id
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to "sidebar-2" to silence this notice and keep existing sidebar content. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 4.2.0.) in /home/netscrib/public_html/civilwarcavalry/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4239I beg to differ. Perhaps from a tactical standpoint, but strategically Brandy Station was huge. The forced reconnaisance collected by the union cavalry strongly indicated that Lee’s main body was on the move. Infantry columns were observed by union cavalry that had broken through Stuart’s screen. As a result, the AOP knew of Lee’s advance before they were supposed to. They had no clue that Lee was on the move before this happened and had Stuart not been caught with his pants down it would have remained that way for a while (IMO, too long). Essentially, these observations completely changed the dynamics of Lee’s campaign and in the end caused it’s failure. It caused Stuart to get trapped by union columns that weren’t supposed to be there yet and it precluded Lee’s ability to choose a winning battlefield in Pennsylvania. Like I said, it was huge.
Even from a tactical standpoint, the Union cavalry, for the first time, held it’s own against JEB Stuart. This was a much needed moral boost. The union cavalry had been routed and embarassed by Stuart every time they encountered one another before this battle. After Brandy Station, that completely changed, the South never really had an advantage with their cavalry again (at least in the East…N.B. Forrest–enough said).
Anyway, I think the Union accomplished a lot at Brandy Station.
]]>I apologize for not responding sooner–I missed your comment.
The answer is no, we’re really not focusing on the wounded much at all. The only portion of the story of the wounded that’s getting any attention from us is the saga of the Wagon Train of the Wounded. Beyond that, it’s more of a logistical issue, and not within the scope of what we’re trying to do here. Rather, our emphasis is on tactics and decision-making, and the story of the saga of the wounded does not fall within those parameters at all.
Eric
]]>No. Brown addresses that, and it’s a logistical thing. We’ve elected not to cover the things that Brown covered in great detail.
Eric
]]>My vote would be for the campaign ending on August 1st, as nearly all of the reports I’ve seen include that time period as well. One could almost make the case that the campaign ended for the Union infantry when Lee crossed the Potomac, but it didn’t end for the AoNV and the Union cavalry until the Rappahannock…. I’ll be very interested to read Trout’s work when it comes out.
You’ve mentioned that the movement of the hospital would be included several times, but are you planning to cover the march of the Confederates’ prisoners of war?
]]>Hope all is well.
Regards from the Garden State,
Steve Basic
]]>I have always been curious about the trials and tribulations that occurred with the evacuation of the wounded from Gettysburg, as well as the differences between the care and transportation of the officers vs. the troops. For instance, how was Kemper treated and ultimately “saved” when his wounds IIRC were originally determined to be mortal, and how many troops died en route to the Old Dominion.
I’m not sure if this even fits into your study, but I have always felt that the post-engagement logistics and experiences surrounding those that fell (and survived) tend to be neglected. That was one of the things that most impressed me about your “Plenty Of Blame” book as you guys made a concerted effort to included the logistics behind the horses. I’d love to see something on the wounded.
To this day, I am still dying to know how Gordon was able to survive being wounded repeatedly at Antietam. Even our good buddy Ranger Mannie said that specific details on his emergency care (after he was removed from the Bloody Lane) is rare. Therefore (to me) its another neglected subject that would fit nicely into an entire study of an army’s retreat. Just an idea.
I always thought that it would be brilliant to write an entire history of WW2 completely from the perspective of the Medics. Their view of the battlefield would be quite different and would be both inspiring and disturbing all at the same time.
]]>Art
]]>One might argue that by and large Meade did, but I dare say Lee did not.
That said (and I haven’t looked at any length at any of the primary sources), those primary sources would indicate the degree to which it need be covered.
Dave
]]>There’s no question that those two weeks need a detailed treatment.
Our problem is that for us to cover those in detail, it would add another 20-30,000 words to a manuscript that is already pushing the limits of the length we’ve been given by Ted Savas for the project. We thus had to make a difficult choice of doing the first ten days in the level of detail we’ve wanted to do, or thin it all out to include these two weeks. Consequently, we decided to do things the way I laid out in the post. We just can’t include it all, keep the book under 160-175,000 words, and keep the price under $40. It just can’t be done.
Fortunately, old friend Bob Trout is planning on tackling this period in his next book, so they will get a detailed treatment.
Eric
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