id
was set in the arguments array for the "side panel" sidebar. Defaulting to "sidebar-1". Manually set the id
to "sidebar-1" to silence this notice and keep existing sidebar content. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 4.2.0.) in /home/netscrib/public_html/civilwarcavalry/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4239id
was set in the arguments array for the "footer" sidebar. Defaulting to "sidebar-2". Manually set the id
to "sidebar-2" to silence this notice and keep existing sidebar content. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 4.2.0.) in /home/netscrib/public_html/civilwarcavalry/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4239I would indeed.
Eric
]]>That’s all well and good, but let’s have some facts and evidence, please. If you’re going to try to get into this particular argument with me, you’d better be prepared to argue specific facts.
I can go on for hours about why my comment about Forrest is dead on the money accurate. Can you do the same in defense of your position?
Eric
]]>JFE
]]>I actually addressed the issue of Price’s Raid in another post last week.
Having said that, I think that the pursuit and destruction of Price’s command was clearly Pleasonton’s finest hour. He did quite well indeed in Missouri. The difference, I think, was two-fold. First, and foremost, he was removed from the politics that plagued the Army of the Potomac. I think he knew that the only way out was to demonstrate that he’d earned his way out of Missouri.
Second, unlike the east, Pleasonton actually led from the front in Missouri, and took personal command of the battlefields there. In the east, that NEVER happened. I think that made a huge difference.
Finally, it bears noting that Price was not Jeb Stuart or Wade Hampton. Let’s not forget that, either.
Eric
]]>I recently read about Pleasonton’s pursuit of Price in the aftermath of Westport (1864), culminating in the debacle at Mine Creek. Although I have only a passing familiarity with the Westport campaign, it would seem that an argument could be made that Pleasonton actually did pretty well in this pursuit phase, far better than he did in any operation in the Eastern Theater—in fact, I think a noted ACW blogger made this point recently.
Out of curiosity, what’s your take on Pleasonton in Missouri—did he really do a better job there?
]]>Of course, you know who I’m going to comment upon, but for a different reason.
I believe implicitly that you are correct in your estimation that the Eastern Theater was critical especially given the proximity of the capitols of both nations. Yet, I remember reading in one magazine account of guerrilla activity in both theaters that Mosby was not nearly as effective or important as his counterparts in Kansas and Missouri BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF THE THEATER involved; that is, because the Western theater was geographically larger, men like Forrest (whom he included in the ‘guerrilla’ category), Morgan, Quantrill, Anderson and Ferguson were really much better ‘guerrillas’ tactically than Mosby – but that Mosby made more of a public ‘splash’ because more attention was paid to Virginia than the West.
The writer also said that it was easier for Mosby to function because he didn’t have to go all that far to find targets and to return to a place of ‘safety’ after every operation; that is that these considerations were mere hours rather than days away.
I wrote to the gentleman who had opined thus and pointed out that the comparison he made was one of apples and oranges. True, Mosby’s theater of operation was smaller geographically, but it was much more important. In effect it was the difference between an ordinary surgeon performing an appendectomy (the Western theater) and a neurosurgeon performing brain surgery (northern Virginia). There was a lot more ‘leeway’ out west than in the east. Mosby was surrounded by a lot more Union troops within a much smaller area making every operation much more dangerous and difficult than would have been the case in the ‘open spaces’ of the Western theater where there was plenty of room to ‘disappear’ when necessary. As well, a great deal more force could be brought against those partisans operating in the Eastern Theater – including Mosby – than could be brought against those operating in the West. To make the argument that because his area of operations was physically smaller meant that it was less important seems ludicrous in my eyes, but then, perhaps I am incorrect in that assessment.
The only reason I bring this up is your point about the difference between the size, importance and quality of men in both theaters of war.
]]>I’m a publicist at Viking/Penguin and I’d like to send you a copy of a new book: THE BLOODY SHIRT: Terror After Appomattox by Stephen Budiansky for possible mention on your blog. Could you please email me with a physical address where I should send it?
Thanks,
Lindsay
212.366.2224