of a dilemma. Do I seek out another publisher to keep Gettysburg’s Forgotten Cavalry Actions in print? Or do I let it go out of print and just wait for the multi-volume study to come out? Since it has always sold well, I’m inclined to find another publisher, but that raises yet another dilemma: who?

I welcome input from you, friends. What do you think I ought to do?

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This afternoon, JD and I got an e-mail from Ted Savas letting us know that the first printing of our book is completely sold out, one week after the books shipped from the printer. What’s more is that Ted told me that he has a very substantial lot of backorders pending, too. He’s going to be ordering a second printing of the book next week.

JD and I both had a pretty good idea that this book was going to sell well, but it’s done better than either of us could possibly have hoped.

There will be a difference between the first printing and all subsequent ones. For some reason, the same photograph of Alfred Pleasonton appears twice in the first printing. Somehow, it slipped by all of us until I noticed it the other night flipping pages. The second printing and any subsequent printings will have a different image where the Pleasonton photo appears the second time. All of us were amazed that it got by Ted, J.D., me, and Lee Merideth, the indexer. It just goes to show you that things sometimes get through, no matter how hard we try to catch everything.

I’m just blown away by the reaction that this book is receiving and with how well it’s doing. Thank you to each and every one of you who has made this happen.

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I continue to plug away at editing/revising the working draft of the Dahlgren biography. I have now completed two full passes at the manuscript. I have one pass left to go before finishing this phase of the editing/rewrite process. I have added a couple of paragraphs so far, and I’ve cleaned up nearly all of the unwanted and excessive use of the passive voice.

I’ve also continued to tweak and modify the discussion of what Lincoln may or may not have known about the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid. I added a whole paragraph to it tonight. Reader Pete Vermilyea made an excellent point in an e-mail to me about this topic that makes a lot of sense. So much sense, in fact, that I added a paragraph. The gist of Pete’s point–and the gist of what I added tonight–is that Grant’s promotion to lieutenant general was approved by the Senate on March 2, 1864, the very day that Ully Dahlgren died. Given that Grant’s promotion was in the works when the raid was ordered, and given that Grant was promoted in order to permit him to assume command of the all of the armies of the United States of America, it does not make a great deal of sense for Stanton to have been closely involved in the plans spelled out in the Dahlgren Papers. Why would Stanton have ordered something that would have created absolute chaos just as Grant–the Lincoln Administration’s chosen savior–was assuming command? As Pete quite correctly points out, this defies logic. It certainly is a powerful argument against the involvement of either Lincoln or Stanton.

Thanks very much to Pete Vermilyea for bringing this fascinating point to my attention. I’m glad he did, as I hadn’t even considered the timing of Grant’s promotion vis-a-vis the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid.

Next up: Begin the third pass at the manuscript. When I’m finished with that, I will take my handwritten notes and enter the revisions into the computer. Once that process is completed, I will then forward the manuscript to my select group of readers who are kind enough to donate their time and effort to reviewing my work for me. When I get their comments and incorporate their revisions, I then make a final pass at the manuscript, and then it’s done.

I’m making good progress, and will continue to do so.

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If you will indulge me in a little shameless self-promotion for a moment….

I’m pleased to announce the release of Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart’s Controversial Ride to Gettysburg, published by Savas-Beatie Publishing, and written by J. D. Petruzzi and me. It’s been a long time coming, but it’s out. When I got home from work tonight, there were sufficient boxes on my side porch for a couple of hundred copies. If I’ve got them, that means that the orders received by Amazon, Savas-Beatie, etc., are ready to be filled.

J. D. and I are also proud to announce the launch of our new web site, devoted to this book. Please visit.

It’s still a thrill every time that I see one of my books for the first time, and I’m especially proud of this one.

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I’m now in the process of tweaking and editing my own work. I typically prefer to get things down on paper and then do a lot of tweaking, editing, and rewriting as I go. I print out the manuscript and work off a hard copy. I will typically take three or four passes at it before entering the revisions into the computer. I use a different color ink for each pass in order to make it easy for me to tell when I’ve made a change. For this first pass at the Dahlgren manuscript, I’m using a green pen. The next pass will be red, the third pass will be in purple, and if I do a fourth pass at it, I will probably use black. When that process is completed, the work is then ready to be sent out for review and comment by a select group of friends who read virtually everything that I write.

My first drafts tend to be plagued by too much passive voice, and eradicating it and making those constructions active tends to be the focus of the first editing pass at the draft. The other drafts focus on fine-tuning and tightening things up. By the time I’ve gotten through my review process, I’ve pretty much done what I can do with the thing, as I can no longer even see problems any more.

I’m nearly finished with my first pass at the Dahlgren manuscript, and should finish that first pass tomorrow night. There’s plenty of green ink bleeding all over the manuscript, and I will definitely have my work cut out for me when the time comes to input all of the changes. I will then take a couple of days off and then pitch into my second pass.

By the time that this process is completed, I’m thoroughly sick and tired of the thing, largely incapable of even looking at it again for a while. It’s a good thing that it typically takes my readers a month or two to go through the draft and get it back to me, because I DEFINITELY need the time away from the manuscript.

I will keep everyone posted as to my progress.

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With his express permission, here is the pertinent portion of the letter from Dave Gaddy:

By e-mail I also wrote of the composition of the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren columns, seeing evidence of “task-organization” that seemed so modern to me. For example, the assignment of men from the BMI, headed by Capt. McEntee, one of the (if not the) top men of Sharpe’s organization; the assignment of two signal officers (which should have entailed a small team of accompanying signal specialists each); engineers, pioneers, commissaries, quartermasters, etc., plus “specialized equipment” for raiders, such as oakum, turpentine, and torpedoes/mines—placed under control of signal officers. I do appreciate your desire not to be drawn into a detailed examination of the raid itself. But, for example, Ed Fishel’s acolyte, Feis [Grant’s Secret Service] (304 n38) identifies “at least” eight BMI “employees” as accompanying the raiders—Capt McEntee plus two with Kilpatrick and five with Dahlgren. The latter include Hogan (Lt., 1st Ind Cav) and Swisher, whom you refer to as Dahlgren’s guides [Chapter 11, pp. 28, which I’ll ref here as 11-28, and 35, more or less], but their relationship with BMI may reveal another dimension to the origin and composition of the raid.

What I’m pressing is the level of “who knew what,” who sketched the concept, who authorized it, who allowed (or directed) Dahlgren’s involvement, etc., which are treated in 11-4, 5 and elsewhere. In a commentary (“Reflections on Come Retribution”) published in the Winter 1989 issue (Vol. III, No. 4) of The International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 567-573, I stressed our discovery of the covert executive-level authorization and funding of secret service activities in the CSA and suggested that it perhaps followed a familiar USA model, namely, that Congress appropriated (starting with Geo. Washington) a “privy purse” to be disbursed at the direction of the President, by his executive agent, the Secretary of State, to the mission agent (say, Secretary of War, for further relay down the line). This provided “executive deniability” for the President and offered two or more cabinet level officials who could “take the fall” if something went wrong. After the publication of CR, James O. Hall directed my attention to proof that the US did follow that model, namely, a Lincoln authorization to Seward to advance “secret service” funds to Meigs for a mission to Pensacola. (This continued until the creation of CIA in 1947 and the deniability aspect disappeared when Eisenhower “’fessed up” to U2 overflights of the Soviet Union.) Sorry for the long-winded digression. My point is that too much behind the story of the raid (talk about foreshadowing the Son Tay Raid in Viet Nam!) smacks of White House secrecy and drew me later to the George/Wistar argument, perhaps stemming from Lincoln’s interview with senior escapees from Richmond. I find it difficult to stop (or start) with Stanton. Wily Mr. Lincoln and his SecWar were as adept at covering their tracks as were Davis and Benjamin. Ditto Butler. (I confess that the psychological complexity of Stanton gives me fits.) There seem to be traces of prior PYA thinking (e.g., Kilpatrick’s acceptance and possible setting-up of Dahlgren as fall guy or sponsored hero), ex post facto cover-up (e.g., the disappearance of the Dahlgren papers originals), and promulgation of the heroic patriot “take.” (That there was genuine concern for the plight of brave men in prison I do not doubt, and I cannot read Adm Dahlgren’s grief-stricken writing unmoved.) I write this for your information: I think you have done an excellent job of finding your trail through the mine-field. This may or may not strengthen your conviction here and there.

Here’s what I find intriguing about his analysis. First, and foremost, there seems little reason to have sent so many BMI guys–including the very best of them–unless there was something more to this than meets the eye. I was not aware that Hogan and Swisher were BMI guys–I understood that Martin Hogan, a lieutenant in the 1st Indiana Cavalry, was simply Dahlgren’s favorite scout, with whom he had worked previously. I must admit that this does cause me to reassess some of my thinking on this issue.

I also find some of his analysis–specifically that part which addresses the conspiracy aspects of this–somewhat persuasive, although I tend not to be much of a believer in conspiracy theories. In point of fact, I normally don’t buy into conspiracy theories.

To clarify one thing he mentions: the “George/Wistar” reference is to an extremely interesting article by Joseph George, Jr., “‘Black Flag Warfare’: Lincoln and the Raids Against Richmond and Jefferson Davis.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 115, No. 3 (July 1991): 291-318. The article by George was the one that first tipped me off to the Wistar expedition.

I am still not persuaded by Dave, although I’m looking at his theory a bit more closely than I did previously. I am going to include this same discussion (cleaned up just a bit) in one of the endnotes to the manuscript because I consider it to be well-reasoned and worthy of inclusion. I remain convinced that Lincoln himself had no knowledge but that the order may well have come from Stanton.

And, as reader Bill Bergen pointed out in a comment to last night’s post, it remains entirely possible–and perhaps even probable–that Kilpatrick and/or Dahlgren were cowboying here, and that nobody beside them knew.

What’s clear is that we will never know the answer to this mystery. It remains a fascinating and terribly perplexing question that will probably continue to tantalize me for the rest of my life.

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Those of you who read this blog regularly know that I’ve spent a lot of time–and a lot of words here–discussing the question of what Lincoln knew and when he knew it with respect to the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid, and specifically, whether Lincoln knew of and approved of a plan to kidnap and assassinate Jefferson Davis and his cabinet, as certain papers found on Dahlgren’s body suggested.

A couple of weeks ago, I posted the working draft of my take on this question here, and the next night, I supplemented that post with additional thoughts on the same question. Between these two posts, I laid out my thoughts on this topic in great detail, and figured that I had, at long last, tiptoed tuft to tuft across this particular morass. I was ready to move on.

I sent the working drafts of those portions of the manuscript that dealt with the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid, including the appendix, which addresses the validity of the Dahlgren Papers themselves, to David W. Gaddy, one of the three authors of Come Retribution, a book-length study of the Lincoln Assassination. This book postulates that the Lincoln assassination actually was ordered and carried out by the Confederate secret service, in part to avenge the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid.

Dave Gaddy is a former intelligence officer, and he is quite knowledgeable about these events. Consequently, I thought I would get his thoughts on the working draft. I got much more than I bargained for in doing so. When Dave wrote me back, he laid out an entirely new angle on this for me that spells out a somewhat persuasive argument that Lincoln not only knew, he actually ordered the kidnapping and execution of Davis and his ministers.

To borrow a line from Michael Corleone, just when I thought that I was out they pull me back in.

Dave’s thoughtful letter to me prompted me to reassess some of thinking on this whole question. I’m still not entirely convinced that Lincoln knew, but I’m leaning a bit more in that direction than I had previously. I’m getting ready to go back and see about revising my take on these events once more. If Dave gives me permission to do so, I will post his letter here.

This question hovers over any biography of Ulric Dahlgren like the sword of Damocles. Much as I would love to duck this question altogether, it simply has to be addressed by anyone attemptin to tell the story of this young man’s life. There is no way around it, and I can’t think of any single question about the Late Unpleasantness that has in turn intrigued me and driven me crazy more than this one has over the years I’ve wrestled with it.

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I’m often asked why I continue to write books about the Civil War. Surely, they say, with the thousands of books that have been written on the subject, what could possibly be left to cover?

The answer, amazingly enough, is plenty. I’ve always tried to choose topics that others don’t. Take a look at my studies of Sheridan’s Trevilian Raid or the Battle of Monroe’s Crossroads if you need examples of what I mean here. From my perspective, the more obscure, the better. There are, of course, exceptions: our forthcoming book on Stuart’s ride during the Gettysburg Campaign is a topic that has been covered previously, but we’ve brought a completely different approach to the subject that will set our book apart from any other treatment of it.

There are a surprising number of major gaps in the body of literature. Although the world most assuredly does not need yet another book on Pickett’s Charge, there are significant holes in the modern coverage of the war that definitely need to be filled. Here are a couple of examples.

The most notable example I can come up with is one that’s been discussed here before, the lack of a really detailed study of the Petersburg Campaign of 1864 and 1865. This campaign lasted nearly ten months, and saw brutal, hard-fought combat. Andy Trudeau’s The Last Citadel is the only book devoted to the entire campaign, but at 514 pages, it obviously does not go into real depth on any single aspect of it. Dick Sommers wrote his mammoth book Richmond Redeemed in 1981, but it covers only Grant’s fifth offensive in the summer of 1864. Will Green’s Breaking the Backbone of the Confederacy deals only with the breakout from Petersburg in April 1865. H. E. Howard has published a number of volumes dealing with small pieces of the campaign, usually of uneven quality, that deal with small bits and pieces of the campaign such as Ream’s Station, the Wilson-Kautz Raid, Globe Tavern, etc. However, other than Andy Trudeau’s book, there is no true study of the campaign. This is a gap that must be filled. I remain hopeful that a scholar of Gordon Rhea’s caliber will step up and write a series of books on the campaign that will document it as well as Gordon documented the 1864 Overland Campaign.

Jubal Early’s Valley Campaign encompassed the months of July-November 1864. However, no published history of the campaign has covered the first two months of the campaign in any detail. Jeff Wert’s fine book From Winchester to Cedar Creek really covers the fighting between Sheridan and Early and does not cover the early phase of the campaign in any detail. Tom Lewis’ The Guns of Cedar Creek likewise gives this period short shrift.

I just finished reading the second half of Scott Patchan’s landmark study on the first portion of Early’s Valley Campaign. Patchan deserves every bit of the praise that this book will generate. He’s covered this period in exhaustive detail, giving the best account of the Second Battle of Kernstown–the critical event of this period–yet written. He likewise touches on the burning of Chambersburg and the resulting crushing defeat of McCausland’s cavalry at Moorefield a couple of days later yet tackled. This book fills a gap that has remained unfilled for far too long, and Scott is to be commended for doing such a fine job of it.

His work is a fine example of the sort of works that are still out there, just begging to be written. So long as works of this caliber touch on these neglected portions of the Civil War, the health of its scholarship will remain robust. However, once we fall back on publishing nothing but the 79th book on Pickett’s Charge with nothing new being added, then there will be no reason to go on. At that moment, I will lament both the state of scholarship, as well as the overwhelming lack of interest in anything new among the consuming public.

Kudos to Scott. Keep up the good work, Scott. I’m eagerly looking forward to seeing this one in print.

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