Craig.

Secondly, the means to move that equipment was degraded somewhat. The engineers had animals to transport, but those were scattered out due to mission requirements. The BEST way to move bridging equipment on the Potomac was, as done in the last weeks of June 1863, by way of the C&O canal. BUT some fellow by the name of Stuart had sufficiently broken that transportation link when he made that “glory” ride to Gettysburg (ahem… one more “consequence” of Stuart’s ride if you ask me).

Third, during the late June bridging operations at Edwards Ferry, the engineers spoke of their preferences for locations to bridge the Potomac. Harpers Ferry was not one of them, and the justification was the narrow (non-existent) flood plain. Further down river, the Potomac enters more open country, particularly around Berlin and again around Leesburg. The engineers preferred those locations as they were less affected by the rise and fall of the river (ask me about the mechanics of the bridging and I’ll write you a book). HOWEVER, I have not seen any discussions of the pursuit crossings and can only offer the preferences of June in lieu.

Lastly, I’d also point out that Warren was not as involved with the tactical decisions with respect to the engineer brigade as we might think. While he provided suggestions for the June 1863 crossing of the Potomac, he was only distantly involved with the operation. Of course the brigade commander (Benham) was likewise less involved than he should have been. The task fell to lower grade officers – Spaulding, Turnbull, Spears,…. So any bridging done on July 12-14 would have fallen to those guys again. Thus, until I see direct correspondence involving those officers that provides details, I’m not convinced any bridging operation was seriously considered.

Lastly, let’s look at the chess board here. If Meade were to throw part or all of the AOP over at Harpers Ferry, what does he gain? Now the AOP has the Shenandoah (a formidable barrier in its own right) at their back. On the other hand, if the AOP moves quickly into Loudoun Valley (even after Lee’s recrossing), isn’t that a more advantageous position? Not only does the AOP stay between the ANV and Washington, but also is in position to interdict movement into Culpeper and thence back to the Rappahannock lines.

Thanks, Eric. Now I have yet another line of research for my studies!

That’s an extremely nice piece of detective work.

My great-great Uncle Isaac was in Co. D, US Engineers Battalion, and on July 12 they were on the march to Sandy Hook. His diary indicates that July 13 was “rainy” while they “lay in camp” near Sharpsburg, so the “river falling” window may have started closing by very late that day (although he records July 14 as “pleasant”). As an aside, he reached Sandy Hook on July 15 “with a lot of rain”. They were detailed on arrival to repair the “Ware”[?] Bridge over the river on that date.