http://ipbiz.blogspot.com/2007/06/what-was-jeb-stuart-really-doing-on.html

Merely fyi:

From the bottom of page 5 of Brooke-Rawle’s “The Right Flank…”

It has been insinuated by a gallant Confederate officer (Major H.B. McClellan, Assistant Adjutant General on the [page 6] staff of General J.E.B. Stuart), who, if indeed he were present, might be presumed to have been in a position to judge correctly, that the cavalry operations on the right flank of Gettysburg resulted victoriously for his cause. That this was not the case will be shown conclusively.

which may have been written in response to text from McClellan (“The Life and Campaigns of Major-General JEB Stuart”) including:

This battle has been described from the Federal stand-point by Colonel William Brooke-Rawle, in an address delivered at the dedication of the monumental shaft which marks the scene of the engagement. This address is characterized by a spirit of fairness and an accuracy of description which are worthy of imitation. It is only in regard to the result of the last mêlée that many surviving Confederate cavalrymen demand that I shall present their testimony. Colonel Brooke-Rawle says:–

As Hart’s squadron and other small parties charged in from all sides, the enemy turned. Then there was a pell-mell rush, our men following in close pursuit. Many prisoners were captured, and many of our men, through their impetuosity, were carried away by the overpowering current of the retreat. The pursuit was kept up past Rummel’s, and the enemy was driven back into the woods beyond. The line of fences, and the farm-buildings, the key-point of the field, which in the beginning of the fight had been in the possession of the enemy, remained in ours until the end.

I have not been able to find any Confederate who will corroborate this statement: on the contrary, all the testimony on that side indicates a result successful to the Confederates in the last charge. It is not just to say that this arises from a disposition on the part of the Southern cavalrymen to claim uniform victory for themselves; for they have put on record many instances of candid acknowledgment of defeat. Moreover, it is improbable that Federal skirmishers could have held possession of the Rummel barn: for that building was not more than three hundred yards from the woods from which Jenkins’ and Chambliss’ brigades debouched for the fight, and on the edge of which the Confederate cavalry and artillery held position until the close of the day. And yet it was more than half a mile from the Lott house, which was, perhaps, the nearest point where any Federal cavalry were visible. If Federal skirmishers held the Rummel barn they concealed their presence; otherwise their capture would have been effected before aid could have been sent to them.

Forgive me for the delay in responding. This slipped by me.

The answer to your first question is I am not aware of anything.

The answer to your second question is that Brooke-Rawle wrote that piece for the dedication of the monument to the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry on ECF. That was his speech at the dedication ceremony.

Eric

#1. One thing Carhart’s book stressed (that Walker did not) was the impact of the West Point curriculum on Lee’s thinking. But that angle is covered in Troy Harman’s, Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg. Is there anything of significance that is in Carhart’s book that is not in Walker + Harman?

#2. Brooke-Rawle’s piece published in 1878 (which basically considers what Walker and Carhart proposed as “obvious”) seemed to have been motivated by something McLellan wrote to the effect that the Confederates won the cavalry battle (it’s a little unclear in Rawle’s text). Does anybody know the reason which caused Rawle to write his article?

My problem with it, of course, is that spreading fallacies misleeads the public and causes the less knowledgeable to buy into BS. That’s my huge problem with this whole thing.

As an author myself, my experience is that folks who read those blurbs assume that if someone blurbed it, it must be a great book. Never mind that none of these folks are Civil War people….

Eric

As to embracing the theory, there are, as noted above, no facts to support the Carhart theory, so any Civil War scholar might have difficulty. But Carhart may be more into the “selling books” business than into Civil War scholarship (as you have noted, there is no bibliography and no detailed footnoting, so this doesn’t have the appearance of scholarship). Carhart’s book could be a new Civil War genre, not flagrantly fictional as Kantor’s “If the South had Won…”, but put forth on non-existent facts to implicate a world “If Lee’s real plan had been executed…”

If reaching “many” people is the goal, Carhart may have succeeded, because there are probably more readers/buyers who think Carhart is right than those who have looked at civilwarcavalry and know he is neither correct nor original. These tricked people may have been helped to such end by reviewers such as noted in the previous post. This brings up another question. What is the responsibility of reviewers (including McPherson) to readers when tossing about words such as novel, original, and never before?
Do potential readers understand that these reviews are merely puffery, or do the readers have some expectation of “truth in review”?

My issue with all of those blurbs is that only one–Gabor Borit–is by someone recognized as a Civil War historian. None of the others would have any reason to know of the Brooke-Rawle writings you’ve identified. And Gabor is a Lincoln scholar, not someone who is a tactical details guy. Winik is a journalist who has written a single book on a single month of the war and is not an x’s and o’s guy, either.

Why is it that none of the Civil War scholars have embraced this theory?

Eric

“Tom Carhart sheds new light on the grandest battle of the Civil War, a remarkable achievement by any military historian”
—John Keegan, author of The Iraq War

“A lively and innovative interpretation of the greatest battle ever waged on American soil. Written with verve and a keen eye for the telling detail, Lost Triumph brings to life both the battlefield and the remarkable men who fought there. Tom Carhart has given us not only a fine work of scholarship, but a fine story.”
—Rick Atkinson, author of An Army at Dawn

“With Lost Triumph, West Pointer Tom Carhart swats a stupendous, historical, out-of-the-park four-bagger. History is seldom page-turning; here, the true events of Gettysburg compose a thriller. Dr. Carhart makes the case for revolutionizing our understanding of the decisive engagement of the Civil War; elevates the renown of Robert E. Lee; improbably reanimates the reputation of George Armstrong Custer; and shows us how history should be analyzed, challenged, proven and taught.
On the way, he condenses the complexities of the military art into entertainingly digestible bites.”
—Gus Lee, author of China Boy, Honor and Duty and Chasing Hepburn.

“Lost Triumph is an exciting, wonderful book rivaling anything yet written about the battle of Gettysburg. It is mandatory reading for Civil War buffs. I have always wondered why General Lee ordered that fateful attack when and where he did. Now I know. Thanks to Tom Carhart’s exemplary new research and his knowledge of military matters, Lost Triumph presents the first comprehensive view of Lee’s previously unknown plan to win the battle.”
—Bruce Lee, author of Marching Orders: The Untold Story of World War II

“Few generals were as brilliant as Robert E. Lee and few battles as titanic — and puzzling — as Gettysburg. Why did Lee fail? In Lost Triumph, Tom Carhart offers a bold and provocative new assessment. Agree or disagree, it is sure to stimulate debate among even the most seasoned Civil War buffs.”
—Jay Winik, author of April 1865: The Month That Saved America

“Provocative and exciting. A very good read.”
— Gabor Boritt, Director, Civil War Institute, Gettysburg College

“A mark of true genius is a writer’s ability to show us the familiar in a new light. Tom Carhart does just that in Lost Triumph, an original and refreshing look at Lee’s strategic thinking at Gettysburg that is sure to set the standard view of that battle on its head. But the genuinely breathtaking aspect of this book is the way Carhart takes his brush to the tarnished image of George Armstrong Custer. Lost Triumph is truly a ground-breaking contribution to American military history.”
—Dan Cragg, author of Generals in Muddy Boots and Top Sergeant

“Lost Triumph sets forth an intriguing theory and goes on to prove that it might just have been possible for General Lee to defeat the Union Army at Gettysburg but for the intervention of George Armstrong Custer. Tom Carhart’s grasp of the Civil War is firm, and his writing is lucid and has splendid pace.”
—Gail Frey Borden, author of Easter Day, 1941

“After 142 years of common belief that Robert E. Lee’s battlefield brilliance had somehow failed him in the decisive battle of Gettysburg, Tom Carhart, a West Pointer and noted historian who knows firsthand the blood and guts and chaos of war as a combat soldier in Viet Nam, has remarkably broken the code and now rewrites history so that we might finally understand what really happened there. Stunning. Brilliant.”
—Gil Dorland, author of Legacy of Discord: Voices of the Vietnam War Era

“Read any of the hundreds of books on Gettysburg-better yet, walk the route of Pickett’s Charge-and you’ll wonder what Lee was thinking when he sent those men across that deadly field. Tom Carhart has an answer. A gifted storyteller, Carhart recreates an entire world and leads us firmly to the far right of the Union line. Lee didn’t lose a triumph at Gettysburg; an impetuous young Federal cavalry general named Custer and his blue-coated horsemen snatched it away.”
— Ed Ruggero, author of Combat Jump: The Young Men Who Led the Assault Into Fortress Europe, July 1943

“Tom Carhart brings a soldier’s perspective to his analysis of Lee’s tactical thinking at Gettysburg. Whether or not you accept Carhart’s conclusions about JEB Stuart’s role in Pickett’s disastrous charge, his command of the principles of mounted combat are superb, and his descriptions of the actions of Stuart’s Confederate cavalry and Custer’s Union cavalry are filled with new insights. Carhart convincingly shows that Custer was at the right place at the right time at Gettysburg, even if that were not the case 13 years later on that grassy hillside overlooking the Little Bighorn in Montana.”
—Col. (ret.) Michael D. Mahler, author of Ringed in Steel—Armored Cavalry, Vietnam 1967-1968

“Students of military history have long wondered why, on July 3rd, 1863, during the Battle of Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee launched the attack against the center of the Union Army’s defenses. This attack, known as Pickett’s Charge, turned out to be a suicidal effort that had disastrous results for the Army of Northern Virginia in the short term, and ultimately to the overall cause of the Confederacy. Tom Carhart offers a fresh and compelling explanation for Lee’s decision in Lost Triumph. Fast paced, well researched, and provocative — this a book that is a must read for Civil War historians, and an entertaining read for those having only a casual interest in the greatest conflict in our Nation’s history. Tom Carhart is not only a scholar, he is a West Point graduate who served as a young officer in Vietnam. Tom writes with a soldier’s perspective — an understanding of tactics and the complexities of command / battlefield decision-making. He is one who has known the sounds, the smells and the fears of battle. These unique insights come through in Lost Triumph, adding realism and authenticity to his work”.
—Ronald H. Griffith, General (Retired), U.S. Army

“Why Robert E. Lee, a brilliant commander and tactician, ordered a tragically failed frontal attack by 15,000 Confederate foot soldiers at Gettysburg has been an unsettling mystery to most military history buffs. One hundred forty years later, Lost Triumph provides a plausible answer. Tom Carhart’s analysis brings the rolling hills of Pennsylvania to life for those who enjoy unraveling history’s mysteries. Truly a great book for those who follow military history.”
—Edward C. Meyer, General (Retired), U.S. Army

**Of course, the question is “who’s right on this,” the above-noted reviewers OR the commenters on civilwarcavalry?