Any info would be appreciated.

I have all your books.

Neither was every Southern general enamored of cavalry. Gen. Jubal Early had no use at all for that service, regular or partisan. Nonetheless, at the end of the war, Early lamented the lack of intelligence when he ran his campaign in the Shenandoah and blamed the only cavalry extant in the region – Mosby’s partisan command – for not giving him what he required. But Mosby made every effort to help Early including sending men to Early letting him know that he and his command were prepared to follow any instructions that Early wished to give and told the General that he had already hit the Union forces at Point of Rocks. The only instruction that Early gave was that Mosby should hit the Union forces at Point of Rocks – which was nonsense. Other than that, Early never again communicated with the Ranger chief or any of his officers.

Thus the only real “cavalry” that the Army of Northern Virginia had available to help Early was effectively kept out of the campaign not by lack of horses or men or equipment or leadership, but by the General commanding the campaign.

I ran across some interesting comments by a Virginia cavalryman in CWTI, June 1970.

Allen C. Redwood agreed that the lack of horses was critical but also opined that around the time of the Dahlgren Raid “It was the beginning of the period in which the prestige of the Southern horse steadily waned. The old spirit flared up now and then, as will the embers of an old fire but only to grow more and more dull as the material failed. With the death of Stuart a few days later, as with that of Jackson a year before, the inspiration was lost just when most needed….The gallant rider who had ‘followed Stuart’s feather’ had fallen in many a hot encounter; the mettlesome chargers which bore them had left their bones all along the roads from Chickahominy to Chambersburg; and the gaps in the ranks were not being adequately filled.”

“The campaign was not wanting in some brilliant, old-time cavalry work on the part of the Confederates, sporadic indeed, and of little over-all effect on the war. But it was ‘the song of the swan,’ perhaps. Hampton’s ‘beef -raid,’ Rosser’s fight with Custer at Trevilian’s, and Wickham’s splendid charge against Merritt at Winchester–futile as it proved–were all in the best traditions of the corps, and as creditable as any. And in many minor affairs, during the Valley Campaign of that year, the Southern troopers more than held their won. But there were not more ‘Buckland Races,’ no more rich captures of much-needed wagon trains and other spoils of war, which had served to supply so many original deficiencies. It was sordid, dead-in-earnest, sure-enough war now, with all the gloss worn off.”

But Redwood wrote that “this starving, sorely depleted cavalry persisted in maintaining what front it could, and came back at its antagonists whenever there seemed to be a fighting chance.”

Lack of horses plus less able recruits according to Redwood along with fewer captures of equipment hurt the Rebel troopers and he obviously missed Stuart.

I’m not sure how reliable his memoirs are, however, but his opinions seem honestly presented albeit with the usual hyperbole.

Larry

“As the great grandson of General J.E.B. Stuart, I have often been asked for an opinion of this great man’s legacy to the nation, and how he should be remembered. Although my answer has changed, as I have grown older, one central theme has endured through time. He was a man who fought for a cause that he deeply believed in with a tenacity and a steadfast commitment that is remarkable by any standard. Two excerpts from a letter that he wrote his wife Flora in 1862 speaks volumes in explaining this dedication and commitment: “I, for one, though I stood alone in the Confederacy, without countenance or aid, would uphold the banner of Southern Independence as long as I had a hand left to grasp the staff, and then die before submitting…” “Tell my boy when I am gone how I felt and wrote and tell him…never to forget the principles for which his father struggled.”

Another element of the Stuart legacy became evident to me only after I had served a good portion of a twenty seven year career in the United States Army. It was not until then that I began to realize and appreciate his accomplishments as a professional soldier – accomplishments made possible by four personal characteristics which seem to me as essential to success in military life today as they were in Jeb Stuart’s time.

First of all, Stuart knew how to organize and lead men in combat; his situational assessment skills were truly second to none; he had no equal in technical proficiency in the deployment and use of cavalry, and he continually demonstrated that he was capable of leading larger units with expanded missions and responsibilities. The last characteristic is the distinguishing hallmark of soldiers destined for high command.

Along with these essential personal characteristics, Stuart possessed the true “Warrior Spirit”, combined a love of horse and horsemanship. As a young West Point cadet he wrote to a friend: “…so far I know no other profession so desirable than that of a soldier, indeed, everything connected with the military has far surpassed my most sanguine expectations.” Horse soldiering was to be his vocation – his trade, craft, and art rolled into one.
Before the American Civil War Stuart’s military skills were sharply honed during seven years as a lieutenant on the western frontier, most of it in cavalry service. On the frontier his professional proficiency was acknowledged by man, including Major John Sedgwick who served with him from 1855 to 1860 in the U.S. 1st Cavalry Regiment. Later on, as a Union general, Sedgewick would pay Stuart the supreme compliment, referring to him as “the finest Cavalry Officer ever foaled in America.”

During the Civil War Stuart received rapid promotion, passing fro Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier General at age 28; to Major General at age 29, the rank he held when mortally wounded at 31. More important than his rise in rank was the role he played in the evolution of cavalry doctrine. (You) should understand that General Stuart came on the scene when the mission of cavalry was in a difficult transitional phase. The U.S. Army Cavalry manual of the time – written by General Philip St. George Cooke, Stuart’s father-in-law – spoke of the “Charge” as being the most decisive element in cavalry tactics. Was this really the case, or was cavalry moving in a different direction prompted by development of the cone shaped bullet, the rifling concept and rapid fire weapons? I think the latter.

General Stuart quickly became an agent for change. Confederate forces under his guidance established early a centralized command for cavalry operations which stressed five basic functions: (1) Reconnaissance (2) Counter Reconnaissance or Denial Operations (3) Screening (4) Security (5) Reconnaissance in Force. These new functions represented revolutionary change in cavalry operational concepts. I contend that if you were to visit an Armored Cavalry Regiment today and ask the Commanding Officer to describe the unit’s mission he would describe it in terms very similar to those which evolved during the Civil War.

To my mind, General Stuart played a major role in developing the doctrines that have shaped the mobile warfare of today. I believe that this contribution deserves wider recognition than it has received, and is the often overlooked legacy of this great American soldier.*

(*the address was taken from the Afterword of Patrick Brennan’s biography of General Stuart written by Col. Stuart)

You covered a lot of meat here, and the leadership of the Southern Cavalry Corps has a tremendous assistance of Tacticle Geography, which favored the Confederates during the Samaria [St. Mary’s] engagement. I have driven the roads and realize what a difficult position the Federals were in with Hampton’s Cavalry blocking all the roads to Harrison’s landing and any resupply of ammunition, etc. The backroad to Charles City Courthouse may have been a lifesaver there.

The issue of Wilson’s extended Cavalry Raid, starting June 22nd out of Petersburg, took on Geography that was farther than their capability of resupply or ammunition replenishment. A 300 Mile raid had telling effects on the horse flesh that was giving out well before the return through a “choke point” in geography at Stoney Creek / Sappony Church, and the Reams Station was predicted as a route by everyone who knew the Geography. Hampton was there waiting for Wilson’s troopers, many riding double saddle as the hard riding had taken a tremendous toll.

Kudos should be given to Wilson for two very important extractions of Grant’s Army from Ox Ford on the North Anna, where Wilson’s “Rouse” and Deceptive moves on Lee’s Left Flanks – Testing and Pointing to a Move across the Little River by the AoP, Paused Lee’s Army long enough to allow Grant to extract himself in a very dangerous position, having to cross Pontoons on Swollen Rivers. If Lee had Pushed Grant Immediately on his Withdrawal from the North Anna, Lee could have Cornered Grant’s Army in a very Vulnerable Position.

Crossing the Pamunkey, early in the morning of May 27th Sheridan’s Cavalry caught the Confederates unprepared with an appropriate sized matching Cavalry Units to meet them. Wilson had done his job. At Nelson’s Crossing, lightly defended by newly arriving members of the 3rd North Carolina, who were fresh up from duty in Carolina, got swept up in their pickets being easily captured. Pontoons were lowered on the Pamunkey at Nelsons and Hanovertown, where Cavalry and Infantry quickly poured across. As Michigan and New York Cavalry engaged Carolina and MD troops on the Hanover Road and easily pushed the small Squadrons passed their enforcements at Crumps Creek, a sense of bravado returned to the Federal Cavalry from their Richmond Raid and Yellow Tavern. No doubt Custer’s Michigan troops meeting smaller units got their courage up very quickly. Lee not knowing where Grant’s Army was going were guaring the approaches to the South Anna, and most of the Cavalry were located there. Credit Wilson for the easy movement of Grant Away from the North Anna and the Crossing of the Pamunkey.

Federal Cavalry in an engagement with Gen Hoke, secured an advantageous position at Cold Harbor June 1st, however Grant waited for Baldy Smith’s Corps to arrive at White House Landing from being shuttled from Bermuda Hundred, and to march to Cold Harbor. In that time frame, Grant allowed the Confederates to Dig and Dig and Dig their Defenses into all kinds of entrapments and enfilade fields of fire. The Attacks of June 3rd were against fortifications equal to those that Lee had on the North Anna.

Wilson’s Cavalry Regiments did Yeoman’s Work at Hanover Court House, Destroying Railroad Bridges above Ashland, and Engaging Hampton’s Troops inside of Ashland. My 3rd NC Cavalry boys ran out of Ammunition in Ashland and were fighting the 1st Vermont house to house, taking a lot of casualties. Hampton had to bring in several Regiments from Atlee’s Station area into Ashland to chase the Federals out of Ashland. The Vermonters being saved by McCormick’s troops who had been burning bridges, arrived in Ashland in time to generate a “Hot Enough Fight” to allow escape. At the end of the Day, Hampton’s Cavalry were on the Defense, without enough forces at the right places: at the Pamunkey Crossing, at Hanover C.H., at Cold Harbor, at Ashland.
Credit a Very Agressive Sheridan with a Very Good Plan of Attack on Key Positions around Richmond. Grant’s Failure – Bringing up Smith, and Allowing the Confederates to Dig.

As Grant Suffered the Results of the Frontal Attacks of June 3rd and being Locked in Position in a No-Win Sniper’s War, he knew that he had to Extricate himself and move on to a Target that was under high consideration for some time – Petersburg. But, just like the North Anna, getting away from Lee’s Army – locked in position, just hundreds of yards apart, was a very risky situation. Here’s where Wilson’s Cavalry turned in another Yeoman’s Performance.

The night of June 12th, Grant’s Army began the withdrawal from the Trenches of Cold Harbor. Sheridan’s Cavalry had departed earlier, and Wilson’s Cavalry Corps were given the task of Screening the Withdrawal of Grant’s Army. Just as the departure of the AoP from the North Anna posed all kinds of Possibilites to Lee, the same set of Circumstances presented Lee with Uncertainity. W.H.F. Lee’s Division of the 9th, 10th, 13th Virginia and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th North Carolina were left behind to defend Richmond and Patrol the areas. As Grant’s Army followed the Old Church road to the Chickahominy, the Patrols of Gen Barringer’s Brigade met the Advance elements of Wilson’s Cavalry, who crossed the Chickahominy and pushed Barringer back to Glendale and Riddell’s Shop, where Lee sent Reinforcements thinking that Grant would attack Richmond from the South. All of the meetings of Wilson’s Cavalry and Barringer’s Brigade at Riddells, Rocks, Crenshaws, Haxall’s Sawmill, and Herring Creek were an Exercise of Running up and Down Remote Virginia Roads, Keeping the Cavalry off of Grant’s Army on the Move. On the Day of the 17th, as Wilson’s Cavalry were finishing their James River Crossing’s at Wilcox on Ferry’s from New York, and Flowerdew Hundred on Pontoons – the Crossing had finally been reported to Lee. Grant’s Advance Elements were already in Petersburg and Attacking, and Lee was Scrambling to cross the James at Chaffin’s Bluff.

General Wilson, Although New in His Command had Twice Allowed the AoP to Extricate Itself from Dangerous Positions at the North Anna and at Cold Harbor. A Considerable Accomplishment in the Back Yard of the Capitol of the Confederacy.

A Major Failure of a Federal Cavalry Commander was that of General Kautz – June 9th as Gen Butler’s Plan of Attack on Petersburg Failed, because of Delay of Kautz and the Failure of Gen Quincy Gillmore Simply to Attack the Very Lightly Defended Dimmock Line. Gilmore hearing a Band [A Black Petersburg Band Playing Dixie] made Gillmore believe that the Dimmock Line was Too Formidable, and Failed to Attack. He was later sanctioned for the failure. General Kautz attacked a lightly defended position of Old Men and Young Boys at Rives Salient June 9th, and in receiving some artillery and accurate fire on his attacking troops, dismounted and took too long in the engagement. Kautz, instead of pushing on took more time in the questioning process of these old men and young boys, allowing Graham’s Battery of Petersburg to arrive south of the City by Blandford Church. There with released Prisoners and Hospital Patients, the Defenders of the City discouraged Kautz from easily entering the City. If Kautz had Blown through the Lightly Defended Position at Rives Salient, and Entered the City – Petersburg would have Fallen. A Missed Opportunity of Substantial Measures.

1864 Was a Year of Survival for the Confederate Cavalry, and Luck and Geography May have Accounted for that Survival as Much as Leadership. Most Surely Attrition of Men and Horses were Wearing away a Once Proud Unit into a Mear Shell by the Beginnings of 1865. But, the Determination of Sheridan, his Pit Bull Methods, and the Success of Wilson in Extricating Grants Army at the North Anna and Cold Harbor, should not be Underestimated.