s Bridge. A brigade of Union cavalry under Col. Robert H. G. Minty and a brigade of mounted infantry under command of Col. John T. Wilder, guarding the bridges, offered stout resistance and delayed the crossing of the southern troops for several hours. During the skirmishing, Minty’s men dismantled Alexander’s Bridge and forced the Confederate infantry to proceed to Lambert’s Ford, a half-mile downstream. This was a textbook delaying action every bit as effective and every bit as important as that fought by John Buford at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863. However, unlike Buford’s stand, it got little attention and even less praise, perhaps because Chickamauga was a debacle for the Union while Gettysburg was a signal Union victory. The tactics were identical, and the results nearly so. [...]]]>That’s very good stuff–thanks for passing that along.
Eric
]]>Three cheers! I have always been bugged by people referring to Buford’s action as a defense in depth – I still see it called that by lots of people. Glad you have been pursuaded.
One helpful way to think about a Defense in Depth is that the defenders actually don’t intend to shift position much – the idea instead, especially under the modern definition – is to instead form hardpoints that the enemy will choose to bypass rather than attack head-on. Bypassing, however, means that the enemy attack force is divided and channelled into prepared kill sacks that become traps. The defender can then commit reserves to eliminate enemy spearheads one at a time.
Covering forces rarely stand and fight, their job instead is to trade space for time and identify the primary thrust to higher command, who can then decide where and how to meet the attacker.
Dave Powell
]]>As always, I enjoyed your assessment of John Buford’s role in the July 1 cavalry action and agree with it. I am biased, of course, but I have always believed Buford’s defense and the fighting to hold McPherson and Seminary Ridges won Gettysburg for the Union. One has only to look at the killed, wounded and missing lists for the entire three days see the truth of it. ]]>
And that’s precisely the point I was trying to make.
US armor fought a heck of a covering force action against the Iraqis during Gulf War I, and it plainly demonstrates that the more things change, the more they remain the same.
Eric
]]>The big difference now is the addition of tanks to the cavalry, which gives it a fighting capabilty that it just did not have in the ACW. Thus guard missions (which involve fighting) are much more common, as is the use of the armored cavalry regiments for covering force actions.
Thus a modern FM on cavalry tactics will still serve as a reasonably good guide for the CW, as long as you understand the differences in equipment and terminology. Our instructors used several CW examples in class and were at some pains to emphasize that cavalry tactics had changed little in 200 years.
]]>You are correct, of course, but what’s interesting to me is how little things have changed over the years. Standard NATO doctrine, back in the days of the Cold War, were to conduct a covering force action at Fulda Gap in the hope of holding back the Soviet armor long enough for the main body to come up. Although there weren’t horses involved, the tactics were identical.
We’ve actually identified about a dozen examples of good covering force actions conducted during the war. The other most famous one was Minty’s brigade at Chickamauga in September 1863, but Dibrell’s division of Hampton’s cavalry fought an outstanding one at Bentonville on March 18, 1865.
Eric
]]>Eric
]]>Having been professionally trained as a cavalryman and a staff officer, I can affirm that the cavalry in the defense has three missions: screen, guard, and cover. In the CW screening missions were the most common, guard missions almost nonexistent, and covering force actions rare. I can only think of three or four, but then I have not read nearly as much about the subject as you.
Period tactics did allow for an advance or rear guard, often a mixed force, that often operated independently or semi-independently as a covering force, and there are a number of late-war examples of the Confederates using their sharpshooters this way.
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