id
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to "sidebar-2" to silence this notice and keep existing sidebar content. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 4.2.0.) in /home/netscrib/public_html/civilwarcavalry/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4239The guys at the Jug Bridge performed extraordinarily well that day, given their experience level. They did have two veterans in charge; Col Alison Brown of the 149th Ohio and Capt. Leib of the 5th US who was in charge of 100 mounted men of the 159th Ohio that day. Also, I have never believed that Early really wanted that bridge; he wanted the road to Washington. Rodes could have ended it fast if Early really wanted it.
As for why Early spent that time at Harper’s Ferry — he wanted to take the river road to Washington where he had a quick escape route available, if needed. He got to Harper’s Ferry and found the bridge out, so he crossed the Potomac and tried to drive Sigel off the Heights and down the road, but Sigel wouldn’t budge. So, he had to take the road through the South Mountain gaps. It’s in his “Memoir of the Last Year of the War,” and two new documents I found at the Huntington Library a couple of years ago — which are at Monocacy.
As for the artillery, Wallace had wonderful advantage of position for his six guns because the bluffs on the south side of the river are so much higher than the level ground on the north side. Confederates had three battalions, Nelson’s Braxton’s and McLaughlin’s with 40 guns. CS artillery really didn’t do much until Gordon’s attack, when they moved in. Then, two batteries, Chapman’s at the Worthington House, and and Lowry’s, placed on a hill near the viaduct bridge over the railroad, wreaked real havoc on the right of Ricketts’ line.
A point really associated with the artillery. Nothing much happened in the morning when Ramseur came down the Georgetown Pike with his division and some of the artillery. They hit Wallace’s position; river in front, high bluffs on south side and stopped. Early wasn’t there, and I think Ramseur had instructions to hold off; Early needed those men to take Washington, didn’t want to waste men in attack on good position. Then, McCausland found that ford, and the rest, as they say is history.
I’m very glad that someone is taking a close look at Monocacy. It is needed.
Gail
]]>Fear not….I had always intended to address the artillery issue, particularly because I have located a published history of Alexander’s battery to use.
I agree with you about the artillery, and I likewise, want to be sure that we address the Hughes Ford episode. Leib really is the unsung hero on the Union side, and I want to correct that.
Thanks for the great suggestions. They are much appreciated.
Eric
]]>Although Wallace had the terrain advantage, he only had six guns from Frederick Alexander’s Baltimore battery. They also had at least one 24-lb howitzer (some sources say two), but that seemed basically worthless.
Confederate forces had nine batteries of between 36 and 40 guns, giving them a significant advantage in this area. But they didnt seem to use that advantage effectively, from what I can tell…US batteries drove CS sharpshooters out of Best barn and seemed to keep CS heads down as much as their guns kept US heads down (until towards the end of the battle during the assault by Gordon)…as the six US guns were deployed in two three-gun emplacements, one would think effective CS artillery fire could have made them irrelevant.
Again, I personally have not seen thorough coverage on this dimension of the Battle of Monocacy, so my comments are based on personal musings.
Also, there was a clash early in the day at northernmost Hughes Ford where companies of the 149th OH, supported by Leib’s company of the 159th OH mtd inf drove off mounted Confederates…in talking w/NPS folks at battlefield, seems general consensus is that those CS were cavalrymen under Bradley Johnson that were on the Point Lookout mission – but can’t find original source info to back that belief up.
AB
]]>Their story at Monocacy will definitely get its due.
Thanks!
J.D.
You’re absolutely right that the story of these Maryland and Ohio “hundred-days men” deserves to be told. I think their stand at the Monocacy against veteran troops is even more courageous when you realize many of those same boys had been involved in the brisk skirmishing near Middletown and the western outskirts of Frederick during the two days prior to the July 9 battle.
Another interesting and often overlooked militia contingent that contributed to the scouting and skirmishing that first week of July are two companies of the loyalist Loudoun Rangers. These anti-slavery Virginians, mainly of German and Scotch/Irish stock from the northwest county that borders the Potomac below Maryland, organized a local mounted unit in June 1862 by the authority of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. As Unionist cavalry scouts charged with patrolling the river and countering guerilla activity in their home territory, they earned the label of “traitor” and the scorn of their neighbors. Mosby’s men considered them bitter enemies and held them in contempt (wrongly) as warriors.
The Battle of Monocacy offers many fascinating stories that have been little examined by previous Civil War historians. I know that you and J.D. will give such unsung units and individuals their due.
]]>As far as the Jug bridge action, well, Rodes engaged only his Division Sharpshooters, who numbered 600 men or so. Brown had at the bridge about 750 men, and barely held off Rodes’ men before his position collapsed at the end of the day.
The real hero, IMO, is Captain Edward Leib, a regular cavalryman who was scrounged from recruiting duty in Baltimore and given a detachment of mounted infantry from the 159th OHNG. He, more than anyone else, held things together and he deserves a closer look.
The real question is why Rodes held off his 4 infantry brigades, who could have smashed thru at any time. Doing so would have threatened Baltimore and cut off Ricketts’ retreat. I think it was on orders from Early, but that merits a look also.
BTW this is one of those battles that you just have to see the ground — very unusual situation.
]]>Excellent points, and we will definitely keep those in mind–thanks for passing them along.
Eric
]]>Not yet. We are just getting started.
I can tell you that there are some manuscript materials on the two Ohio national guard regiments that fought at the Jug Bridge that have not been used by anyone else, and I intend to track them down.
Eric
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