Enjoyed your comments re: Mosby. In truth, I am neither for or against his actions, either for or against Early’s actions. My interest in Mosby lies in his continuous sparring with Custer and Merritt’s troopers. I have developed a pretty extensive knowledge of Mosby/Custer and am looking for more info on Mosby/Merritt. Custer was blamed for the hangings of Mosby’s men at Front Royal, and I have always felt that it was Merritt who ordered/supervise their executions. I have been working for several years on a book about the Custer/Merritt relationship and feel that the Front Royal incident was one of the major sticking points in their emnity. So thanks for the info-every little bit helps!

Al

Mosby tried to work with Early and sent men to that General when he began his operations – men whom Early knew and who knew him. But Early was devious and gave Mosby little or no information about his intentions. He then ordered Mosby to make an attack on Point of Rocks – an attack he just performed and Early knew it! Early also insisted on sending Mosby oral rather than written orders. Mosby, not knowing Early’s messengers and aware that he was always in danger of traps and ambushes, refused to follow such directions noting that both Stuart and Lee (Robert E.) had always sent him written orders. However, Mosby really did not know the extent of Early’s malignant hatred until after the war when he learned that Early had dismissed help any help from the 43rd by saying that he was damned if his men were going to do the fighting while Mosby’s did the looting. If Early had cared to look, he would have learned that Mosby’s command had outfought and defeated Union commands often many times their number.

No, I would not make any determinations about Mosby from men like Early or Rosser or Fitz Lee. Their judgment was tainted by envy and ego and neither objective nor accurate.

I agree with you concerning Stahel’s entire division, but it does speak to some extent of Mosby’s influence that the ever-acquisitive Pleasonton wasn’t able to obtain another brigade or two from Stahel’s formation.

In fairness, attributing 6,000 sabers to Stahel’s division is generous. As Craig notes, several of the regiments were very green, and several of the veteran regiments suffered from depleted ranks. 6,100 on paper, perhaps, but I’d estimate closer to 4,000 effectives.

Don

Great post on Mosby. That lawyerly mind of yours sure can cut to the meat of the matter.

To Rick Savard: In defense of Jubal Early’s treatment of Mosby, he wasn’t the only Confederate general who felt that way. In fact, outside of JEB Stuart, you would be hard pressed to find a Rebel general who put much stock in the partisans. Stephen D. Ramseur, and many others in Early’s command believe that the partisans were a detriment to the Confederate cause, and worked tirelessly to have the system outlawed. Eventually, the Confederate Congress abolished the guerilla bands-with the exception of Mosby. In the official records, R. E. Lee complimented Mosby on several occassions, but at the same time took him to task for several episodes which were ethically/morally borderline. He even accused Mosby of profiteering from his military activities, while so many in the regular army were suffering all kinds of privations.

However, there is no doubt of the effect Mosby and his ubiquitous and very dangerous command had on Sheridan’s fight with Early later in the war. Sheridan himself noted in his autobiography that despite his advantage in troop numbers, said advantage was effectively nullified by Mosby’s presence in his rear. When a man in Sheridan’s position blames in print a command that never had a thousand men over the course of the war or more than five hundred (and usually a great deal less) at any given time, there has to be a certain admission (however grudging) of Mosby’s effectiveness as a commander and strategist. Remember, Mosby’s largest assault was the Berryville raid (August 13, 1864) in which he used 300 men to attack a very large wagon train. In that action he lost two men dead, two wounded, took two hundred Union prisoners and a very large amount of cattle, horses and mules as well as burning seventy wagons. In October of that same year, he hit the B&O line that Sheridan had declared “safe” from guerrilla depredations and after burning the train, got away with an army payroll of over $165,000. When the matter was reported, other army paymasters locked themselves in their rooms and refused to move until they were guaranteed protection against Mosby and his men.

As noted, I cannot comment upon Brandy Station except to quote the comment by the Count of Paris (a Union officer) and the testimony of General Hooker. Hopefully, Mr. Crouch might be able to add to the discussion.

Correct.

Eric