id
was set in the arguments array for the "side panel" sidebar. Defaulting to "sidebar-1". Manually set the id
to "sidebar-1" to silence this notice and keep existing sidebar content. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 4.2.0.) in /home/netscrib/public_html/civilwarcavalry/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4239id
was set in the arguments array for the "footer" sidebar. Defaulting to "sidebar-2". Manually set the id
to "sidebar-2" to silence this notice and keep existing sidebar content. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 4.2.0.) in /home/netscrib/public_html/civilwarcavalry/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4239David Gregg has long been a favorite of mine, as he settled in my home town of Reading, PA in the years after the war. He became one of Reading’s first citizens, and he was much loved.
That also means that Pennock was related to Pennsylvania’s war-time governor by marriage. The governor was Andrew Gregg Curtin, and he was General Gregg’s first cousin.
Eric
]]>Cheers,
Pete
]]>On Sears
Could you explain or elaborate this, particularly as it applies to his books on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg? Hooker cetainly bungled Chancellorsville, but (other than ensuring Howard’s flank was protected), not to the point he should have lost. Now, in giving up despite still having a fighting chance and then some, that’s less forgiveable.
On Howard
Yeah, I don’t know what Howard was thinking. Gettysburg, he at least has the excuse, such as it is, of not necessarilyk nowing that Early would come in and send Barlow’s division in disarray, but it was hardly well done.
On Reynolds
As far as I can tell, Reynolds is a Good General on the basis of leadership, not on the basis of his tactical prowess. Though truth be told, I can’t even come up with any off the top of my head examples of that to any unusual degree. The Army of the Potomac’s officer corps is not a very bright collection of people, even when competent, its simply ordinary feeling..
On Jackson’s Death and New Corps Commanders
If not Ewell and A.P. Hill, who would have any merit? Lee wrote that that Hood and Anderson would make good corps commanders “if necessary”, as I understand it, but that’s not backed up by anything I know of about their performance.
Sorry if this seems a little long. So much to learn, so little time.
]]>Point well taken. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg are joined at the hip much as Chickamauga/Chattanooga are one huge strategic campaign.
The Couch controversy is one thing I’m unclear about. Did Hooker actually relieve himself of command of the army, or did he rather order Couch to take charge of a withdrawal in his stead (as the effects of his concussion made his active command impossible)?
I’m not a John Reynolds fan. He was a well liked and respected member of the command family of the AoP, but his actual track record in the few battles he actively participated in are hardly anything to write home about. A minnie ball made him immortal.
Oh. As to Lee’s tactics at Chancellorsville being opposed to common wisdom. Err, two words: Cannae and Lake Trasimene. Hannibal versus the Romans. Both cases the weaker Carthaginian army refused their center and enticed the Romans to advance head on while the flanks were reinforced and extended to envelope and flank and encircle the enemy. The larger but, less experienced Romans panicked and lost continuity when overlapped. I don’t propose anything ala Carhart here, but when JEB Stuart came to Lee and said the Union right was in the air, cavalryman Lee pounced at the chance to make a victory out of desperate situation.
As long as I’m warmed up: while basking in their operational success no one seems to recall that Jackson’s immortal flank attack failed to do what was hoped. Like so many CW actions it was slow to develope, launched too late in the day to be exploited, and exhausted it’s span of control after intial success and was blunted by a new line bolstered by some strategically placed cannon. (Longstreet wasn’t at Chancellorsville to be mesmerized, but thoought back to Second Manassas and how his grand assault lost impetus as it proceeded.)
Sorry, here’s your soapbox back ;)…
]]>Don
]]>Thank you. I’m glad you enjoyed it.
The best is the Bigelow map study, but without the maps, it’s useless. You have to get the maps, but it will cost you a couple of hundred bucks to get the maps.
If you’re not able to spend that kind of money, I recommend the Ernest “Pat” Furgurson’s Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave, which is a fair and balanced study. Sears’ book, like most of his, has an agenda, which is the rehabilitation of Joe Hooker.
Eric
]]>Christ
]]>I don’t think the guys in the 8th PA liked Alfie much either.
I find it interesting that In the two monument dedication addresses in Bates PA @ GB there’s nary a word regarding Pleasonton.
Also, John Vanderslice who wrote “Gettysburg–Then and Now” and served with the 8th later in the war hardly even mentions Pleasonton. 4 X’s in 500 plus pages.
It’s as though Pleasonton was being snubbed by being ignored as much as possible.
At any rate,
Old DMcM Gregg is up there on the PA Monument watching over his old 8th from up above. Unfortuneately, so is Pleasonton.
The reason this topic peaks my interest is that last week my amatuer self was giving a tour to a guy who wanted to see GB monuments of units that had bad luck or suffered heavily at C-Ville like the Dutch, the 8th, and the poor Rose Woods 17th CT for example. Even though we were in GB! So Eric’s thoughts really got my ear!
Any chance of me ever getting a look-see at that letter?
Thanks for that info!
Stan
]]>