This book is the first and only detailed tactical study of this important but overlooked engagement. It features five excellent maps by master cartographer Mark Anderson Moore, and represents the second book that I have published with my friends at Fox Run Publishing. I will have copies to sign and ship in a week or so. In the interim, copies are available for sale here.

I will let everyone know when the book is back in print later this year.

And thank you for your support.

“The Devil’s to Pay”: John Buford at Gettysburg: A History and Walking Tour. By Eric J. Wittenberg. Photos, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 286 pp., 2014, Savas Beatie, www.savasbeatie.com, $32.95.

Until the publication of Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels and the public release of the movie “Gettysburg,” only students of the Civil War had known anything about Brig. Gen. John Buford and his Federal cavalry division at Gettysburg.

Eric Wittenberg in “The Devil’s to Pay” has separated the real story from the popular one and has brought to life John Buford and his stalwarts who bought precious time until the Union infantry could arrive on the battlefield.

A West Point graduate, the Kentucky-born Buford had relatives who fought for the Confederacy. Ironically, a fellow classmate, Gen. Henry Heth, would open the Confederate attack on July 1 against Buford and his troopers.

Wittenberg meticulously describes the ties within the Buford family that the war tore asunder.

From there he goes into the opening shots by the cavalry on June 30 and carries the story through the end of July 2 when Buford’s division was relieved of duty.

He finishes the narrative with an analysis of Buford’s performance on the field and a detailed walking/driving tour of the cavalry positions on the field.

This book, which I could not put down, has completely changed my perspective on the role of Buford’s cavalry on July 1 and 2.

Without giving away everything I learned from this carefully crafted work, I will share a few of the generally unknown “gems” that I mined from its pages.

A.P. Hill, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia’s Third Corps, and his division commander Heth had decided the day before the battle to engage what they believed to be local militia despite orders not to bring on a general engagement.

Buford’s men, through very effective scouting as they approached Gettysburg, had gathered enough intelligence to inform Union Gen. John Reynolds of what to expect before the infantry advanced on Gettysburg.

Brig. Gen. Thomas Devin’s cavalry brigade engaged Gen. Robert Rodes’ division of Richard Ewell’s 2nd Corps before the Union 11th Corps arrived on the right of the Army of the Potomac. There is so much more to glean from this narrative that makes it worth exploring.

Wittenberg has skillfully filled a historical void in the Gettysburg story and has defined what really happened to Buford and his cavalrymen on that fateful July 1.

While historians have portrayed Buford as a visionary cavalryman, the author has cleared away the mythology surrounding him and has preserved for future generations an honest assessment of a solid, no-nonsense professional officer and the troopers who followed him.

The numerous citations from letters, memoirs and diaries, both military and civilian, make the action come alive. The flowing narrative involves readers in the heat of battle.

After reading this book, Gettysburg visitors should be able to stand before the monuments along the cavalry line and vividly remember the men they represent.

“The Devil’s to Pay” is essential reading for everyone, Civil War enthusiasts and novices, interested in the Battle of Gettysburg or Civil War cavalry.

John Michael Priest

I am humbled by Mike’s kind words and appreciate them a great deal. Please be sure to check out Mike’s latest, Stand to It and Give Them Hell: Gettysburg as the Soldiers Experienced it from Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top, July 2, 1863, which is quite a good book in its own right.

I’m pleased to tell you that after attending an event put on by ECW this weekend, I am far more comfortable with the future of the study of the Civil War. If this is what the next generation has to offer, then we’re in very good hands.

For one thing, there’s the Emerging Civil War Series of books. These are meant to be gateway books into specific topics, filled with lots of photos, maps and battlefield tours. They are intended to provide introductions to different battles that will lead others to study those battles in a far more in-depth fashion. This series is the brainchild of Chris Mackowski and Kris White, and it’s quite good indeed. Our mutual publisher, Savas-Beatie, publishes these books.

This weekend was ECW’s first annual Civil War Symposium. The event was held at the absolutely gorgeous Stevenson Ridge inn (the house where we stayed is the image at the beginning of this blog post), which happens to be owned by Chris Mackowski’s in-laws, and which is located on a portion of the Spotsylvania battlefield. Friday night featured a very interesting panel discussion, and Saturday included a full slate of speakers. ECW gave me the honor of being the keynote speaker at the event, which was on the war in 1864. Four of the talks (including mine) were filmed by C-SPAN and will be broadcast at a later date (I will let you know when I know the date). All of the talks were excellent and it was an honor to be included. Today was a full day battlefield tour. Attendees could choose between an in-depth tour of Spotsylvania, or an overview tour of both the Wilderness and Spotsylvania.

I want to focus on one speaker in particular. Lee White, who is a ranger at Chickamauga, was supposed to speak on the Atlanta Campaign, but a family issue prevented him from attending. A young man named Ryan Quint, who is still an undergraduate college student at Mary Washington University, filled in, and did so quite ably indeed. He gave a terrific talk. If this 20-year-old college student represents the caliber of talent in the next generation of Civil War historians, then our avocation is in very good hands indeed.

It was a real pleasure getting to spend time with the likes of old friend Dave Powell, Chris Kolakowski, Chris Mackowski, Kris White, Dan Davis, Phil Greenwalt, Michael Hardy, John Michael Priest, and lots of familiar faces among the attendees. Thanks to the ECW crew for an outstanding event.

I can’t say enough good things about what this group of historians is doing. The second annual symposium will be on turning points in the Civil War and will be held at Stevenson Ridge next July 30. Next year’s battlefield tour will be of Chancellorsville, one of my very favorite battlefields. Do yourselves a favor and plan on attending. You won’t be disappointed. I will be there.

Ummm….no. While I may not have the formal military training, like Carhart does, I have a license to practice law, and I know and understand evidence, weighing that evidence, and evaluating its credibility. And I know an intellectual fraud when I see one.

I give J.D. a great deal of credit for being civil to this poseur and for not doing a “Jane, you ignorant slut” with him like the old Saturday Night Live bit. I’m not at all persuaded that I would have been able to show the same level of restraint. I would have found it all but impossible not to describe his book as the festering pile of turds that it is. And I would have found it all but impossible not to tell him to his face that he and his book are nothing but an intellectual fraud. Kudos go to J.D. for not doing so. In fact, after viewing that interview, many mutual friends later told J.D. that Carhart looked pathetic, frustrated, nonsensical, and that J.D. must have had infinite patience in dealing with Carhart’s silliness. The interviewer was also obviously increasingly frustrated with Carhart and kept signaling J.D. to move the discussion along as Carhart kept trying to dominate the conversation.

I had a chance to discuss all of this with J.D. at the Williamsport event last weekend, and yesterday, while driving, I had a sudden realization.

The gist of Carhart’s theory is that Stuart’s presence on East Cavalry Field was a coordinated thrust with Pickett’s Charge (one “prong” in a supposed “two “prong” attack), and that it represented a major component of Robert E. Lee’s plan for the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg. I’ve already dealt with the bulk of this stupidity in Appendix C to the new edition of Protecting the Flank. But last night, I had an epiphany about it.

Let’s assume, just for the sake of discussion, that Carhart’s theory is correct (we need to first, of course, throw out all of the definitive evidence that refutes Carhart’s theory). If that’s the case, wouldn’t Stuart have committed all of his troopers to an all-out attack on East Cavalry Field? And would he have just called it a day after the repulse of one large-scale attack, as he did that day, if his orders were to make a coordinated attack with Pickett’s Charge? If he truly was to take the offensive, after that charge was repulsed, wouldn’t he have committed his entire command and tried again? The uncontroverted fact is that he did not do so. Instead, Stuart called it a day after the repulse of the charge of Hampton’s and Fitz Lee’s brigades at the climax of the fighting on East Cavalry Field.

The evidence shows that when he was on the offensive, Stuart was quite aggressive and quite persistent. A study of Stuart’s taking the offensive to the Union cavalry during the retreat from Gettysburg and keeping it tied up for days at a time by constantly attacking it demonstrates this beyond a doubt. Just take a good look at the battle of Boonsboro (July 8, 1863) and the battle of Funkstown (July 10, 1863) for examples of what I mean here. By taking the fight to the Union cavalry and being unrelenting about it, Stuart kept two full divisions of cavalry tied up and away from the defensive position being built by the Army of Northern Virginia. In short, Stuart’s aggressiveness bought Lee the time he needed to forge a largely impregnable defensive position along the banks of the Potomac River at Williamsport. Stuart committed his entire force on each occasion, and launched attack after attack in the process.

By contrast, on East Cavalry Field, Stuart tried once, and then with only a portion of his command. The charge by the brigades of Lee and Hampton that was the climax of the fighting on East Cavalry was only by a portion of his command. Stuart watched and saw his command was repulsed by a vastly outnumbered force scraped together from the brigades of McIntosh and Custer and he called it a day after that. If Stuart’s orders were to reach the Union rear at all costs, would he really have just quit after committing only a portion of his force? And wouldn’t Stuart have known the repercussions of withdrawing from further attempts, if his “offensive” action were indeed a vitally important prong of a “two prong” attack coordinated with the infantry assault? If, as Carhart and others have posited, Stuart was so embarrassed by his performance during the week of June 25 – July 2, and was chastised by Robert E. Lee for it, why would he run the risk of further chastisement and disappointment by Lee by not making an all-out attempt to fulfill his “coordinated mission”?

Knowing Stuart’s tenacity and aggressiveness as well as I do, the fact that Stuart did not press the issue indicates the following to me:

1. He knew his command was in wretched shape from its ordeal on the way to Gettysburg and that his mounts probably could not stand more hard fighting.

2. His orders truly were to guard the flank against what he knew was the presence of two full divisions of cavalry—four of the Army of the Potomac’s eight brigades of cavalry—from the attacks of July 2, and were not to execute some grand, coordinated assault as part of the Pickett’s Charge scenario. This protection of the ANV left flank is, of course, all that Robert E. Lee claimed himself as Stuart’s mission on July 3 in his own official report of the campaign. Nothing more, nothing less.

3. The single mounted charge represented Stuart at his opportunistic best—given the opportunity to break through and make some mischief in the Union rear, he would have done so. He was probing to see whether he could get through, and the repulse persuaded him that he should simply be content with guarding the flank effectually, as he did, and as he was ordered to do.

These observations are the only ones that make any sense. Any other interpretation of these events is neither logical nor supported by the evidence.

But, then again, Carhart’s comments to J.D. demonstrate quite plainly that this man is not one to allow the facts to get in the way of a good story.

Here is the schedule:

Sunday, July 28: Gettysburg
Morning (time TBD): Lance Herdegen Tour – Gettysburg: July 1, 1863: The failure of Archer’s Attack on McPherson’s Ridge
1:30 – 3:00 pm: Lance Herdegen Tour – Gettysburg: In the Bloody Railroad Cut: The Charge of the 6th Wisconsin
3:30 – 5:00 pm: George Newton Tour – Gettysburg: Confederate cannonade and Union artillery on July 3, 1863
7:00 pm: Informal gathering at Reliance Mine Saloon

Monday, July 29: Gettysburg
8:30 – 10:00 am: J. David Petruzzi Tour – Gettysburg: Buford on Day 1
10:30 am – 12:00 pm: Eric Wittenberg Tour – Gettysburg: Farnsworth’s Charge, July 3, 1863
1:30 – 3:00 pm: David Shultz Tour – Gettysburg: Attack and Defense of the Union Center July Second – Pitzer Woods’ Cause and Effect: The “Little Fight” that Changed it All
3:30 – 5:00 pm: Eric Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi Tour – Gettysburg: East Cavalry Field

Tuesday, July 30: South Mountain, Antietam, and Ball’s Bluff
8:30 – 11:00 am: Tom Clemens Tour – South Mountain: Fox’s Gap, the Struggle for Key Terrain on South Mountain
12:00 – 2:00 pm: Tom Clemens Tour – Antietam: West Woods, Crisis on the Confederate Left
3:30 – 5:00 pm: Jim Morgan Tour – Loudoun County, VA: The Battle of Ball’s Bluff

And the best part of all: IT’S FREE!!!

I will be there Sunday night and on Monday. I won’t be there for the Tuesday tours, as I must get back to work. However, having toured Ball’s Bluff with Jim Morgan and all of the 1862 Maryland Campaign sites with Tom Clemens, I can tell you that you cannot possibly do better than to have either of them lead you on a tour of their respective favorite battlefields. Among the authors expected to be there are J. D. Petruzzi, Dave Shultz, Tom Clemens, Jim Morgan, Lance Herdegen, George Newton, Dave Powell, and others. It’s a great opportunity to meet some of my favorite Civil War authors, to get your books signed, and to hang out with us.

To sign up, click here.

Ted just informed me that the new edition of Protecting the Flank at Gettysburg: The Battles for Brinkerhoff’s Ridge and East Cavalry Field, July 2 – 3, 1863 has also been chosen by the book clubs. Ted informs me that it will be a featured alternate in the July 2013 catalog offering, which mails on June 2, 2013. I am, of course, very flattered to learn this, and am excited to be featured by the book clubs once more. For those of you who are members of any of the three book clubs, please keep an eye out for it.

Thanks again to Ted for making this happen.