03 May 2007 by Published in: General musings 16 comments

Tonight, in the final installment of this series, I will address the many connections between Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. I’ve long believed that nobody can ever truly understand Gettysburg without having a good understanding of Chancellorsville. The two are inexorably linked.

First, and foremost, Hooker had two full infantry corps that really didn’t even fire a shot in anger at Chancellorsville. Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds’ I Corps was one of them. Reynolds was very aggressive, and it had to have driven him crazy to be held out of a large fight. Is it any wonder, therefore, that Reynolds pitched in so eagerly at Gettysburg on July 1? His aggressiveness cost him his life that morning, but not before validating John Buford’s decision to stand and fight at Gettysburg.

George Meade’s V Corps also didn’t do much fighting at Chancellorsville after the first day. Hooker held a council of war and didn’t listen to his corps commanders, who encouraged him to hold the good high ground the army occupied on May 1. Hooker withdrew and his army got clobbered. Again, is it any wonder that George Meade was so determined to hold the good high ground at Gettysburg?

Dan Sickles and III Corps were ordered to give up high ground and got clobbered by Confederate artillery when the Southern gunners took up the position Sickles had abandoned. As a result, Sickles was determined not to give up high ground where Confederate artillery could then be employed to hammer his men. Consequently, Sickles disobeyed orders and moved his entire corps forward to high ground along the Emmitsburg Road that he liked better, creating a salient that caused the sacrifice of his corps. The die for Sickles’ move forward at Gettysburg was cast at Chancellorsville.

Hooker sent his entire Cavalry Corps, save for one brigade, off on an extended raid behind enemy lines, thereby leaving his army blind and without any sort of an effective screen. That, in turn, meant that the Eleventh Corps flank was uncovered and in the air, setting it up to take the brunt of Jackson’s flank attack. Although Meade did a better job of using his cavalry at Gettysburg, there were similar problems, particularly when Pleasonton sent Buford’s two brigades to Maryland to guard wagon trains and left Sickles’ flank in the air

O. O. Howard’s performance at Chancellorsvile was atrocious. He ignored reports of a large enemy force operating on his flank and did nothing to prepare his men for an onslaught. Consequently, the XI Corps was overwhelmed and driven from the field. It never had a chance. The same thing happened at Gettysburg. Howard sent the XI Corps out onto flat ground on a plain below high ground held by Confederate artillery with no support and its flank in the air, and a savage enemy flank attack crashed into the position and rolled up the XI Corps, sending it flying in the face of an attack it never really had a chance to stop. The men of the XI Corps fought well in both instances, but became the scapegoats of the army because they happened to be the command that broke and ran on both occasions. Those men deserved better.

Lee’s audacity at Chancellorsville in defying every accepted rule of warfare caused the unlikely Confederate victory there. Lee divided his much smaller army in the face of the enemy and took the offensive even though it was outnumbered more than two to one. He left only 13,000 men in place to hold the body of the Army of the Potomac while sending the bulk of his army off on a daring flank march. The success of this audacious plan set the stage for the debacle that befell the Army of Northern Virginia on July 3, 1863. The success at Chancellorsville apparently persuaded Lee that his army could not be beaten and that his men could do the impossible as they were asked to do during the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble charge on July 3.

Finally, there’s the point raised by Ian Duncanson in a comment to last night’s post. Ian pointed out that Darius Couch was the senior subordinate officer in the Army of the Potomac. When Hooker was relieved of command of the Army of the Potomac at his own request, Couch would have been next in line for command of the army. However, Couch, who was utterly disgusted by Hooker’s terrible performance at Chancellorsville, refused to serve under Hooker’s command any longer, and requested a transfer. He was sent to assume command of the Department of the Susquehanna at Harrisburg. How Couch would have done in command of the army–instead of George Gordon Meade–is one of those daunting “what if’s” that we will never be able to answer. Couch’s transfer made it possible for Meade to end up in command of the army, and, fortunately for the Union, Meade was the right man in the right place at the right time.

These are just a few of the similarities. As indicated, nobody can ever truly understand the Battle of Gettysburg without understanding the Battle of Chancellorsville, because events at Chancellorsville set the stage for what occurred eight weeks later in Pennsylvania.

Scridb filter

Comments

  1. Thu 03rd May 2007 at 9:07 pm

    Amen and well said Eric. And I also think there’s a book (albeit a shorter one) in there – or maybe an article.

    J.D.

  2. Stan O'Donnell
    Fri 04th May 2007 at 7:01 am

    Very enjoyable reading Eric!

    When I think of cavalry at C-Ville, I don’t think of Stoneman.
    I always picture Pennock Huey and the 8th PA Cav getting chewed up and sabreing their way out of the Wilderness.
    Which,
    In part, led to Lane’s guys hearing hoofbeats at night, assuming it was Yankee cavalry, and then plugging the great Presbyterian. Broad implications there.

    The 8th PA monument at GB is the one near the PA Memorial that had it’s sword and scabbard stolen by vandals and has yet to be replaced.
    After reading your comments I just had to tie in C-Ville and GB somehow even though the 8th was at Westminster.

    You’re right. To know one you have to know the other. Command attrition, combat experience and/or lack of, and casualties at C-Ville greatly effected both the outcome and tactics at GB.

    Like JD said………that really would make an interesting written study.

    Thanks for the great reading!

    Stan

  3. Michael Aubrecht
    Fri 04th May 2007 at 9:13 am

    You’ve said some brilliant things over the years Eric…

    BUT “As indicated, nobody can ever truly understand the Battle of Gettysburg without understanding the Battle of Chancellorsville, because events at Chancellorsville set the stage for what occurred eight weeks later in Pennsylvania.”

    May be the MOST brilliant to date. Well done on all three posts.

  4. Brian S.
    Fri 04th May 2007 at 9:39 am

    Eric,

    Great posts. I guess that during your research for your 11th Corps book Howard’s not looking too good? Brian

  5. Fri 04th May 2007 at 9:43 am

    Brian,

    No, not at all. The more I read about him, the less impressed I am.

    Thanks for your kind words, guys. These are thoughts I’ve been wrestling with for some time, trying to put all of this in its proper historical context.

    Eric

  6. Fri 04th May 2007 at 9:49 am

    Stan,

    I always think of the charge of the 8th PA as well – and how the pathetic Pleasonton took “credit” for the cavalry charge that supposedly blunted Jackson’s flank attack enough to save the 11th Corps. Whew.

    In fact, I own the original order that Pleasonton wrote of the charge, and which was in the personal possession of Col. Tom Devin (who was in charge of the small cavalry brigade with Hooker’s army). I got it off eBay a few years ago and it’s one of my prized artifacts.

    Huntington really ripped Pleasonton in public (Battles & Leaders) for taking credit for placing his artillery, and also in private in copies of letters that I got from Don Pfanz. The Pleasonton farce really got its start at Chancellorsville in a public way and at the expense of a lot of good young lives.

    J.D.

  7. Stan O'Donnell
    Fri 04th May 2007 at 2:21 pm

    J.D.,

    I don’t think the guys in the 8th PA liked Alfie much either.
    I find it interesting that In the two monument dedication addresses in Bates PA @ GB there’s nary a word regarding Pleasonton.
    Also, John Vanderslice who wrote “Gettysburg–Then and Now” and served with the 8th later in the war hardly even mentions Pleasonton. 4 X’s in 500 plus pages.

    It’s as though Pleasonton was being snubbed by being ignored as much as possible.

    At any rate,
    Old DMcM Gregg is up there on the PA Monument watching over his old 8th from up above. Unfortuneately, so is Pleasonton.

    The reason this topic peaks my interest is that last week my amatuer self was giving a tour to a guy who wanted to see GB monuments of units that had bad luck or suffered heavily at C-Ville like the Dutch, the 8th, and the poor Rose Woods 17th CT for example. Even though we were in GB! So Eric’s thoughts really got my ear!

    Any chance of me ever getting a look-see at that letter?
    Thanks for that info!

    Stan

  8. Christ Liebegott
    Sat 05th May 2007 at 2:24 pm

    Eric,
    A great series. Now, my question is: What is the best book(s) on the C-ville battle?

    Christ

  9. Sat 05th May 2007 at 3:29 pm

    Christ,

    Thank you. I’m glad you enjoyed it.

    The best is the Bigelow map study, but without the maps, it’s useless. You have to get the maps, but it will cost you a couple of hundred bucks to get the maps.

    If you’re not able to spend that kind of money, I recommend the Ernest “Pat” Furgurson’s Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave, which is a fair and balanced study. Sears’ book, like most of his, has an agenda, which is the rehabilitation of Joe Hooker.

    Eric

  10. Don
    Sun 06th May 2007 at 9:32 am

    Eric,
    Great series of posts. I enjoyed them immensely, and as usual learned a lot.

    Don

  11. Dave Kelly
    Sun 06th May 2007 at 12:27 pm

    Eric:

    Point well taken. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg are joined at the hip much as Chickamauga/Chattanooga are one huge strategic campaign.

    The Couch controversy is one thing I’m unclear about. Did Hooker actually relieve himself of command of the army, or did he rather order Couch to take charge of a withdrawal in his stead (as the effects of his concussion made his active command impossible)?

    I’m not a John Reynolds fan. He was a well liked and respected member of the command family of the AoP, but his actual track record in the few battles he actively participated in are hardly anything to write home about. A minnie ball made him immortal.

    Oh. As to Lee’s tactics at Chancellorsville being opposed to common wisdom. Err, two words: Cannae and Lake Trasimene. Hannibal versus the Romans. Both cases the weaker Carthaginian army refused their center and enticed the Romans to advance head on while the flanks were reinforced and extended to envelope and flank and encircle the enemy. The larger but, less experienced Romans panicked and lost continuity when overlapped. I don’t propose anything ala Carhart here, but when JEB Stuart came to Lee and said the Union right was in the air, cavalryman Lee pounced at the chance to make a victory out of desperate situation.

    As long as I’m warmed up: while basking in their operational success no one seems to recall that Jackson’s immortal flank attack failed to do what was hoped. Like so many CW actions it was slow to develope, launched too late in the day to be exploited, and exhausted it’s span of control after intial success and was blunted by a new line bolstered by some strategically placed cannon. (Longstreet wasn’t at Chancellorsville to be mesmerized, but thoought back to Second Manassas and how his grand assault lost impetus as it proceeded.)

    Sorry, here’s your soapbox back ;)…

  12. George
    Mon 07th May 2007 at 10:20 pm

    Hello, just looking over this site and having some musings and questions.

    On Sears
    Could you explain or elaborate this, particularly as it applies to his books on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg? Hooker cetainly bungled Chancellorsville, but (other than ensuring Howard’s flank was protected), not to the point he should have lost. Now, in giving up despite still having a fighting chance and then some, that’s less forgiveable.

    On Howard
    Yeah, I don’t know what Howard was thinking. Gettysburg, he at least has the excuse, such as it is, of not necessarilyk nowing that Early would come in and send Barlow’s division in disarray, but it was hardly well done.

    On Reynolds
    As far as I can tell, Reynolds is a Good General on the basis of leadership, not on the basis of his tactical prowess. Though truth be told, I can’t even come up with any off the top of my head examples of that to any unusual degree. The Army of the Potomac’s officer corps is not a very bright collection of people, even when competent, its simply ordinary feeling..

    On Jackson’s Death and New Corps Commanders
    If not Ewell and A.P. Hill, who would have any merit? Lee wrote that that Hood and Anderson would make good corps commanders “if necessary”, as I understand it, but that’s not backed up by anything I know of about their performance.

    Sorry if this seems a little long. So much to learn, so little time.

  13. Tue 22nd May 2007 at 9:37 pm

    Great stuff. My grandfather used to tell me his father, Col. Pennock Huey, “won the war for the Union” by spooking Jackson`s troops, who later shot him, with his inadvertant charge, after having stumbled across Jackson`s brigade on the plank road. I always thought my grandfather had his tongue firmly planted in his cheek but……
    I`ve got a file cabinet full of great grandfather Pennock`s papers, correspondence, etc.. One of these days I hope to get it all in some semblance of order and donate it to the Chester County Historical Society.

  14. Tue 03rd Jul 2007 at 7:58 am

    Hi Eric,
    With your and Eric`s encouragement I`ve been organizing great-grandfather Pennock Huey`s documents which include a number of letters from Gen. David Mcm. Gregg. A little digging turned up that the “McM.” stands for McMurtrie. Further research shows that his mother was a McMurtrie, making him and Pennock first cousins if I`ve sorted out the various relationships correctly. Perhaps he was somewhat of a mentor.
    Thought you`d be interested in this latest bit of trivia.

    Cheers,

    Pete

  15. Tue 03rd Jul 2007 at 5:19 pm

    Now that’s fascinating, Pete.

    David Gregg has long been a favorite of mine, as he settled in my home town of Reading, PA in the years after the war. He became one of Reading’s first citizens, and he was much loved.

    That also means that Pennock was related to Pennsylvania’s war-time governor by marriage. The governor was Andrew Gregg Curtin, and he was General Gregg’s first cousin.

    Eric

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