David Long’s Dahlgren Article

Eric,

After reading the article I reached the same conclusion that you did. And, like you, I remain intrigued by this whole question and try to keep an open mind.

I read the article as well, and think he scores some points and has a more coherent theory about how everything transpired and why than any I have read so far. That Lincoln was close to Dahlgren Sr. was something I missed and want to study on my own. But having built his case with small step after small step, he is forced to take running giant steps to get to the conclusion that Lincoln ordered a raid to assinate Davis and his cabinet. I think we disagree with Long only because we take somewhat shorter steps to get to a suspicion that Dahlgren acted on his own. That, on balance, is what the evidence indicates.

I know this controversy is one of those that I will ponder until someone comes up with evidence that conclusively points one way or another. Until that time, I will keep looking and wondering. I am looking rather intensely at Stanton’s actions in the late summer and throughout the fall of 1863; if anything emerges, I will let you know.

Bill

This recent trend in CW history to write these types of articles in which the circumstantial is stretched into what appears to be fact is beginning to get under my skin. Perhaps some historians are lately feeling that there’s nothing left to write about, so we’re getting this from all sides. Take a controversial subject, take the “non-conventional” side (anything juicy that bucks current notions about personalities, etc) and present it in a way that appears to be fact. The danger in all this, though, is the reader who accepts the speculation as fact. Readers are led beyond the acceptable result that differing sides of a controversy are “possible” and led to believe that, for instance, Long’s assertions have more weight in the evidence than other possibilities.
IMHO, Long should have made much more of the point that everything he postulates is based on shaky circumstantial evidence. The postulations in the article are terrific – and have been proffered in other articles and books before – but this style of presentation can give many the wrong idea about what is fact, what is speculation, and what is not supported in the historical record.
I don’t know. Maybe 30 years ago this type of writing wouldn’t be printed without running the gauntlet of a tougher editorial department. Maybe there would be much more of an effort to have disclaimers throughout, and more made of exculpatory evidence. I have a collection of the popular CW magazines going back 40 years, and this is definitely a trend you wouldn’t have seen back then, I think. And it’s not just CW subjects – look at many of the history shows on TV today and you see the very same thing.
Again, it’s not just investigations into various theories of controversies, but that new trend to present the highly speculative as if fact. Maybe the shock factor is becoming more attractive to an increasingly bored audience.

J.D.

Eric,

Cover his own tracks in what way? By blaming Dahlgren, Stanton could have historically speaking, not only covered his OWN tracks but Lincoln’s as well. Surely, he was far LESS likely to be seen as ‘innocent’ when he became directly involved in the ‘disappearance’ of the original documents.

Someone once pointed out in an article naming Mosby as a party to Lincoln’s death, that ‘the guilty flee where there is no pursuit’. Parenthetically, in Mosby’s case, the writer was wrong as Mosby had EVERY reason to avoid arrest, but he did in fact, NOT ‘flee’. Rather, he remained in Northern Virginia, the area in which he had operated during the war. On the other hand, by attempting to destroy all traces of the original documents, Stanton gives every appearance of a man ‘fleeing’ despite the fact that none were pursuing him – or Lincoln for that matter. If the article writer is correct, then it would appear that Stanton’s actions constitute an actual admission of guilt. But even if Stanton HAD been involved, that does not automatically exonerate Lincoln – it merely takes the onus off Dahlgren as the sole miscreant.

As for articles being written based upon speculation: again, how else can they be written when those involved have long gone to their reward? Coming to a conclusion by deduction that is based upon evidence supported by the facts, historical documents, contemporary testimony etc. is what being an ‘historian’ is all about. As none of us lived through these times, we must, of necessity base what we write on the conclusions (and sometimes speculations) arising from and based upon the evidence at hand. Sometimes there is no doubt about that evidence – who won, who lost, dates of battles, births, deaths etc. But damned little history could be written if historians limited themselves to such concrete, irrefutable things.

Most histories contain more than a bit of ‘deduction’ (or call it speculation if you will) which in turn is based upon the writer’s perception of the iron-clad facts as well as more circumstantial pieces of the puzzle. Indeed, I believe that frequently, many new and interesting insights are garnered when previously accepted facts – circumstantial and otherwise – are seen through new and different perspectives frequently brought about by such ‘speculations’.

There is a difference here between historical revisionism performed to turn the orthodox view of a matter on its head (often merely for the sake of doing just that) and the exploration of other possibilities not ruled out by clear and concise facts referable to the event in question. There is no reason that today, as in the past, sacrosanct ‘orthodoxies’ may be proven erroneous and replaced by a more accurate interpretation of the event or events. But that only comes about when we aren’t afraid to ‘speculate’ ourselves or entertain the speculations of other competent sources.

I haven’t gotten my copy yet, so I cannot speak to the article.

However, I do find that frequently, writers cast their conclusions as ‘fact’ inasmuch as they have used ‘fact’ to arrive at same. Naturally, the problem lies in the translation, interpretation and/or interpolation of facts arriving at the conclusion being presented as something OTHER than a translation, interpretation and/or interpolation but as the facts themselves.

For instance, 1 + 1 +? We can all agree that 1 is 1 and that’s a fact. We can also agree that it is possible to add together 1 to another 1 and that, too, is a fact (no pun intended). The problem arises when we get to the other side of the ‘=’ sign. In the above example, the ‘conclusion’ is obvious. However, it is also math and math has a tendency to be fairly ‘proveable’. With less concrete and more circumstantial ‘facts’, even though they ARE ‘facts’, the other side of the ‘=’ sign is, in most instances, reasonably open to debate.

It would seem to me therefore, that your problem is not with speculation, per se, but with the presentation of speculation, deduction, educated guesses, conclusions etc. as that part of the equation to the LEFT of the ‘=’ sign; that is, when all of the above is now presented as ‘fact’ rather than what it is. If that is your point, I agree wholeheartedly. Fact is fact and even though I might find that a series of facts and even prior accepted conclusions lead to ‘point A’, I am not permitted to present my point of view as ‘fact’, only as what it is: my point of view. If the article writer is presenting his conclusions and deductions – no matter how persuasive – as ‘fact’, I will take issue with him as, I assume, you also do.

Alas, however, that is how many people write today. Few make the statement that the conclusions they’ve reached – however informed and reasonable – are still speculative since there is no absolutely conclusive evidence either way.

Of course, there are conclusions considered ‘orthodox’ in the historical community that are based on circumstantial evidence. Indeed, probably MOST ‘orthodoxy’ arises in that way and that is because so very few ABSOLUTES are available. When they are, then there is little controversy but even the most acceptable ‘truths’ are open to interpretation.

I happen to concur with Mr. Long’s conclusion from the facts I have seen – albeit I have not read his piece. However, I would never have presented it in that way. I would have said that there was evidence which indicates that President Lincoln could well have been involved – and I think that that statement is reasonable. However, to make the bald statement that it is a matter of irrevocable fact is less than honest. On the other hand, he got your attention, didn’t he and maybe that’s why he made the statement in the first place! 😀

Just a note before I leave for my tour of Mosby’s Confederacy: I gave the article a quick glance last night and, of course, immediately discovered something of IMMENSE interest. Mr. Long refers to John Mosby as speaking with CUSTER sometime after the war. We know that he spoke with Wistar as Eric mentioned from Mosby’s own letters. However, to my mind, if John Mosby had any contact with George Armstrong Custer after the war, it most probably would have been to shoot the man, not talk with him. Mosby never forgot nor forgave Custer for the hanging and shooting of his men at Front Royal although there is some question as to whether or not Custer can be faulted or at least faulted exclusively given that the order was Torbert’s. Nonetheless, Mosby’s antipathy for Custer never wavered and that ‘s why I could not believe Mr. Long’s off-hand mention of their meeting (and talking civilly, that is!) in his article.

At the same time, however, I am also far too ignorant to state with any confidence that such a meeting did NOT take place. Ergo, I have sent the question out to some Mosby experts whom I know to see if they can further enlighten me. If it turns out that this ‘meeting’ to which Mr. Long refers is unknown to the persons whom I have contacted, it is probable that it never took place and that puts Mr. Long’s accuracy in grave doubt.

I will let the group know the results when I receive the information requested.

I conducted a 2-1/2 day seminar on the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid with David Long two years ago, and also participated with him on the same subject at a symposium. Whilst I concentrated on the military aspects & objectives of the Raid and David focused on Lincoln’s involvement (or non-involvement) in the Raid, there’s no question that he wants to advance his theories as far as he can. I’ve also develpped an hour-long slide presentation on the Raid, relying heavily in my research on the same primary sources that Virgil C. Jones used when he wrote his definitive book on the Raid, Eight Hours Before Richmond. “Pat” Jones interviewed eyewitnesses to the events surrounding the Raid in the years before they died. While David’s circumstancial evidence bears examining, there is no proof that the Raid originated in Lincoln’s mind nor did he advance it before it was proposed to him. The War was entering its fourth full year in 1864, and it seemed like it would go on forever. In addition, the plight of Union soldiers held captive in Libby Prison and on Belle Isle in Richmond was becoming well known, thanks to reports provided by Elizabeth Van Lew. Maj.-Gen. Benj. Butler, headquartered at Fortress Monroe, was a very politically ambitious man who had eyes on the Executive Mansion in Washington. As the commanding officer of Brig.-Gen. Isaac Wister, Butler stood to gain a lot of favorable publicity that would have been of immense political value to him in the election of 1864 had Wister’s raid been successful. Gen. Butler also had a personal score to settle with the President of the Confederate States. Despite the fact that Butler campaigned very hard to have Jefferson Davis nominated for president at the 1860 Democratic national convention, Pres. Davis was not amused by Butler’s behavior when Butler’s troops captured New Orleans in 1862 and he, among other things, declared that the ladies of New Orleans were to be treated as common prostitutes if they showed any disrespect to the Federal occupation forces. Mr. Davis branded Butler a common criminal and an enemy of mankind who should be executed without trial should be be captured. Another equally ambitious man was Maj-Gen. H. Judson Kilpatrick, spending an idle winter of 1863-64 encamping at his headquarters, Rose Hill, in Culpeper County, Va. Kilpatrick had eyes on the state house in Trenton and envisioned himself as the next governor of New Jersey. With the failure of the Wister raid, why not propose the same type of raid on a grander scale, with the likelihood that he, Kilpatrick, might be the next occupant of the Executive Mansion if his raid should be successful and the War brought to a close? During his convalescence in Washington following the amputation of his leg, Col. Dahlgren was a frequent visitor to the Executive Mansion, thanks to his father’s close friendship with Mr. Lincoln, and there is a documented meeting between Lincoln and Dahlgren while Mr. Lincoln was being shaved a few days after Lincoln’s meeting with Kilpatrick in mid-February 1864. Was the raid discussed between Lincoln and Dahlgren? There is no evidence to prove it but it is quite likely that the raid was discussed, for Dahlgren reported to Kilpatrick’s headquarters near Stevensburg, Va., a few days later, as the Army of the Potomac was about the celebrate Washington’s birthday with a ball to be held in an enormous wooden building constructed just for the purpose. But Dahlgren was not there in Culpeper County to dance.
It’s interesting to note that, after the failure of the K-D Raid, vehement objections about knowledge of the darker aspects of the raid—burning Richmond to the ground and the killing of Jefferson Davis and the cabinet—were raised at the highest levels of the Army of the Potomac. Maj.-Gen. Kilpatrick denied ordering any depredations against the Confederate government or the civilian population of Richmond, stating that if what was contained in the Dahlgren Papers was true, then the orders must have come from Col. Dahlgren, who was not in a position to defend himself, having been killed at Mantapike Hill in King & Queen County on the night of March 2nd, 1864. Maj-Gen. George Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, vigorously denied knowing of the darker aspects of the raid in a flurry of correspondence he conducted with General Lee. But in private letters to Mrs. Meade, he confided in her that he believed that the depredations proposed against the Confederate government and the civilian population lay squarely with Gen. Kilpatrick. Interestingly enough, there was nothing but silence from the Executive Mansion regarding the controversy. Nevertheless, once the Dahlgren Papers were published in Southern newspapers and inflamed public opinion about the barbarism of warfare proposed by the Federal government not only in the Confederacy but also in Europe, the Confederate States soon began earmarking substantial amounts of money for the Confederate States Secret Service, for expenditures that have recently come to light regarding “black flag warfare” as terrorim was known in the 1860s. That being the case, it is quite likely that the telegram dated 9.25 p.m. on February 11th, 1864, ordering Gen. Kilpatrick to go to Washington to see Abraham Lincoln might well have been Mr. Lincoln’s death warrant. Of course we’ll never know for sure. But David Long seems determined to find the “smoking gun” and place it squarely in Mr. Lincoln’s hand. ~~~AC

Eric~~~You’re welcome. In the interest of space, I could have gone on to cite a number of other documented examples which clouds the issue of Lincoln’s direct involvement before Kilpatrick or Dahlgren got involved. Contrary to what David Long stated in his article, other historians HAVE examined the correlation between Stoneman’s 1863 raid and the K-D Raid of 1864. In fact, Pat Jones wrote in his book that Kilpatrick looked at how close Stoneman came to accomplishing his mission in the 1863 raid and this gave him the confidence that he could pull off such a raid in 1864. Needless to say, I get very suspicious when an author states as fact that he/she is aware of something of historical importance that multitudes of other historians managed to overlook. Thus, David Long begins his article by stating that his research has proven to him without a doubt that the K-D Raid originated with Lincoln, a fact that no one else has ever uncovered, and that he selected Ulrich Dahlgren to lead the raid and that Kilpatrick was just a diversion. To be a truthful and accurate historian to have made statements like that, one can only assume that there is documented proof to support those claims. It’s incredible that David Long found that proof when it escaped so many other historians, including this writer. Knowing what we know of Judson Kilpatrick and his ambitions and penchant for taking advantage of any opportunity that could possibly be of some benefit to him, I find it equally incredible to believe, in the absence of any documented proof, that Kilpatrick would have been willing to allow Dahlgren to reap the glory had the raid been a success, and that he, Kilpatrick, would have been content to occupy a secondary role in achieving the objectives of the Raid. With Dahlgren dead and unable to defend himself, why would Kilpatrick have expended so much energy and pen and ink blaming others for the failure of the raid if he had occupied only a seconadry role in the Raid? He blamed Dahlgren for failing to achieve his objectives (inlcuding crossing over the James River at Jude’s Ferry); he blamed Butler for failure to send troops up the peninsula from Yorktown to support him when Col. Walter Stevens and the Confederate troops at the Intermediate Defenses of Richmond turned Kilpatrick’s troopers back on the Brooke Turnpike on March 1st. But nowhere does Kilpatrick say “don’t blame the failure of the raid on me; I only had a secondary role and wasn’t in charge of the raid.” If Kilpatrick’s role had only been secondary, there’s little question that Kilpatrick—knowing him as the man he was—would have been quick to shift the blame from himself for those reasons—if they were true. But Kilpatrick never said that, and in the denials and objections voiced by the Army of the Potomac’s high command regarding the black flag warfare after the failure of the raid, Kilpatrick’s role as a secondary office was never raised. Most likely because he wasn’t in a secondary role.
Parting thoughts: in 1872 (J.B. Lippencott, Philadelphia), John Dahlgren wrote a vigorous defense of his son and the raid (I have a copy in my personal library) entitled MEMOIR OF ULRICH DAHLGREN BY HIS FATHER. The story of the raid covers Chapter XI. On Page 204 of the book, Admiral Dahlgren states: “The project of an expedition to rescue the Union soldiers from the horrible dungeons of Richmond where they were immured reached him [Ulrich Dahlgren] about this time. The idea originated with General Kilpatrick and, on being submitted in all its details, met the approbation of the Secretary of War, and of the President of the United States.” Being as close as Admiral Dahlgren was to Abraham Lincoln (after all, David Long states that Lincoln went to see John Dahlgren almost every single day that Lincoln occupied the Executive Mansion), I would think that John Dahlgren would have been in a good positon to know what was going on, especially where his son was concerned. There’s more, but ’nuff said. ~~~AC

I haven’t formed an opinion as to whether Lincoln knew, but Butler did report directly back to him on March 4th (copying Stanton) regarding what he had learned when Kilpatrick got to his lines. By itself, that is not enough to convince me Lincoln knew in advance. It could just be Butler was politically astute enough to know this was news which would be of interest to Lincoln and Stanton.

It is worth noting Butler apparently did not know of the raid until it was well underway (based on reports in the O.R.). If there had been some scheme to do more than free the prisoners would it not have been likely Butler would have had orders to have his forces at the ready to exploit the confusion? Instead he appears to have only had been ordered not to advance beyond a certain point on the New Kent Road.

Finally, Kilpatrick is quoted in the O.R. in Butler’s report as saying Dahlgren was ordered to move as a diversion supporting Kilpatrick’s movements. Why, at this early juncture and in reports back to superiors who allegedly would of known of some greater purpose, would Kilpatrick maintain his raid was the primary movement?

As to Dahlgren’s papers, if the Confederates forged them it would have had to have been done very quickly, as they were forwarded to Cooper by Fitz Lee on the 4th. My best guess, and no more than a guess, is Dahlgren went beyond his warrant on his own authority, exceeding what even Kilpatrick intended.