It may not be of much use, but I came across a passage in Fletcher Pratt’s Stanton, Lincoln’s Secretary of War, Norton, 1953 that discusses Stanton’s heavy involvement in the prison-of-war issue in late 1863 and early 1864. See pp. 336-339. Unfortunately, it is nowhere attributed, but may reflect material from Stanton’s own correspondence (a major source for Pratt) and the OR. If true, and I there are so many particulars here to make it credible, then it is obvious that Stanton had a very good idea of what was happening at Libby Prison and other confinement sites in Richmond.
I picked this book up years ago in DC and only now got around to reading it. Time for a new biography of old Edwin!
Hope this helps.
Bill
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]]>True, there had been civil wars before, but the War Between the States – a name which I believe is more accurate than that most used – was unique insofar as the relationship of the combatants was concerned. This was not a matter of one ‘faction’ of the country vs. another ‘faction’ – Cavaliers vs. Roundheads – nor was it a religious conflict in the true sense of that term. Yes, there were ‘factions’ and yes, to a certain extent, there was a ‘religious ferver’ involved, especially in the abolitionist movement. But there can be no doubt that the many reasons for the eventual conflict were unique to both place and time. Therefore, Lincoln’s past behavior simply could not be used except in the most fundamental way as a true guide to what he might do in a crisis during the war.
For instance, I’m sure that Lincoln would not have agreed to poisoning the water supply of some Southern city or for the ruthless murder of non-combatants and civilians a la Quantrell in Lawrence. Such immoral and obscene acts would have been rejected out of hand even had the President been convinced that the war could be ended by their use. On the other hand, however, a strike at the ‘head’ of the enemy was not all that problematic morally. Davis and his government were considered ‘criminals’, not adversaries. That is obvious even from the press coverage. While the military leaders of the Confederacy were somewhat ‘covered’ in their treason by their position as underlings of a CIVIL authority – the situation that had been in place in the United States since its founding – the CIVIL authority which had produced and now directed secession was considered treasonable by the United States Government and therefore had no such ‘cover’. Ergo, Davis et al. were fair game at least in the legal sense. In the same way, Lincoln was ALSO fair game although not in the sense of being a traitor and criminal, but in being Commander in Chief of an enemy nation. The President of the United States is NOT a ‘non-combatant’.
There had already been concern in both the military and civilian leadership of the Union that a certain ‘independent’ command of the Army of Northern Virginia (I won’t say directed by what Confederate commander) might sneak into Washington and either kidnap or even assassinate the President which has to mean that the thought of an assault by military elements on an enemy civilian government was not an unheard of concept or unconsidered at least in the North. If Lincoln’s men were concerned about the Gray Ghost, as Lincoln termed him, and what he might do to Lincoln and/or others in Washington, where is the ‘great leap’ of thought needed for those within the Administration to see the possibility of turning the situation around and sending UNION military units to Richmond to accomplish the same thing. Indeed, given the state within the Confederacy of which Lincoln and his Administration were well aware, such a plan – though dangerous insofar as further widening the scope of the conflict – had a great deal of merit. And that merit grew as the conflict lengthened, casualties mounted and the people in the North began to question the noble cause.
Finally, I simply cannot imagine two seminal things: [1] Ulrich Dahlgren – after becoming as intimate with Lincoln as Mr. Wittenberg has noted – just deciding on this strategy and being given carte blanche to go off without anyone knowing just WHAT it was that he was trying to do. That makes Dahlgren a comic book figure and eveyrone in the Lincoln Adminstration and the Union military idiots! Dahlgren – as I have already mentioned – was not an independent commander like White or McNeill or Mosby or Quantrell. He was ‘regular army’ and, as such, had to have the necessary orders to be given the men and equipment he had with him when he died (or was he alone? I think not!) and [2] That members of the Administration – Stanton, Dana, Seward or whomever – came up with this plan, approached Ulrich Dahlgren and Kilpatrick – or more importantly, approached their MILITARY SUPERIORS – made arrangements for the raid and sent them off while Abraham Lincoln was totally in the dark about the matter. For one thing, if the plan worked, just how were they going to explain the matter to Lincoln? Or, perhaps did they think that if the thing succeeded, he would be happy enough to overlook their little indiscretion of leaving the President out of a major policy decision? And if they believed that to be the case, that ALSO says something about Lincoln; that is, that he really wouldn’t mind much what they did as long as it worked.
No one is saying that Lincoln was a monster and cruel to people around him, but he wasn’t Mahatma Ghandi either. Read his comments about the destruction committed by Sherman in Georgia. Lincoln was in a unique situation. He HAD no ‘historical record’ from which to gain much in the way of insight into his predicament. He was being forced to take chances and make decisions that might well be considered beyond a man with his limited experience. He certainly did not make much use of his first Vice President, a man with considerably MORE national experience. He was a man of moods, subject to depression and melancholy. He had great instincts, but he was also deeply flawed. As a man, I can easily see him considering this plan (whoever thought it up) BEFORE it was initiated. He may even have chosen young Dahlgren as the kind of ‘noble youth’, the son of a much admired father, whose boundless ambition and past bravery might well carry such an audacious plan to fruition. Frankly, I see that as much more likely than the other scenarios presented here. There is just too much ‘backup’ by the regular military in Dahlgren’s raid to permit it to be considered the brainchild of a ‘lone gunman’.
V.P.
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s raid would have been most out of character. All I am saying—and limited conclusion it is—is that in the absence of any hard evidence, one should give the benefit of the doubt to that which reflects the pattern of behavior, and not the exception.
About the idea that to believe Lincoln could not have known is to believe he was the pawns of the other people, the President was shrewd enough to let other people think he agreed with them and that they had influence. But, as we all know, pawn he was not. However, Stanton was skilled at playing all sorts of double games simultaneously and had played them for years in Washington. Look at his Janus-faced behavior as attorney general in the last months of the Buchanan administration. Look at his history of erratic behavior. Look at his befriending McClellan while working hard to get him dismissed. Look at what other matters he kept from Lincoln. Look at the vendettas he pursued against all sorts of people. For all his talents, he was a hater, one who had to manufacture enemies where none existed. My guess—and guess it must remain—is that he made the raid happen and that Lincoln did not learn anything about Dahlgren's plans beyond freeing prisoners.]]>My skepticism about Lincoln’s involvement reflects my experience that one can almost always perceive a repeating pattern of behavior in people’s lives. If you study a famous person’s life long enough, events and statements begin to point to a consistency in the character for that individual. There can be growth born of experience and age, but the behavior, the mindset, stays remarkably constant in most people.
Lincoln could be ruthless in his pursuit of political goals and terribly ambitious at times, and he had the sort of wide-ranging intelligence that could fathom all manner of means for winning the war. He was capable of duplicity when it served his purpose.
But nothing I or, apparently, anyone else, can recall anything about Lincoln that suggests he exhibited at any time the sort of personal vindictiveness and risky “go-for-broke†mindset that would have been involved in approving Dahlgren’s raid. In fact, as I have pondered this question over the last two days, examples keep coming to mind that point to the opposite, to the caution, the self-control, the masterly ability to analyze situations and see them as they are and not as one would wish them to be. It could have happened, but Lincoln approving Dahlgren’s raid would have been most out of character. All I am saying—and limited conclusion it is—is that in the absence of any hard evidence, one should give the benefit of the doubt to that which reflects the pattern of behavior, and not the exception.
About the idea that to believe Lincoln could not have known is to believe he was the pawns of the other people, the President was shrewd enough to let other people think he agreed with them and that they had influence. But, as we all know, pawn he was not. However, Stanton was skilled at playing all sorts of double games simultaneously and had played them for years in Washington. Look at his Janus-faced behavior as attorney general in the last months of the Buchanan administration. Look at his history of erratic behavior. Look at his befriending McClellan while working hard to get him dismissed. Look at what other matters he kept from Lincoln. Look at the vendettas he pursued against all sorts of people. For all his talents, he was a hater, one who had to manufacture enemies where none existed. My guess—and guess it must remain—is that he made the raid happen and that Lincoln did not learn anything about Dahlgren’s plans beyond freeing prisoners.
]]>Even the most superficial knowledge of the Confederate military shows the conflicts within it. Many believe that Lee spent more time pacifying his underlings than fighting the Yankees! The same held true in the Union army, obviously, but that army was maintained and governed by a strong central government with a line of succession as mandated by the Constitution. The death of Lincoln did not end the federal government because that government was of long duration (considering the circumstances, of course) while the death of Davis would have left the very amorphous Confederate government quite literally, headless.
I’m sorry, but I am beginning (?) to see a defense of Lincoln that has more to do with hagiography than history. No, it simply COULDN’T have been Lincoln! Stanton? Certainly. Dana? Baker? Sure, but honest Abe? No way! Sorry, but I don’t buy it. Unless, of course, Lincoln was a pawn of those around him – and I don’t think that was the case nor do I believe that his most ardent admirers would hold that position either. Put another name to the man in the White House with the facts as they are known and I think most people would believe that the plan originated in the Administration – although not necessarily with the President – and that the Administration – INCLUDING the President – signed off on it in hopes of bringing a bloody conflict to an early end.
V.P.
]]>Furthermore, what was more important in 1865 in giving rise to the perception that the war was over–the fall of Richmond or the surrender of the Army of Northern Viriginia? I know they were both linked and in close proximity to one another but it was Lee’s surrender that cut to the quick those who still held hopes of an independent Confederate States, even though other forces such as those of Johnston and Kirby Smith were still in the field. With a successful Dahlgren Raid, you would still have had Lee’s army intact, the civilian leadership killed but Stephens alive; Richmond would have been occupied, burned but then most likely quickly abandoned by the raiders as they had accomplished their purpose and were not in sufficient number to hold it against an aroused Confederate military. Viewed in this light, I still don’t think the Dahlgren Raid would have acheived the decisive result of collapsing the Confederate cause and ending the war.
Eric and everyone else, I have enjoyed this discussion immensely. Often, speculative history is something I don’t delve into too much but it has really helped me consider the questions surrounding Dahlgren from a number of different angles.
Lincoln’s political position in early 1864 was precarious, and he was anxious to avoid to further aggravating either side, and again I have trouble seeing this cautious and astute politician taking such a gamble especially, as John points out, capturing Davis and his cabinet would not necessarily end the war. I think of his words to Hooker before Chancellorsville when, apparently worried about Hooker’s blowhard tendencies, counsels the general to “beware of rashness.” And I continue to wait for anyone to come up with a specific incident or statement by Lincoln that would suggest that he harbored the sort of wrathful thoughts that would be consistent with approving or sponsoring Dahlgren’s raid. Once can cite plenty of such instances in the writings and statements of Union military leaders–Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan–and political leaders–Chase, Stanton, and the Congressional Radicals. But not in Lincoln’s . . .
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