Eric

That position would not only invite an attack by Neill’s infantry it would also be disadvantagous to defend since Wolf’s Hill rises above it.. JI Gregg was also already……please correct me if I’m wrong,…. posted just a few hundred yards to the east of that very swampy low lying area. (I was just back there and I don’t know that name of that little creek either. 😕 If it even has one?)

Stuart was familiar with that immediate area as a result of the Brinkerhoff Ridge fight the evening before.
I think Stuart knew exactly where he wanted to positon his four BDE’s. He wanted open fields suitable for a mounted Cav fight and an artillery platform in his rear.
Cress’ ridge provided the arty platform and the Rummel & Lott farms provided the manuevering area neede for mounted operations.

Plus there’s that very important mattress button of an intersection that was the key to the rear of the Union life line. If you take the Hanover/Low Dutch Road intersection then you don’t have to worry about screening the York Pike because your possesion of that vital intersection is sure to create havoc and alarm even with a dolt like Pleasonton in charge.

BTW,
From the Town square to the ECF entrance near the Jos. Spangler via the Hanover Road is exactly 3.3 miles.
From the Town Square to the Fitz Lee BDE marker on Confederate Cavalry Avenue via the York Pike, making a right at the Harley Dealer and continuing on ” East Cavalry Feld Road” is exactly 3.9 miles.
Of course, those measurements are from the Square and not Ewell’s infantry positions.

Thank you for your thoughts, Don.
It was very refreshing to read an obviously well thought out modern perspective of why Stuart did what he did.

Stan

By comparison, on May 2 at Chancellorsville Stuart was about two miles north of Jackson’s main body, near Ely’s Ford, when the later was mortally wounded. But that example is a bit skewed, as Stuart was arguably directly pressing toward the Federal rear.

At both Fredericksburg and Antietam, elements of Stuart’s command were charged with flank protection. However terrain (major rivers) compacted the flank somewhat. Still Stuart was a good quarter mile from Early’s left flank at dawn of September 17, 1862. I’d submit that a quarter mile at Antietam would be like leaving a gap of a half mile on any other field.

At Second Manassas, the cavalry guarding the Confederate right before Longstreet’s arrival were more than a mile off Taliaferro’s flank. A few days later, while the battle of Chantilly climaxed in the rain, Stuart was about a 1 1/2 to 2 miles east in the Flint Hill area.

Now I haven’t measured said distances with a laser theodolite, but I’d say the referenced gap in the lines was not outside the norm. A sampling of Federal cavalry in the same theater and time frame would probably yield similar examples. I would submit, while it sounds alarming when mentioned alone, when placed in context of the tactical situation those two miles distance were not that far out of alignment.