Respectfully…

You wrote, “The converse is also true. A guy like John Bell Hood was a truly great tactician on the battlefield at the divisional level, but once he was promoted to corps command and then to army command, he demonstrated no gift for much of anything other than attacking straight ahead. “All of the lion and none of the fox,” Robert E. Lee reportedly said when he learned that Hood had been given command of the Army of Tennessee, and Lee was absolutely correct. In a series of head-long attacks that took little or no account of terrain, strategy, or anything else, Hood pretty much sacrificed an entire army between Atlanta and Nashville.”

First, Hood’s four attacks on Sherman at Atlanta were all flanks…Peachtree Creek on the Union left; Bald Hill/Atlanta on the Union left and rear; Ezra Church on the Union right; and Jonesboro on the Union right. During his subsequent Tennessee Campaign Hood flanked Schofield at Columbia (to Spring Hill) rather than attack fortified Union positions. In his entire tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee, only at Franklin did Hood attack “straight ahead” as you say, and at Franklin he had no choice but to launch an immediate frontal assault, or allow Schofield to retreat into Nashville and join with Thomas. Even later at Nashville, Hood did not attack, rather, Thomas attacked Hood’s fortified lines south of the city. Call Hood aggressive, but to say he advocated frontal assaults is not so, otherwise he would have done so more than one time. Hood was of the Lee and Jackson school…offensive minded but prefered flanks.

Finally, there is absolutely no primary source for the myth that Lee called Hood “All lion and no fox.” This is one of the countless rumors in Civil War history that have been repeated so many times that they have become an unchallengeable truth. A free steak dinner to anyone who can show me where Lee wrote that.

Eric

Great comments, and great examples. Many thanks for writing and for adding this worthwhile contribution.

I agree with you about Grant. He was really a remarkable man.

Eric

Tactics and strategy I feel comfortable kibbitzing on 😉

To press the analogy a bit. 19th Century and earlier readings address S&T as the ying and yang of military art. But as armies and technologies got more complex and sophisticated differentiating fighting skills from all the tasks required to develop the battle and provide ways and means of warfare required more subtlety. Thus terms like Grand Tactics and Grand Strategy came into use. Grand Tactics and Strategy were redefined between the World Wars by JFC Fuller and Liddell Hart (Sandhurst Boys School 😉 ) into what we now know as Operational Art.

To your Law firm again: The Organization, Goals and Means of the Firm are Stategic. The mustering of and preperations for trial are the Operational aspects of preparing cases for execution. The trials execution is the tactical portion of the business.

Why the distinction regarding the CW? Because I think CW generalship looks pretty dismal when you look at the three hemispheres. (Understanding that US military expertise was limited to doctrinal schooling of 2 LTs and few persons had manuevered more than a small division in the generation before the war – anybody with greater experience being 65 or older.)

Lee for example was actually both a poor tactician and a poor strategist. His forte was OA, not Strategy. His protection of Virginia and shying away from useful national dialog with Davis are on point.

US Grant probably was the most well rounded general on either side. My only observation on Grants weakness was a timidity in dealing with superiors on strategy. Grant really didn’t make the 1864 strategy. He executed Lincoln/Hallecks. Grant had wanted to extend his indirect approach experiences in 1863 to 1864 but was told the manpower and time available required a direct approach.

FWIW