09.18.08
Thinking About the Battle of Monocacy
The title of the recent book by Marc Leepson, Desperate Engagement: How a Little-Known Civil War Battle Saved Washington, D.C., and Changed American History, clearly states the book’s thesis: that the Battle of Monocacy saved the Federal capital at Washington, D.C. from falling to Jubal Early’s Confederate army. That’s the conventional wisdom, and there’s certainly absolutely nothing new about that interpretation.
I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about this important and fascinating battle, and I have likewise spent a fair amount of time talking about it with old friend Scott Patchan. In fact, Scott deserves a major tip of the hat, as he’s the one who really got me thinking along these lines. Scott’s point is that while the fight by Lew Wallace’s men at Monocacy was valiant, brave, and worthy of praise, it really didn’t save Washington. Scott’s point, which I have come to accept as being correct, is that Monocacy really could not have saved Washington, because Early never really intended to go there and take it.
As Scott points out, Early lingered in front of Harpers Ferry for several days on his way north, and then he likewise dawdled at Martinsburg, Hagerstown, and then Frederick, ransoming each. Had Early been serious about taking Washington, he would have headed straight there without delay, and he would have found the place almost undefended. For one thing, Wallace would not have had Ricketts’ division at Monocacy Junction, and the rest of the Sixth Corps and elements of the Nineteenth Corps would not have arrived in Washington in time to persuade Early not to launch an all-out assault on Fort Stevens on July 12. Instead, the city would have been lightly defended, and Early could have dashed into the city and raised havoc.
The fact that he dawdled suggests that the real intention was to draw Union forces away from Petersburg and not taking the Union capital. Had he entered Washington, Early would not have been able to hold it, so other than the embarrassment and chaos factors, entering Washington would not have gained much for the objectives of the Confederacy, whereas if could draw forces away from Petersburg and enable Robert E. Lee to break the Federal hammerlock there, his foray north of the Potomac River would have had real, tangible benefits for the Confederacy, justifying any casualties, diverted resources, weakening of the Army of Northern Virginia, etc.
Therefore, while I certainly don’t want to take anything away from Wallace’s fine fight at Monocacy–it was a tough, hard fight wherein the severely outnumbered Federals more than held their own against a greatly superior force of Early’s veterans–I have come to the conclusion that Scott is right, and that perhaps saying that Monocacy saved Washington, D. C. overstates the case.
In a comment to this blog, Benjamin Franklin Cooling snidely asked me what I thought I could add to the body of knowledge about Monocacy in light of his work, Fred Ray’s work, and Leepson’s book. There you go, Dr. Cooling: I’m going to argue an analytic outcome that directly contradicts the conventional wisdom.
Nick said,
September 18, 2008 at 11:10 pm
Interesting. Would it have been physically possible for his men to do a forced march into DC in early July? Would it be worth the numbers of men who would have dropped out during the march?
or
Were the dawdles at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry deliberately done to raise the alarm that there were Confderates north of Petersburg? The resulting panic would force the War Department to send those troops north from Petersburg to address the threat to the supply lines. (as it actually did) Kind of like a bank robber deliberately tripping the alarm to measure police response time.
The General said,
September 19, 2008 at 6:54 am
Nick,
Why not? They had already done so in marching north from Lynchburg.
I’m rather certain that the dawdles at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry were deliberately done to raise the alarm that the Confederates were heading north of the Potomac River in an attempt to draw forces away from Petersburg.
I think it was trying to be a replay of Jackson’s Valley Campaign of 1862, where precisely the same thing occurred, with great success.
Eric
Nick said,
September 19, 2008 at 10:38 am
Hmmm…I’ll have to go back and check, but what about the dawdles being built in to the schedule to allow the really hare-brained part of the scheme to work? Namely the proposed amphibious liberation of the prisoners at Pt. Lookout. He’d have to match his schedule with that of the ship carrying the arms and CS Marines to meet up with his cavalry forces at the proper moment. Or was that part of the operation blown well before Early entered the lower Shenandoah Valley.
Brooks Simpson said,
September 19, 2008 at 11:29 am
In terms of troop diversion, recall Early’s offensive did divert 19th Corps, too.
Of course, Grant reacted late to Early.
As Bill Feis points out, intelligence failure.
The General said,
September 19, 2008 at 11:54 am
Nick,
The only problem with your theory is that the Johnson-Gilmor Raid did not commence until July 9, while the guns were booming at Monocacy.
Eric
The General said,
September 19, 2008 at 11:56 am
Brooks,
I mentioned the arrival of a division of the 19th Corps in the third paragraph above. You are, of course, correct, and so is Bill Feis.
That failure of intelligence is one of a number of things that I want to focus upon in my take on this campaign.
Eric
Marc Leepson said,
September 19, 2008 at 4:23 pm
I’d like to add my two cents to this interesting discussion.
My thesis in Desperate Engagement was not that Wallace’s stand at Monocacy saved Washington from falling to Early. Like you, I don’t believe Early could have taken the city. But consider what eight thousand lean and mean Confederate troops loose in the streets of Washington could have done. Plenty of damage, I’d say.
Remember that the Navy had a ship provisioned for Lincoln to get out of town if Early had breached the defenses. At the very least, even if his troops had slashed and burned and then gotten out of Washington somehow, this would have been a humiliating experience for Lincoln and the Union, at a time when his popularity was very, very low.
I believe that what Wallace did at Monocacy held Early up enough to give Grant time to get those two Sixth Corps Divisions to Washington before Early could attack. Early was at the gates of the city with the Capitol dome in his sights at around noon time on July 11. At just about that hour, the Sixth Corps troops were landing at the Potomac.
Early decided not to invade then, he said, because his men were exhausted and were strung out for miles and miles behind him on the 7th Street Pike.
Grant and Halleck had relieved Wallace of his command after they found out that Early prevailed at Monocacy. But two weeks later, Grant re-instated Wallace, and Grant says in his memoir that had Wallace not done what he did at Monocacy–hold Early up for at least a day, probably two–he (Grant) would not have had time to get the Sixth Corps men up to Washington, nor the Nineteenth Corps, which came soon thereafter.
Like you, I believe that what was uppermost in Lee’s mind when he sent Early to the Valley and into Maryland was to force Grant to take troops away from Richmond and Petersburg. Grant seems to have realized that, too, and he waited until the last minute before ordering the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps northward.
The General said,
September 19, 2008 at 5:00 pm
Marc,
Thanks for chiming in. I appreciate it.
I agree with most of your interpretation. The only thing I disagree with is the significance of Monocacy in the big scheme of things. Yes, it did delay Early for a day, but had Early not dawdled at Harpers Ferry, Martinsburg, Hagerstown and then Frederick, there never would have been a Battle of Monocacy, or, if there was, it would have been an insignificant skirmish.
Eric
Brooks Simpson said,
September 19, 2008 at 5:30 pm
I know you mentioned thr 19th Corps starting to arrive, but the larger point is that Early did achieve something rather important in detaining a far larger number of soldiers than should have been merited by his numbers … and sent Halleck in a tizzy to boot.
Had the 19th Corps been at Petersburg later that month, perhaps Lee’s stretched way too thin at the time of the Crater.
Monocacy’s an interesting battle and a nice park, but I tend to agree that much too much has been made of it.
Todd Berkoff said,
September 19, 2008 at 7:11 pm
Eric — what do you make of Early’s own account of the campaign that he submitted 14 July 1864? I agree that Early never planned on HOLDING Washington but I’ve always assessed he planned a quick foray into the capital. Sending his cavalry or a small infantry strike force on a quick raid into the heart of the city would have shown the complete ineptness of the Lincoln administation during an election year, not to mention the utter chaos of CS forces galloping down Pennsylvania Avenue.
“I am sorry I did not succeed in capturing Washington and releasing our prisoners at Point Lookout, but the latter was impracticable after I determined to retire from before Washington. There was intense excitement and alarm in Washington and Baltimore and all over the North, and my force was very greatly exaggerated, it being reported that you were in command, having left Beauregard at Petersburg. Washington can never be taken by our troops unless surprised when without a force to defend it. Please send me orders by telegraph to Winchester.” – Jubal Early
Mark said,
September 19, 2008 at 7:47 pm
Eric,
A useful augment to your take on this campaign and the question of Early’s priorities in the Valley in 1864 are, if memory serves, Lee’s orders to him at the outset. Though I can’t recall the text verbatim, and am at work without access to my library, I believe the substance was for Early to press Union troops and clear the Valley, but I think explicitely mentioned was diverting Union troops into the Valley as well. Moreover, I don’t recall any mention of Lee ordering Early to push into Washington
Mark said,
September 19, 2008 at 7:47 pm
Eric,
A useful augmentation to your take on this campaign and the question of Early’s priorities in the Valley in 1864 are, if memory serves, Lee’s orders to him at the outset. Though I can’t recall the text verbatim, and am at work without access to my library, I believe the substance was for Early to press Union troops and clear the Valley, but I think explicitely mentioned was diverting Union troops into the Valley as well. Moreover, I don’t recall any mention of Lee ordering Early to push into Washington
Marc Leepson said,
September 19, 2008 at 10:16 pm
As for what Lee ordered Early to do vis-a-vis Washington, this is how Early described the mission in his autobiography:
“I was directed to move,†he said, “for the Valley.†The object: “to strike Hunter’s force in the rear, and if possible, destroy it, then to move down the Valley, cross the Potomac†and “threaten Washington City.â€
Gail Stephens said,
September 28, 2008 at 1:13 pm
Gentlemen,
The files at Monocacy contain two dispatches from Early to Lee, one dated 6/28/64 and one dated 7/7/64. One of the interpreters from Monocacy and I found them at the Huntington Library in 2001. In the first dispatch Early positively states that he intends to proceed according to Lee’s instructions, “to threaten Washington and if I find an opportunity — to take it.” He also states his intention to cross the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and send cavalry to cut the railroads between Washington & Harrisburg and Baltimore and Philadephia “while I am moving on Washington.” He wanted to drive the Federal forces out of Harper’s Ferry in order to move along the river roads, making any necessary retreat to Virginia easier. In the second dispatch on 7/7, he states that he had found MD Heights so “thoroughly fortified” that he would not attempt to take them. Therefore, he has decided to move by Boonsboro and Frederick City, adding “I then move on Washington.” If Jubal Early didn’t intend to take Washington, he certainly talked a good game.
Andrew Ballard said,
May 20, 2009 at 1:43 pm
I agree that Early’s primary mission was to relieve pressure on Lee by drawing fed forces from Petersburg/Richmond…
However, if Early had no intention of taking Washington, why did he head that way- why not up into PA or towards Baltimore? why not set up a solid defensive position somewhere and wait for the arrival of federal forces?
I also continue to believe that taking DC was possible- obviously holding it for too long would have been difficult…it also would have resulted in a political and strategic victory (obviously a large federal force would have descended on the capital- the bulk of it likely from Grant’s forces, providing Lee with the relief he sought).