Eric

However, I will also make one more observation, to wit: I think/feel that you are looking at the facts, circumstances and persons with the firm and fixed belief that Lincoln WAS NOT or even perhaps COULD NOT HAVE BEEN involved and that opinion is – I also believe – based upon your assessment of Lincoln the man – rather than any absolute proof of his non-involvement since I can see no such absolute proof. Hence, you construct the facts as above and they are being, I have no doubt, correctly construed from your point of view.

On the other hand, I am looking at the same facts, circumstances and persons with the firm and fixed opinion that Lincoln WAS or certainly COULD HAVE BEEN involved based upon MY assessment of Lincoln the man rather than any proof of his actual involvement. Hence, I construct the facts as I posited them. I have tried manfully (womanfully?) not to ignore any fact that might be seen as conclusive proof of Lincoln’s NON-involvement, but I do not doubt that you may believe that I have done so when I reach a different conclusion based upon the same facts.

The facts are fairly consistent, it is the conclusion drawn from them that differs although I certainly admit that you are undoubtedly MUCH better informed than myself as a ‘newcomer’ to the field. And yet, as there is no ‘smoking gun’ one way or the other, in the end, it becomes a matter of individual judgment rather than a simple knowledge of the historical facts.

I see Lincoln as being perfectly willing to do whatever was necessary to win the war- and, indeed, given the actions of Sherman and Sheridan, he DID do whatever he believed necessary! I do not put much (if any) faith in the man’s ‘conciliatory words’ towards the South because they were spoken AFTER the Confederacy had been hammered into submission and were therefore of little account insofar as what MIGHT have happened in the so-called ‘reconstruction’. It is always easy to be forgiving and magnanimous towards someone you have utterly defeated. Of course, had Lincoln survived and lived up to his much lauded ‘magnanimity’, I might have a different opinion, but that, too, is mere conjecture as he did NOT survive.

Ergo, I have absolutely no problem – given all that has been revealed so far – in finding Lincoln’s hand in the planning of the raid and his blessing upon its execution. I do not see him as some sort of civil ‘saint’, a modern day Mother Theresa who could never consider doing anything as ‘dastardly’ as murdering the entire Confederate government and burning the Richmond in order to bring the war to a swift conclusion – and before election day, too!

On the other hand, I know that for many, Lincoln is a mythic hero and therefore, the Dahlgren-Kilpatrick raid seems entirely out of character for the man. I understand and respect that opinion and since there is no real piece of completely credible and irrevocable evidence either way, I am more than willing to ‘agree to disagree’

But one last time: Any historical evaluation of the public’s view of Grant and Lincoln’s political standing in the spring of 1864 as opposed to the late summer will find two different moods represented. Far from carrying a lot of baggage, Grant was widely popular and being touted as a presidential candidate by both parties in early 1864. He was not known as a drunkard except inside the army, and the Lincoln administration was very careful to check out such rumors before he was brought east. (It might also be noted that newspaper charges of drunkenness flew around the generals of both armies in the war whenever there was a need to explain a setback.) So there was plenty of reason to hope for success in early 1864, and the disappointment of the bloody Overland campaign and the Petersburg siege lay in the weeks and months ahead. The same is true about his problems with Halleck and Hancock and the Crater, etc.

The issue of Grant the butcher was raised, but that is not relevant to the discussion here, because the label was first applied by a Richmond newspaper in May—months after Grant’s appointment–and then picked up in the Democratic Party’s papers in the north. Still, it is worth debunking one of the enduring myths of the Civil War. Whatever the public perception then or now, measured by the rate of casualties and absolute numbers, it is Lee, not Grant, who comes who incurred greater numbers of wounded and killed soldiers. Let me repeat that point using different words. A soldier in the Civil War would have a better chance of survival if he served in an army commanded by Grant rather than one led by Lee. One scholar has calculated that armies commanded by Lee suffered 121,000 killed and wounded during the war, a casualty rate of 20 percent. Grant’s armies suffered 94,000 casualties, 27,000 fewer than Lee, and racked up a killed and wounded rate of “only” 15 percent. Seen through a smaller lens, the higher percentages hold: If one counts the Wilderness and Spotsylvania as one battle, Lee lost 23,000 men, more than 34 percent of his force, compared to Grant’s army losses of 33,000 men, amounting to about 28 percent. The crucial point is this: Lee’s overall casualty rate was high because he incurred the bulk of his losses while attacking in the glory days of 1862 and 1863, just as Grant did during the Overland Campaign.

Let’s look at it another way: When Grant was appointed general-in-chief in March 1864, the war had already dragged on for nearly three years and the Confederacy was battered but remained largely whole (though it had lost Tennessee and the Trans-Mississippi in 1863). There was yet hope for a Southern nation. By year’s end, nine months later, thanks in large measure to the grand strategy Grant devised, the Confederacy consisted of broken fragments, Lincoln had won re-election, and everywhere Southern armies were besieged or in retreat. But I digress . . .

As for the Lincoln mythology, no one here is calling him a saint. But I have honestly searched for his record, in his actions and his words, to find anything that would suggest that he would countenance a bloody and desperate raid as this, and I come up empty. My research has found the opposite. Time and time again, when things look desperate, it was Lincoln who kept an even keel and stayed the course, never approving desperate schemes or changing courses on a whim. And, again, March 1864 was not a time of despair on any level, and there was much reason to think that desperate measures were not needed.

Of course it is possible that Lincoln broke with character and rolled the dice to approve of the K-D raid, and I have no way of disproving that any more than someone else has a way of proving that. I think it quite likely that, driven in large measure by concern for Union prisoners in Richmond, a concern shared by Secretary Stanton and Congressional Radicals, he approved a daring raid to free them and stipulated that it be planned and given resources outside of normal channels. But to me the evidence suggests that the Dahlgren papers represent a wild addition to the plan that was cooked up much further down the chain of command. The language used in the order itself suggests nothing so much as the words of a testosterone-poisoned glory-hunter. We probably will never know, but chances are that Lincoln knew nothing of that part of the plan (if one can dignify Dahlgren’s words with such a noun).

Furthermore, my point is ‘revisionist’ only because the present point of view has been accepted without any credible evidence for a long time as part of the ‘Lincoln mythology’ – very much as many ‘scientific facts’ have long since been disproven as technology has permitted us to see what was once beyond our ability to comprehend (i.e. the atom is the smallest particle in nature). Indeed, for quite some time I believe that the documents involved were believed to be forgeries and only now comes an admission by many ‘main stream’ historians that such may not be the case.

I have presented above what I consider to be very proven, credible, believeable, objective points that reasonably lead to the conclusion that the plan was concocted in the Administration. And as the Administration WAS, for all intents and purposes, Lincoln, it is hardly reasonable to believe that he was unaware of it.

On the other hand, If you can present to me evidence that many important schemes and plans were developed in either the military or the government and that those plans were purposefully – AND SUCCESSFULLY – kept from the President, then I will be willing to admit that it is POSSIBLE (and no more) that Lincoln might have been kept in the dark about this one as well. But somehow, I don’t think you will be able to do that and keep alive any pretence of the ‘greatness’ of Lincoln. Let’s face it, the man cannot be a political genius who was the fount of all that was glorious and a dupe who could be used and confused by his underlings; the two concepts are antithetical.

Finally, regarding Kilpatrick: we are not speaking here of some slight infraction of the rules here . If you truly posit that Kilpatrick was responsible for a plan that would have been denounced and rejected by Lincoln and the Union high command and that he attempted to carry out that plan against the known wishes of his superiors, then I cannot imagine how he would have been let go without even a ‘slap on the wrist’. Far too many Union officers of greater and lesser rank than Kilpatrick were summarily cashiered for far less egregious acts! (I know this from my study of Mosby; a lot of those whom he made look foolish in their efforts to capture or kill him found themselves court martialed and drummed out of the army!)

The object of this raid became known by the Confederacy and was a source of GREAT embarassment to the Administration and the Union high command. If Kilpatrick had been one of the culprits, he surely would have suffered at the very least dismissal and at the worst, a far greater punishment. The very fact that he was not punished at all but went on as if nothing had happened (when the son of one of Lincoln’s closest friends – a young man known and apparently liked by Lincoln – died during the escapade) seems to be just one more nail in the coffin of the theory that Dahlgren and Kilpatrick acted independently.

By evidence, I mean something more than supposition and theorisation. Something tangible … a primary or relevant secondary source that states Lincoln was actually involved.

Otherwise, it’s just another piece of probable revisionist thought that hasn’t been subject to the processes of historical verification discussed earlier on the thread.

I must admit that I don’t agree with many of your assessments above, and wish I had time to deal with them in detail. Two points briefly. Firstly, if the Union had cashiered all their inept officers they wouldn’t have hardly any left by this time. Far better to ship the useless ones out West, and avoid the political fallout. The better ones, from the West, were shipped back East. Secondly, Lincoln had no direct control over what went on in the Army (other than replacing those at the top) and that was a source of great frustration for him.

Best wishes,

Mark

But Grant carried a lot of baggage AND lost a lot of men after he was appointed ‘General-in-Chief’. He still had to cope with his reputation as a drunkard and the ‘butcher’s bill’ that seemed to accompany some if not most of his battles with Lee. True, the Union could afford to lose a regiment more than the Confederates could afford to lose a squad, but all those wounded and dead being shipped to Northern hospitals and cemetaries did NOTHING to help the morale of the North. The Union STILL hadn’t ‘prevailed’ despite victory after victory and Lincoln’s re-election was hardly a ‘sure thing’ even AFTER Grant took command.

On the other hand (evidently speaking)

1. We KNOW that Dahlgren and his father were intimates of Lincoln and the young man visited the White House frequently prior to the launching of the raid and therefore, unless he was a COMPLETE ignoramus and/or morally bankrupt, was aware of what would not and what WOULD be tolerated by the President.

2. We KNOW the makeup of the raiding party and that it wasn’t just ‘a few good men’ on horseback. There were a goodly number of troops involved together with explosives experts which hardly would have bene the case had this been a clandestine plot by two over-eager soldiers.

3. We KNOW – or it has been strongly suggested with Union testimony – that a similar raid had been planned earlier unless we dismiss General Wistar entirely and I see no reason for that. That means that even BEFORE Dahlgren, a plan had been underway to do what the Dahlgren/Kilpatrick raid was supposed to accomplish and that fact reasonably removes BOTH Dahlgren AND Kilpatrick from the ‘loop’ at least as far as planning the raid is concerned.

4. We KNOW (or let us say that is has been fairly well proven) that the papers were NOT Confederate forgeries, so that removes the claim that this was never a Union objective in the first place.

5. We KNOW that Lincoln was a ‘hands on’ President. He was not an ’empty suit’ who waited around for his underlings to make policy and determine strategy. I would say to you that NOTHING important was forthcoming from the Administration that was absent the President’s involvement – great or little.

6. We KNOW that Lincoln was in the middle of a VERY difficult run for a second term and that the war was not all that popular in the North, especially after it had been ‘reinvented’ as a war to free the slaves rather than a war to save the Union! There had already been serious civil strife over the draft (see the New York draft riots) and the question was being asked – both North and South – ‘When will this cruel war end?’ The appointment of Grant – who had a LOT of baggage as I noted – was not the ‘cure-all’ that seems to be presented here. Grant still was very much at odds with many in the Army. Halleck was no friend of his nor was Hancock, both very important commanders. The casualties in the Wilderness and another battle (the Crater? – I’m not a battle aficianodo.) was such that Grant was called a ‘butcher’ by much of the Northern press.

7. Finally, even if the ‘plan’ had been called off as seems to be one of the points being made, that does not in any way change its ORIGINS. That is, even if Dahlgren and Kilpatrick determined to carry on after receiving orders to desist, that does not make the ‘plan’ theirs; they were still working from a plan conceived elsewhere – and where else could that ‘elsewhere’ be, but the Administration?

As for bringing Kilpatrick to justice had he actually conceived the plan with Dahlgren: again, I must respectfully disagree. He would not have been the first officer cashiered for gross insubordination and it certainly would have been seen as entirely contrary to the well being of the Army to permit an officer who had acted in such an egregiously insubordinate and possibly treasonous manner to just ‘walk away’ from the incident not only uncharged, but still retaining his commission! How on earth would such an ‘oversight’ have played in the ranks? And believe me, the matter would have become known! Armies are not closed mouthed in such matters. The only real answer as to why Kilpatrick was not cashiered or even court martialed is that he did nothing other than ‘follow orders’ – and that brings us right back to square one.

I believe that what I have posted here must be considered as ‘evidence’, albeit circumstantial in nature. There is no ‘smoking gun’ here other than the documents and they do not allude to the people who drew up the plan for the raid. But certainly, there is absolutely NO evidence that contradicts my position that is anything but itself circumstantial and, in fact, a great deal less convincing than the evidence in favor of my point.

I don’t believe that Abraham Lincoln would have been willing to trust his re-election to the ‘good feelings’ and ‘rising morale’ that supposedly accompanied Grant’s appointment. After all, how many generals had ALREADY been appointed – to great huzzahs – but who came to nothing in the end. Yes, Grant had been triumphant, but in the West and NOT against Lee. For all the people of the North knew, he might prove to be another Hooker or Burnside or Meade or Pope, only a bit less sober. No, I don’t think that a shrewd and intelligent politician like Linoln was willing to put ALL his ‘eggs’ in that one basket when there was the possibility that the entire Confederate government and its capitol could be brought down in one quick, decisive military strike.

Whilst I share many of your opinions about Grant, Kilpatrick was bad … even by UK cavalry officer standards. The fact that books until recently have described Pleasanton as a “brilliant cavalry officer” goes to show the real dearth of Federal trooper heroes, with those such as Gregg and Buford having, until recently, been largley ignored. A travesty, but a matter of politics.

Of course governments cover up. They still do now! They don’t care what the opposition think, as it is home opinion that counts. It didn’t matter that Davis knew the truth. By that time, who in the north cared whatRichmond thought? Until someone shows me evidence that Lincoln was involved, it’s just another revisionist theory; not history.

Bill’s obviously quite right about probability … and not just Kilpatrick was shipped out to the West. So was that other Union horsie hero Pleasanton! They just sent him to the Trans-Mississippi. So, instead of firing them, keep the hero, and send them out West where the opposition is weak.

I’ve followed your earlier discussions on the point, and have tried to see the alternative viewpoint. In fact I love the alternative theory. But, I want to see some evidence in order to convince me that there is some merit in your argument.

Best wishes,

Mark

That is a great point, and I was thinking along slightly different lines: there was not only the hope of Union victory in 1864, there was an expectation that it would happen. The overall mood of the U.S., as I read it, was hopeful. And it was clear weeks before Grant assumed office that he would become general-in-chief. Lincoln supported the bill to authorize the rank of lieutenant general only after he was assured that Grant had no presidential ambitions. That alone suggests that Lincoln was more apprehensive about a winning general like Grant seeking the presidency vs. a McClellan.

Lincoln’s re-election seemed much more likely in early 1864 than it would in August before the capture of Atlanta and Mobile and the victories in the Shenandoah. From the Confederacy’s standpoint, the last half of 1863 had been a string of defeats: Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Chattanooga. The Mississippi was open, Tennessee was firmly in Union hands, and Lee had been unable to work his magic and inflict a defeat on the Army of the Potomac. There is no reason to think, then, that Lincoln would have rolled the dice on a risky raid. He was not in any case a risk-taker; when in late summer it appeared that he would be defeated, Lincoln engaged in no wild moves to win victory.

Valarie’s point about why the conspirators were not brought to justice is plausible, but I would think it more likely that, in wartime, such a wild scheme would simply be hushed up. And that is apparently what happened. Kilpatrick was shipped out west, away from any inquiry.

Bill

On the other hand, had Kilpatrick been a suriving conspirator – as is being suggested, if I understand all of this correctly – he could be sacrificed without any loss of face and, in fact, doing so would have cleared up the whole mess with everyone satisfied that justice had prevailed and the conscience of the Union was still pure! But nobody brought Kilpatrick ANYWHERE, much less ‘to justice’. Indeed, he was allowed to go his merry way, rank and command intact, probably because he knew far too much to be put on ANY witness stand. I’m sure that even if Kilpatrick was not in on the planning, Dahlgren must have told him all about it – AND those who were involved – and that made old ‘Kill-cavalry’ a VERY dangerous man to tamper with. Newspapers are SO interested in scandal – even those days and I don’t see Kilpatrick being willing to get shot to save Lincoln’s reputation, do you?

As for the bit about Grant. Well, maybe that might have figured in some people’s minds, but surely, a plan like this that already had an earlier version (if General Wistar is to be believed) might have been too far along to be abandoned simply because Grant came into the picture. After all, even his presence did not quickly end the war nor, after a huge butcher’s bill with little to show for it, did it guarantee Lincoln’s re-election.

Like Lincoln, I fear we are looking at Grant through the rosy glass of hindsight. The man was certainlly NOT above criticism even among his fellow officers. Indeed, it took Grant a considerable time to make much of a difference and remember, it was SHERMAN, not Grant, who won the election for Lincoln. So to my mind, I cannot see why Grant’s sudden appearance in the Eastern Theater would have led to the plan being abandoned even if the Administration had every hope that Grant would ‘win the day’. Lincoln needed a spectacular victory, something that would cause the spirit of the North to rise and there was no reason to believe that Grant could produce any such victory quickly enough to guarantee Lincoln’s re-election. On the other hand, the decapitation of the Confederate government and the burning of Richmond would fill the bill nicely.

But let’s just suppose that it WAS abandoned and that Dahlgren and Kilpatrick were determined to try to accomplish it anyway. I seem to remember that they set off with quite a few men including explosives experts. If the orders for the plan had been contramanded, why were they allowed to go? And, furthermore, that still does make the plan THEIR ‘brainchild’! And so we are back to considering that the plan had its origins in the Lincoln Administration and that includes the President. If, in fact, the plan had been abandoned as a consequence of Grant’s assuming command but those chosen to execute it attempted to do so anyway, their actions do not change the origins of the plan and those responsible for it.

Sorry, but the facts as they have been presented still lead to only one credible conclusion in my opinion: the raid was the brainchild of the Lincoln Administration and Lincoln’s history as President presupposes that he had, at the very least, knowledge of it and, at the very least, gave tacit approval to it. Nothing else makes any sense in the context of the information so far presented.

Amen, brother. My thoughts on that particular topic are well-known, and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that I wholeheartedly agree with you.

Eric