An attack on the union center by only around 15,000 men; the soldiers would be torn to shreds as they marched about a mile to attack a fortified union line. I find it hard to believe that Lee wouldn’t have realized that it alone would fail; he himself used 28,000 me to attack and successfully crush an unprotected Union flank at Second Manasses. Clearly, the man had at least some sense of the proper amount of force needed to succeed. Pickett’s charge alone would be a perfect way to lose an army.

However, upon later learning of the east cavalry engagement at about the same time that day it all started to make sense to me. The center of the Union line would have almost definitely broken under the simultaneous attack of the Pickett’s fresh hammer and Stuart’s 4000 cavalry anvil. At the very least military reason dictates that it would have given the confederates a chance to succeed by easing some of pressure faced by their advancing infantry as the Union responded to the rear cavalry threat.

Currently, I am a student at Cornell, and I am working on a paper about this topic. I thank you all for your input and your knowledge; you have all added a substantially helpful perspective to my views as I sit down now to write it. I am deeply indebted to you all. Thanks for all the help.

The following was written by me for our family records re: William Wallace Rogers before I bought and read Lost Triumph in recent weeks on the positive recommendation of a friend who has a strong foreign service background and grounding in military history. Since then I have had e-correspondence with staff at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania who seem to find the thesis of “Lost triumph” of interest. At least they don’t seem hostile to it.

The cavalry battle at Gettysburg, called the East Cavalry Field, on the afternoon of July 3, 1863, in which Capt. Rogers was wounded, was both a major cavalry action and an important part of the Union victory on that day. There are many historical reports of Capt. Rogers’ valor that day. “While the 1st Michigan slugged it out with Hampton (Wade Hampton’s Confederate cavalry) who by now was supported on the flanks by Lee and Chambliss, additional bodies of Federals that had been scattered about the field rallied and struck the Confederates on the flanks. Among them were two squadrons of the 3rd Pennsylvania, under Captain Charles Treichel and Lieutenant William Rogers (should be Capt. Rogers) who struck the Confederates on the right” and with others joining in “Soon the entire Confederate assault was being repulsed…” Blue and Gray Magazine, October, 1988, page 38. Other sources that report this action include: Gettysburg: Day Three by Jeffry D. Wert, Simon & Schuster (2001), p. 269; and, Protecting the Flanks: The Battles for Brinkerhoff’s Ridge and East Cavalry Field, Battle of Gettysburg, July 2-3, 1863 by Eric J. Wittenberg, Ironclad Publishing (2002), pp. 68 & 107.
Excerpt from THE MILITARY CAREER AND FAMILY HISTORY OF WILLIAM WALLACE ROGERS, Including the all too short, unfortunate military service of his son Dewey Rogers (who died in action in the Boxer Rebellion with the 9th Infantry). Compiled from family and other sources by John J. Nesbitt, III (June 5, 2012).

You will recall that in my, I guess “blog,” in response to your uncompromising, actually scathing, “review” of Lost Triumph I made a point to explain to you that I have a voice in this matter based on Rogers’ family oral history as follows, This is not a new revelation for me. In fact it goes back to my mother’s mother who passed on the stories of W.W. Roger’s military service, my grandmother having been born in 1890, the year W. W. Rogers died. The oral history I was told as a young boy in the 1950s, and my mother’s family back to the 1630’s was very good at oral history, is that the action on the East Battlefield at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863 was a very important action and vital to preserving the Union.

While I knew that this view of the cavalry action on July 3rd at Gettysburg was not shared by all, particularly in the official and “formal” histories of the Battle of Gettysburg, I did not focus much of my time and attention on this controversy until 1988. That was the year that Blue & Grey Magazine in the October number published their “Anniversary Issue,” “Gettysburg Cavalry Operations: June 27-July 3, 1863.” Like your book, Protecting the Flank, this issue of Blue & Grey Magazine has been a useful reference, particularly the maps on pp. 36 and 37 for their size and some details. But, I took exception to the opening of the description of the July 3rd action on the East Cavalry Field, which was as follows, “One of the myths of the battle of Gettysburg is that Lee planned for Stuart to strike Cemetery Ridge in rear simultaneously with “Pickett’s Charge.” There is no evidence to support this theory. Rather, it appears Lee merely wanted Stuart to protect his left flank, and to be in position to threaten the Union rear and harass a hoped-for rout of Meade’s army.” Blue & Grey Magazine, Oct., 1988, p. 32, as it was contrary to the Rogers’ family history as told to me by William Wallace Rogers’ niece, my grandmother, whose mother was his sister, who, living into the 1930s, was also able to pass on this oral history on to my mother (who only passed away in 2003).

Civil War Era Photographs of William Wallace Rogers, Capt. 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry
As my mother and her mother were very good at keeping the Rogers’ family history “alive,” as have been other branches of the Rogers family, both in documentation and orally, I have benefited from that, and have as time allows built upon that base of information. Hence, I was pleased to come upon your book Protecting the Flank, particularly since on first glance it seemed to complement my knowledge, including Brooke-Rawle’s 1878 record, of the cavalry battle of July 3rd. But, then I got into your conclusions, specifically on page 130, of Protecting the Flank, where you say, “Therefore, although Stuart never really explained his reasons for being where he was, analysis plainly shows plainly that he intended to ambush Gregg’s Federals and that the attempted ambush failed.” As you will know, the italics are mine. I would like to be more kind, but this is nonsense. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1945) defines an ambush as follows: “1. A post or tactical trap of troops in wait, concealed for the purpose of attacking an enemy by surprise; hence, a device to entrap.” In simplest terms, Stuart’s movements on July 3rd do not at all demonstrate a move to “entrap” Gregg’s cavalry, but rather a movement to out flank the Union right to gain the rear of the Union lines, and, when confronted by resistance, to aggressively defeat and pass through this resistance in time to be in concert with Pickett’s Charge.

I should note at this point that on May 1, 1863 1st Lt. W. W. Rogers, up to then in Company C, 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry, was promoted to Capt. upon being transferred to Company L, with which he served at Gettysburg, as well as after he had recovered from his wounds of July 3rd. Brooke Rawle joined Company C on May 16, 1863 as a 2nd Lt. For myself, as a student at Bucknell University I completed Army ROTC and went on to serve, following graduate school, as a military intelligence officer 1967-1969, leaving the Army as a Captain. My active duty officer training included I.O.B.C. at the infantry school at Ft. Benning, GA and the officers’ Combat Intelligence course at the Army Intelligence School, then at Ft. Holabird, MD. My active duty service was with a joint services intelligence “branch” of the DOD.

You almost casually dismiss the viewpoint of “Doug,” apparently a former military officer with combat experience and Special Ops. knowledge by his own description back in 2008, as follows:
Question: “Why Lee would move Stuart to Meade’s rear and not conduct a rear attack, which is classic Napoleon, makes no military sense what-so-ever. Even if it was not Napoleonic, it still would make no military sense what-so-ever.” Doug 16 Nov 2008.” Response: “The flaw in your argument is that Stuart was NEVER in Meade’s rear, only on the flank. And I will take the words of the actual participants over your 25 years, any time.” The General 16 Nov 2008 Response to Response: “ …Stuart is not in a good position to roll my flank, but he can have a devastating effect on my rear operations, regardless of his being about a mile or two north of my exact center rear. His position would be frightful in regards to what he could do to my rear area. If Carhart’s map is correct, all Stuart needs to do is take the Bonaughton and Baltimore roads, and my army will be experiencing a very significant emotional event in the worst way in a very short time. Stuart would not be in a good position to role (sic) my flank because he would run into the cavalry screening my flank. But he is in a great position to wreak havoc on my rear.” Doug 19 Nov 2008.

You say to Doug that you “…will take the words of the actual participants over your 25 years, any time.” To that I direct your attention to the written record as put forth by “actual participants” William Brooke-Rawle, 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry, and Frederick C. Newhall, 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, as follows:

THE RIGHT FLANK AT GETTYSBURG, BY WILLIAM BROOKE-RAWLE (1878)

“…on the right flank occurred one of the most beautiful cavalry fights of the war, and one most important in its results. It may be confidently asserted that, had it not been for General
D. McM. Gregg and the three brigades under his command on the Bonaughtown road, on July 3d, 1863, that day would have resulted differently, and, instead of a glorious victory, the name of “Gettysburg ” would suggest a state of affairs which it is not agreeable to contemplate.” p. 6

Brooke-Rawle then attributes lack of knowledge of the importance of this action partially to the fact that, “The Second Cavalry Division, moreover, was not a favorite among the newspaper correspondents.
None of them were attached nominally to its staff, nor allowed in its camps or among its men, for its commander saw the mischief which they worked. He was appreciated the more for his rule, but there are instances of others thereby gathering in the ephemeral records of the times the glory which he had rightly earned, well knowing that no public denial would come from him. It is but tardy justice which is
now being done to him and his command, and the importance of the operations on the right flank was never brought before the public until the recent appearance of Major Carpenter’s able article, containing extracts from the official report of the Confederate General Stuart, of infinite importance to the history of the battle, but which the War Department, for some reason, has hitherto refused to the public.”; and, adding that Bachelder in the official maps of the battlefield “…has paid but little attention in his studies of the battle to the operations of the cavalry…” pp. 6-7

Referring to Stuart, Brooke-Rawle writes that, “On the morning of the 3d he moved forward to a new position to the left of General Ewell’s left, and in advance of it, where, from the elevated ground, there was a view of the country for many miles. He was thus enabled to render Ewell’s left secure, and at the same time to command a view of the routes leading to the rear of our lines. His purpose, he states, was to effect a surprise on the rear of our main line of battle. It is obvious that he intended to accomplish this by way of the Baltimore pike, and the roads hereafter described, simultaneously with Pickett’s attack in front.” P. 12

Of the final effort by Stuart’s cavalry to break through to the Union rear in support of Pickett’s Charge Brooke-Rawle states, “This was about three o’clock.” and that, “Just then there appeared in the distance, turning the point of woods on the cross-road by the Stallsmith farm, a brigade of cavalry. It was manifest to every one that unless this, the grandest attack of all, was checked, the fate of the day would be decided against the Army of the Potomac. It was Stuart’s last reserve and his last resource, for, if the Baltimore pike was to be reached and havoc created in our rear, the critical moment had arrived, as Pickett was even then moving up to the assault of Cemetery Ridge.” P. 20
???

GREGG’S CAVALRY FIGHT AT GETTYSBURG, WILLIAM BROOKE-RAWLE,
Historical Address, October 15th, 1884, Dedication of the Monumental Shaft

“During the morning of July 3d, Stuart moved forward to the left and in advance of Ewell’s Corps, for the purpose of occupying the elevated ground east of Gettysburg, from which, while protecting the left of Lee’s army, he could command a view of the routes leading to the rear of the Army of the Potomac, and could, at the same time, be in position to move out at the proper moment, and there attack it, simultaneously with the grand assault which was to be made upon Cemetery Ridge from the other side by Pickett’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps, supported by Heth’s and Pender’s Divisions and Wilcox’s Brigade of Hill’s Corps. That this was his purpose he tells us almost in so many words.” p. 13
“We cavalrymen have always held that we saved the day at the most critical moment of the battle of Gettysburg- the greatest battle and the turning point of the War of the Rebellion. I know that it has not been the custom among historians to give us credit for having done so, nor, except very
recently, to give us credit for having done anything. So fierce was the main engagement, of which the infantry bore the brunt, that the fighting on the part of the cavalry passed almost unnoticed ; yet this was the only battle of the War in which the three arms of the service fought in combination
and at the same time, each within supporting distance and within sight of the other, and each in its proper sphere. The turmoil incident to an active campaign allowed us no opportunity to write up our achievements, and no news correspondents were allowed to sojourn with us, to do it for us. But now that the official records of the campaign, both Union and Confederate, have been brought together,
and, for the first time, been made accessible, and the official map of this field has been prepared,* the Great Historian of the War, as yet unknown, and perhaps unborn, will have at hand materials which have been denied to others. He will see the importance of the fight which I have attempted to describe, and will give it the credit due to it. Had Stuart succeeded in his well-laid plan, and, with his large force of cavalry, struck the Army of the Potomac in the rear of its line of battle, simultaneously with Pickett’s magnificent and furious assault in its front, when our infantry had all it could do to hold on to the line
of Cemetery Ridge, and but little more was needed to make the assault a success,- the merest tyro in the art of war can readily tell what the result would have been.” P. 28
???

LT. COL. FREDERICK C. NEWHALL’S SPEECH AT THE DEDICATION OF THE MONUMENT TO THE SIXTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY ON THE BATTLEFIELD AT GETTYSBURG, GIVEN ON OCTOBER 14, 1888
(a relevant excerpt thereof)

“On this spot, on the afternoon of the 3rd, a portion of our own regiment came into the fight, and at the same hour, or a little later, while Pickett was charging up Cemetery Ridge-which lies between us and Gettysburg, my brother, in the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, was wounded in a brilliant cavalry charge, seven miles from where we now stand, at Rummel’s farm yonder in the northeast, where Gregg and Custer checked Stuart’s vain attempt to gain the Baltimore Pike, in the rear of the Army of the Potomac.”
???

In Summation: My intention here is not to settle the matter of the controversy, but to set the record straight that there is a very strong case for the position that Stuart’s intended goal was to go around the Union right flank on July 3rd at Gettysburg with the objective of a coordinated attack on the Union rear in direct support of Pickett’s frontal attack on the Union center. Central to Tom Carhart’s thesis in Lost Triumph is that Lee gave Stuart “verbal orders” that put Stuart and his forces in position designed to outflank the Union right flank to attack the Union battle lines from the rear. Everything we know of Lee the soldier and military leader, back to his brave exploits in the Mexican War, is supportive of this thesis. In other words, that Stuart had the “mission” to out flank the Union right and attack the rear of the Union lines in direct support of Pickett’s Charge. As a former intelligence officer, I also find it logical that Lee would be very cautious about the “security” of his orders to his top commanders for July 3rd at Gettysburg, and that he gave Stuart verbal orders. “Need to Know” and “Loose lips sink ships,” are from our times, but it is well known that Lee, like General Washington before him, very well knew the value of timely and accurate intelligence and the corresponding vital necessity of protecting one’s own strategically and tactically important communications and information.

I appreciate your writing.

Be assured that I know what I’m talking about. I am an award-winning Civil War historian who specializes in cavalry actions with 17 books in print. If you can wait a bit, you will see a new edition of my book Protecting the Flank that contains a 6000 word essay that completely dismantles Carhart’s academic fraud. It speaks for itself, and I commend it to you.

At the bottom of page 213 of “Lost Triumph” Tom Carhart quotes the “Bachelder Papers,” volume 2, 1123:
“The 1st N.J. becoming warmly engaged, two squadrons of the 3rd Penna. Cav. were sent in on their left. The enemy then ran out a battery on the knoll in front of the woods in which they had their forces masked and at the same time further strengthened their line.” One of these two squadrons was “L,” commanded by Capt. W. W. Rogers.

The General attacks the position of author Tom Carhart that Lee’s plan was to have Stuart out flank the Union right and attack the rear of Meade’s army in support of Pickett’s Charge. He argues that without hard facts Tom Carhart’s thesis is without any merit, and he stands on the established, conventional wisdom of “historians” that Pickett’s Charge was a great mistake by Lee.

While the debate will go on, I strongly ascribe to the position put forth by Tom Carhart in “Lost Triumph.” This is not a new revelation for me. In fact it goes back to my mother’s mother who passed on the stories of W.W. Rogers military service, my grandmother having been born in 1890, the year W. W. Rogers died. The oral history I was told as a young boy in the 1950s, and my mother’s family back to the 1630’s was very good at oral history, is that the action on the East Battlefield at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863 was a very important action and vital to preserving the Union. Building on that foundation, and with my own study of the Battle, including commentators who preceded Tom Carhart by decades in believing that Lee planned for Stuart to outflank the Union right and attack Meade’s army from the rear, I was convinced of what the “General” refuses to consider absent a written record to this effect.

My thanks to Doug, 16 Nov. 2008, in support of Tom Carhart’s central thesis, and his follow-up back then to the “General’s” rebuttal that “The flaw in your argument is that Stuart was NEVER in Meade’s rear, only on the flank. And I will take the word of the actual participants over your 25 years any time.” Interestingly, Lt. William Brooke Rawle, a 3rd Penna. Cavalry Lieutenant on the right flank on July 3rd is recorded as writing: “Had Stuart succeeded in his well-laid plan, and, with his large force of cavalry, struck the Army of the Potomac in the rear of its line of battle, directly towards which he was moving, simultaneously with Longstreet’s magnificent and furious assault in its front, when our infantry had all it could do to hold on to the line of Cemetery Ridge, and but little more was needed to make the assault a success- the merest tyro in the art of war can readily tell what the result would have been.” Source “Commander-in-Chief Biographies, Major General David McMurtrie Gregg,” MOLLUS web site.

Capt. Rogers was wounded in attacking the Confederate charge from the left in support of Custer and his Michigan troopers counter-charge, being shot twice in his own words, once in the “right breast” and once in the “left shoulder.” He returned to duty in Sept., 1863 and served throughout the War.
On one point I must agree with the “General.” I think that Tom Carhart’s heavy criticism of Gen. Gregg is much overdone and undeserved. Gregg was a much better officer than he is portrayed as being in “Lost Triumph,” and certainly was very much responsible for his forces being in the “right place at the right time.”

John (former Capt., U.S. Army, MI)

I must say I’m first very interested in who at the time said that Stuart was on the flank? That is a mystery to me, and I’d like to see how he stated it and in what context. Was it the report of Stuart’s aide…McClellan?

If I were to develop a MCOO (Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay) and a mobility overlay, Stuart would not end up on a flank, but clearly behind my lines. First, I recommend to try not to think of a units location based on latitude/longitude (as I know he is pretty much straight east of Ewell), but think of “effects” (a term we commonly use in our current combat zones). If Stuart’s intent was to somehow have an effect on the flank, he is much too far east to be doing a screening operation (i.e. on the defense), and if he is on the offense to effect the flank, he is pretty far away. I even had one of my armor NCOs state that if Stuart was trying to affect the Meade’s flank, he appears to be lost. I’ll talk McClellan’s comments later on.

If I were to make the overlays mentioned above, I would probably draw my lines to show anything that could possibly have an effect on my rear as anything east of Rock Creek and White Run Creek (I’m looking at a map which shows the battlefield din 1863), as I have Union cavalry screening just northwest of the White Creek area. On a modern map, Highway 15 is well behind my lines, and Stuart is well east of that. If I were the Operations Officer of an army, and I told my commander that Stuart was not in my rear, but on the flank, and he then saw Stuart’s position, I’d be on a quick airplane home with a recommendation on my officer evaluation report saying “do not promote” (as a minimum). From that position, Stuart is not in a good position to roll my flank, but he can have a devastating effect on my rear operations, regardless of his being about a mile or two north of my exact center rear. His position would be frightful in regards to what he could do to my rear area. If Carhart’s map is correct, all Stuart needs to do is take the Bonaughton and Baltimore roads, and my army will be experiencing a very significant emotional event in the worst way in a very short time. Stuart would not be in a good position to role my flank because he would run into the cavalry screening my flank. But he is in a great position to wreak havoc on my rear.

I doubt the theory some have used that Stuart was going to just harass the lines of communication (LOCs). Attacking LOCs can have varying effects depending on how far to my rear they are attacked. However, there is nothing Stuart can do to my LOCs which could affect my ability to hold off Picket in an attack which is about to take place. Also, rear areas in armies during those days were not like rear armies of today which practically have cities of headquarters and logistics behind them. Meade was up near the front lines, and any weapons and munitions which would be used in the attack were either near the line, or too late in coming to have an effect on the battle. Had Stuart attacked any logistical wagons along the road 12-24 hours earlier, it might have had an impact. But Lee was already out numbered in the battle. Therefore, the principle of war “Mass” and “Economy of Force” were of utmost importance to Lee, just as they had been in all Lee’s previously battles. He could not attack the full Union line, he had too few forces, but he had to use “economy of force” and concentrate his “mass” at the key location (something he was remarkably effective at during the 7 Days Battle). If Lee was sending the large groups of troops away from the battlefield to attack LOCs, I would need to take Lee of the list of great tacticians, and put him down with the three Bs (Burnside, Butler, and Banks). Napoleon’s Les Manoeuvre Sur Les Derrieres (or “Strategic Envelopment” as David Chandler translates it) had been an effective technique Lee had employed earlier, and with Stuart’s previously knowledge of the enemy rear area from his earlier venture, using the Les Manoeuvre Sur Les Derrieres was a very good idea on Lee’s part.

As far as an historical sense, I do know that Stuart’s aide, H.B. McClellan stated that “At about noon Stuart, with Jenkins’ and Chambliss’ brigades, moved out on the York turnpike, to take position on the left of the Confederate line of battle.” It’s an interesting comment and I wonder if that is the one you are refereeing to. The route does take Stuart to the Northeast, and then his move south obviously puts him in geographically east of Ewell, but I would never call Stuart on the “Line of battle”. In 1863 warfare, Stuart would need to be almost touching to be on the “line of battle.” In modern warfare I could see the term used, but not in 1863. If that was truly Stuart’s intent to be on the line of battle, then I think my armor NCO is correct in stating that Stuart “was lost.” However, I cannot image Stuart moving several miles up the York Road and thinking he was still on the “line of battle.” He is anything but. If that is McClellan’s true intent, he is either mistaken, or intentionally trying to cover things up. I don’t know a military mind today who would call Stuart “on the line of battle” when he met the Union cavalry.

McClellan also states that “Stuart’s object was to gain position where he would protect the left of Ewell’s corps, and would also be able to observe the enemy’s rear and attack it in case the Confederate assault on the Federal lines were successful.” “Protect the left of Ewell’s corps? !!!!“ This leaves me seriously in question of McClellan’s motives about writing this. A proper screening operation to protect Ewell’s flank and rear would have been to have positioned his troops generally along creek that goes from behinds Ewell’s lines (Stuart would have needed to connect to the east flank of Ewell, of course), and generally hold the line along that creek as it goes between Benner’s and Wolf’s Hill (I don’t see a name on the creek on the old 1863 map I am looking at). Whether Stuart screened along the creek or on the hill would depend on the terrain on the ground, but based on a map recon, I’d initially look at putting my cavalry along the northwest side of the creek, and position my artillery on Benner’s Hill (vegetation and visibility from Benner’s Hill would obviously effect my decision). I would then ensure that I had proper surveillance on both Hanover and York Pike roads.

But as it was, Ewell’s rear and flank were very much vulnerable to Gregg’s cavalry had Meade and the Army of the Potomac had any sense of offensive operations in mind. Ewell’s rear was so exposed that I’m surprise that Gregg didn’t request an attack. There was nothing stopping it. Again, if McClellan really calls Stuarts position near the Low Dutch Road as ‘protecting Ewell’s corps,’ I need to put both Stuart and Lee on the list of the three Bs. Most offensive-minded commanders would dream of such an enemy “flank protection” position. I have great difficulty believing that McClellan really thought he could be taken seriously by professional military officers in saying that the two mile gap between Stuart and Ewell was ‘protecting Ewell.’ The position of the cavalry battle field leaves both the Hanover and York Pike roads complete exposed. Stuart is not protecting the Confederate rear!!! Perhaps had McClellan known the battle would be studied so much, he might have found a different excuse. Not to be rude, but I question McClellan’s sanity with the comment. No military mind would ever call Stuart’s position “flank protection“ or “rear protection” of any confederate force that day.

The final point would come to “hearsay, I suppose. As Fitzhugh Lee wrote: “The position held by my cavalry at Gettysburg on the morning of the 3d was held by them at dark. They never left it except to go to the front in a charge. Such a condition of things could not have existed had other portions of the line been abandoned.”

That seems to indicate that Stuart stayed on the defensive the whole time. Yet, as Carhart quotes William Brooke-Rawle of the 3rd Penn, “In close columns of squadrons, advancing as if in review, with sabers drawn and glistening like silver in the bright sunlight, the spectacle called forth a murmur of admiration. It was, indeed, a memorable one.” There does seem to be room for Carhart’s comments that 4,000 confederates were on the move. Being so close to Meade’s rear, it would be a mystery of all times if Stuart had not made an attempt to strike Meade in the rear.

I think to sum it up I really have to question McClellan’s motives in why he said Stuart was in a position to protect Ewell. If the man were here today and told me that, I’d have no trouble telling him he were either completely ignorant or stupid, or a very bad liar. Stuart was in NO position to protect any part of the Confederate army, but he is in a dandy position to attack Meade’s rear!

V/R Doug

The rest of what you wrote, not so much. The cheap shots are not appreciated, and if you do it again, you will be banned from MY site.

The flaw in your argument is that Stuart was NEVER in Meade’s rear, only on the flank. And I will take the words of the actual participants over your 25 years, any time.

Next?

Eric