Fabius was not a Roman emperor… he official position was Dictator, from which we get the word. The war with Hannibal was fought in the period when Rome was still a Republic. They elected two Consuls annually to run the state jointly, but in times of emergency a Dictator was elected for a year only.

In Fabius’ time, an “imperator” (from which the word emperor derives) meant a victorious general.

One point about Fabius is that his strategy succeeded in saving Rome and weakened Hannibal. Later the Romans went on the offensive under Scipio Africanus, invaded Africa, and forced Hannibal to evacuate Italy. Hannibal was defeated and went into exile.

The morale is that a Fabian strategy may weaken an enemy, but complete victory might require a higher level of risk than a Fabian strategy would allow.

Eric

I copied this to John, he said thanks.

Ken

I would compare Washington’s strategy more with Giap’s in IndoChina against the French. Start with guerrillas, then progress to militias, then to a field army capable of defeating the enemy in a pitched battle. With allies, of course, which the Confederacy never had.

A Fabian approach was completely unworkable for the South for a couple of reasons:

1) there were no areas ‘safe’ from Union occupation. Fabius’ power base – Rome and other major cities – could remain inviolate because Hannibal could not beseige them. He lacked the force and the supplies to do so. In the Am Rev, the British never had the manpower to come even remotely close to holding the bulk of the countryside – the Rebels could hold places like Carlisle or Albany safely, giving them safe havens. In the ACW, there was no place the Union army couldn’t get to or occupy.

2) One of the South’s principle war aims – the protection of slavery – would be destroyed outright. Even before the EP, wherever Union forces appeared in strength, for all practical purposes, slavery ended. A Fabian approach would only speed this process along.

Dave Powell