id
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to "sidebar-1" to silence this notice and keep existing sidebar content. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 4.2.0.) in /home/netscrib/public_html/civilwarcavalry/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4239id
was set in the arguments array for the "footer" sidebar. Defaulting to "sidebar-2". Manually set the id
to "sidebar-2" to silence this notice and keep existing sidebar content. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 4.2.0.) in /home/netscrib/public_html/civilwarcavalry/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4239I do think it’s a fair comparison. I tend to think that had Ully Dahlgren survived the war, he would have ended up with a commission in the Regular Army in the years after the war, and I suspect he would have had the same issues that Custer had. I likewise think that he might have met an untimely end just as Custer did.
As for the Fredericksburg expedition, I believe that Dahlgren knew what the expedition was all about. In his report, Dahlgren wrote, “I started from Gainesville, on the morning of the 8th instant, to Fredericksburg to ascertain the force of the enemy at that place, and then to examine the Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg Railroad on the return.” So, that suggests to me that he knew exactly what was going on and what the object of the mission was. Instead, he destroyed the bridges and exceeded his orders.
I agree with the rest of your conclusions, as well as the contrast between command and control on one hand and cowboying subordinates on the other.
Eric
]]>In the case of the Fredericksburg Raid one wonders what Dahlgren knew of the intended plans of his superiors regarding movement towards the city. Had it been made clear to Dahlgren that his raid was intelligence gathering in anticipation of movement in that direction I would presume he would understand that the destruction of bridges wasn’t to the benefit of his command. In the absence of a clear conops such an officer took it upon himself to hurt the enemy given the opportunity. So where was the operational shortfall in this circumstance?
It has been noted that Stuart’s first ride around McClellan before the 7 Days also was unsolicited and had negative consequences because it hastened McClellan’s orders for a change of base before Lee struck. As a result Lee misconstrued McClellan’s line of retreat (to the James instead of Williamsburg.)
I don’t think the answer to this dilema in command and control is demanding simple obedience to orders, as the orders may be deficient in scope or purpose to begin with. Modern command and control procedures do in fact expect that the order give some sense of intent of the mission and how it relates to a scheme of maneuver. Issue bad instructions and you get what you give.
So we have several issues here in fact. Command and control on the one had. Cowboy subordinates on the other.
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