Eric

What a great Ph.D. dissertation topic that would make….what a fascinating thesis. Perhaps someone will latch onto the idea.

Eric

I read Wawro’s excellent book last year when I was recovering from shoulder surgery. As you say, it was a terrific read, and it spurred me to go on and then read a two-volume biography of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

There was obviously a significant difference in the martial skills of Napoleon III and Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, the very competent Prussian army commander, and the father of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The contrast is pretty stark.

Next time you go by the memorial, if you could get a digital photo of it, I would be happy to post it here. I’d be interested in seeing it.

Eric

As always, I appreciate your input. Thanks for correcting me about the Schlieffen Plan–I realize that Schlieffen himself could not have engineered the plan; rather, I meant that the concept itself worked. I recognize now that I could have been a lot more clear in how I said what I said.

Of course, your point about the French is well-taken.

I am, however, reminded of one of my favorite cartoons. It’s a picture of a stack of rifles with a sign over them that says: “French military rifles for sale. Never fired. Only dropped once.” 🙂

Thanks for reading.

Eric

Proof of the latter can be found in a quick survey of commentary about the current Iraq War. The Vietnam paradigm reigns supreme. One party argues that the effort is Vietnam redux–“quagmire,” “disaster,” puppet government, natives that won’t fight, and so forth–while the other party argues domino theory, world-wide threat matrix, conflict concentration “over there” to avoid having to wage it “over here,” and so forth.

The American fault line have been going strong now for over 30 years. I wonder how, (if ever) it will be resolved?

Like Ethan Rafuse, I was forced by assignment to the Department of History at USMA to learn about 1870-71, but since reading Wawro’s book I’ve been hooked. The French held many of the cards- including an excellent rifle, a seasoned professional army, and strong defensive positions on their home turf. In many respects, the Prussians won in spite of their army- a mass conscript force that had a significant percentage of troops from satellite states who didn’t really want to be there. I believe you are correct to point out the ineptness of Napoleon III as one of the deciding factors.

The town in Germany where I live, Bad Windsheim (near Nuremberg), has a Franco-Prussian War memorial, and because of Wawro’s descriptions of the Bavarians’ reluctance to charge into the face of French Chassepot fire, I chuckle every time I run or drive by it.
Cheers,
Charles Bowery

Another great post that contains a lot of really good points–historically. I am not touching your comments on current affairs.

But, the Schlieffen Plan could not have worked “big time” in 1870; it was not conceived until decades after the victory of 1870-71. Moreover, the Schlieffen Plan was based on the premise that the French would make their main effort in a future war in Alsace-Lorraine (where the decisive battles of 1870 were fought) and sought to bypass this by going elsewhere, namely Belgium. And whether you considered the Schlieffen Plan to have “worked” depends on your standard for success. If it was the complete defeat of France in less than two months (as Schlieffen defined “worked”) this was simply impossible, for Schlieffen made ridiculous assumptions regarding the marching and fighting capacity of the German reservist, logistics, and how the enemy would react. Even taking the “inside track” east of Paris, rather than the much longer “outside track” proposed by Schlieffen, compelled the German First Army to march about 400 miles in 27 days in 1914, 11 of those days seeing battles.

On the other hand, the German plan of 1914 did ensure that the Western Front would be on French and Belgian soil and that the richest of France’s provinces would be unavailable to the French war effort. The advantages this provided to the Germans were many. It forced the French to be on the offensive, for one, with all the consequences that brought in terms of blood. Moreover, using the trenches of the West as an economy of force measure, enabled the Germans to save the Austrians and ultimately knock Russia out of the war.

And the French did learn from the Schlieffen Plan. Their war plan for 1940 was based on the assumption that the Germans would replay the Schlieffen Plan and go through Belgium. Had the Germans done so–as the initial Plan Yellow called for in late 1939–the French were prepared for this and may well have stopped them at some point in Belgium. Unfortunately for the French, the Germans did not replay the Schlieffen Plan, in part due to the fact that the French got their hands on documents that enabled them to discern the German plan. The Germans learned of this, which contributed to their changing their minds and deciding to make their main effort in 1940 through the Ardennes (the famous Sichelschnitt), which, thanks in part to great luck on the Meuse River, won the campaign of 1940.

Still, the French must have gotten something right. Alsace-Lorraine now belongs to them and they, not the Germans, have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Best,
Ethan